Fintech and Secured Transactions Systems of the Future

Syftet med den här studien var att undersöka hur pedagoger tänker kring sitt förhållningssätt i konflikter och vilka effekter de tror att förhållningssättet kan få i barngruppen. Studiens metod har varit kvalitativa intervjuer där sex pedagoger från olika förskolor har deltagit. Resultatet visade att deltagarna hela tiden reflekterar över sitt förhållningssätt till konflikter och varför konflikter uppstår. Något som alla deltagare belyste var att det är viktigt att barnen ges verktyg för att klara konflikter själva. Flera olika strategier kunde ses på hur konflikthantering går till men mycket handlar om bemötande, förklaringar och att alla i slutändan ska känna sig nöjda. Alla deltagande ansåg att konflikter är lärande men på olika plan. Bland annat handlar det om ett lärande utifrån den gemensamma respekt man bör ha mot varandra men även det sociala samspelet nämns. De slutsatser som kan dras är att konflikthantering i förskolan är en viktig del där pedagogens förhållningssätt påverkar konfliktens utgång. Att ge barnen verktyg för att klara konflikter själva ses som en bra start och en central del i konflikthantering hos deltagarna

The Bankruptcy Code’s Safe Harbors for Settlement Payments and Securities Contracts: When Is Safe \u3ci\u3eToo\u3c/i\u3e Safe?

This Article addresses insolvency law-related issues in connection with certain financial-markets contracts, such as securities contracts, commodity contracts, forward contracts, repurchase agreements (repos), swaps and other derivatives, and master netting agreements. The Bankruptcy Code provides special treatment—safe harbors—for these contracts (collectively, qualified financial contracts or QFCs). This special treatment is considerably more favorable for nondebtor parties to QFCs than the rules applicable to nondebtor parties to other contracts with a debtor. Yet even some strong critics of the safe harbors concede that some special treatment may be warranted. This Article offers a critique of the safe harbor for settlement payments, as interpreted by the courts, and the safe harbor for transfers in connection with securities contracts that is clearly written into the Bankruptcy Code. It provides an overview of the legislative history, describes the scope and operation of the statutory components of the safe harbors, briefly describes the various academic critiques, and offers my general views on revisions that should be made to the safe harbor provisions. It questions the quite expansive interpretation given by some courts to the safe harbor for settlement payments. It then explains how the safe harbor for transfers made in connection with security contracts could be used to protect from the avoidance powers payments and collateralizations of ordinary debt, transactions that have nothing to do with the QFC markets

Global Standards for Securities Holding Infrastructures: A Soft Law/Fintech Model For Reform

Intermediaries such as stockbrokers and banks are ubiquitous in global securities markets, playing essential roles in markets, including trading, settling trades, and post-settlement holding of securities. This essay focuses in particular on the roles of intermediaries in securities holding systems. It proposes an IOSCO-led “soft-law-to-hard-law” approach to the development of Global Standards for reforms to these holding systems. States would be expected to adopt “hard law” reforms through statutory and regulatory adjustments to securities holding systems. The reforms would embrace not only important standards of a functional and regulatory nature, but also holistic standards relating to the private law, insolvency law, and the technical aspects of infrastructures for securities holding systems. The Global Standards would not propose model text or even doctrinal rules, but would establish the baseline results that holding systems should achieve, such as the elimination of intermediary risk. As the principal organization for the coordination and cooperation among securities market regulators, and with a track record of producing excellent and important studies and reports, IOSCO is singularly well suited to lead the development of Global Standards. One challenge would be to confront the need for reforms to the private law. Another challenge would relate reforms of the holding infrastructures (e.g., increased transparency in holding systems). But the ongoing and increasing role of Fintech in the financial markets means that securities (and other) regulators must face these challenges in any event. Possibly the most difficult challenges would arise from within the securities industry. One could expect resistance from market participants who wish to preserve their positions and roles in the securities markets and their current and future business plans. But this is a principal reason that regulators (through IOSCO in particular) should play a leading role in the process