Religious Fundamentalism in Eight Muslim‐Majority Countries: Reconceptualization and Assessment

To capture the common features of diverse fundamentalist movements, overcome etymological variability, and assess predictors, religious fundamentalism is conceptualized as a set of beliefs about and attitudes toward religion, expressed in a disciplinarian deity, literalism, exclusivity, and intolerance. Evidence from representative samples of over 23,000 adults in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Turkey supports the conclusion that fundamentalism is stronger in countries where religious liberty is lower, religion less fractionalized, state structure less fragmented, regulation of religion greater, and the national context less globalized. Among individuals within countries, fundamentalism is linked to religiosity, confidence in religious institutions, belief in religious modernity, belief in conspiracies, xenophobia, fatalism, weaker liberal values, trust in family and friends, reliance on less diverse information sources, lower socioeconomic status, and membership in an ethnic majority or dominant religion/sect. We discuss implications of these findings for understanding fundamentalism and the need for further research.Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/146946/1/jssr12549.pdfhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/146946/2/jssr12549_am.pd

Middle Eastern Beliefs about the Causal Linkages of Development to Freedom, Democracy, and Human Rights

This paper investigates the extent to which people in five Middle Eastern countries endorse key beliefs of developmental idealism that associate development with freedom, democracy, and human rights. Developmental idealismis a set of beliefs concerning the desirability of development, the methods for achieving it, and its consequences. The literature suggests that these beliefs have diffused worldwide among elites and lay citizens and posits that when such beliefs are disseminated they become forces for social and economic changes. Although developmental idealism research has primarily examined family and demographic issues, developmental idealism has tremendous potential to influence other aspects of society. This paper extends knowledge by considering societal aspects not addressed previously in the developmental idealism literature: personal freedom, democracy, and human rights. Using survey data from Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, we investigate how publics of these countries associate development with these elements. We find that majorities believe development brings greater personal freedom, democracy, and human rights. Conversely, the data show that in four of the countries majorities believe more personal freedom contributes to development. These findings provide support for the idea that developmental idealism beliefs concerning freedom, democracy, and human rights have diffused to lay publics in these five Middle Eastern countries. We also find evidence of uniquely Islamic developmental models; a significant proportion of people in these countries believe that more religion will bring more development

Modalities of National Sovereignty: Territorial Nationalism versus Islamic Fundamentalism in Muslim-Majority Countries

I employ the concept of modality in order to capture the configurations of homogeneous elements that may exist in a heterogeneous context encompassing diverse nationalist movements. Modalities of nationalism are varied outcomes of the efforts of intellectuals to resolve issues concerning the identity of their political community, its boundaries, and the ideal political regime. A modality rests on identity and feelings of national solidarity such that changes in identity and feelings are linked in a predictable way to changes in attitudes toward other issues. I argue that the modalities of territorial nationalism, pan-Arab nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism are varied ways in which indigenous intellectual leaders resolved sociopolitical issues. I also argue that modalities have varying supports among ordinary individuals. They are clustered on and driven by identity and national pride. An analysis of data from twelve crossnational surveys carried out in ten Muslim-majority countries in 2000-2008 has shown that the change in the basis of identity from religion to territorial nation is connected to a significant increase in favorable attitudes toward gender equality, secular orientation, secular politics, Western culture, and, except in two cases, democracy, but not linked consistently to attitude

The Arab Spring and Egyptian Revolution Makers: Predictors of Participation

This paper juxtaposes two clusters of theories; political conflict, resource mobilization, organizational, and political opportunity theories, on the one hand, and mass society, structural-functional, and relative deprivation theories, on the other. It assesses their explanatory power in predicting participation in revolutionary movements. It uses survey data from a nationally representative sample of 3,143 Egyptian adults who rated their participation in the revolutionary movement against President Mubarak from 1, no participation, to 10, utmost participation. The analysis of the data identified three sets of variables that are linked to participation: attitudes against the government and attitudes in favor of alternative sociopolitical orders, individual efficacy, dysphoric emotions, and immorality; such mediums of communicative power as the Internet, mobiles, and opposition newspapers; and demographics, including being male, residing in the urban area, and living impressionable years under President Mubarak. The socioeconomic status having an inverted-U relationship with participation suggests that the revolution was led by members of the middle class. The data, however, provides support for contradictory hypotheses drawn from both clusters of theories. The analysis thus suggests rethinking about predictors of participation. This entails departing from the conception that presumes the participants as monolithic individuals rather than manifold and heterogeneous, a new look at the relationship between immorality and participation, and a refocus on the monolithic state as the unifying element in the revolutionary process. The Arab Spring and Egyptian Revolution Makers: Predictors of Participation

Measuring Fundamentalism Across the Abrahamic Faiths

We develop a scale to measure fundamentalism among the followers of the Abrahamic faiths. The scale is intended to overcome the challenges that beset the comparative analysis of the subject: variability of religious fundamentalist movements historically, cross‐nationally, and across these religions; differences in the definition of fundamentalism, and etymological ambiguity of the term. We conceptualized fundamentalism as a cluster of core orientations toward one’s and others’ religion. These orientations are categorized into four components: disciplinarian deity, inerrancy or literalism, religious exclusivity, and religious intolerance. Each component is measured by four survey questions. The 16 items make a single fundamentalism scale. We discuss the scale’s validity, and then verify its statistical and predictive validity on nationally representative samples from Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Turkey, a total of 24,758 cases.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/170272/1/jssr12730_am.pdfhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/170272/2/jssr12730.pd

Sectarianism and Counter-Sectarianism in Lebanon

In examining the social correlates of sectarianism in Lebanon, this paper first assesses the significance of two major factors. One is political and the other is cultural. It argues that the historical shift in power relations resulted in equality of power among the three major Christian, Sunni, and Shi'i political players in Lebanon. This change has thus removed the functional need for sectarianism in order to maintain the structure of power inequality. Drawing on data from a 2008 world values survey in Lebanon, the paper also shows that on the cultural level, the differences in Lebanese attitudes and value orientations toward historically significance issues do not quite fall on the confessional fault-lines, although Christians and Muslims differ significantly in their attitudes toward gender relations as well as religious fundamentalism. The paper then has identified the sets of factors that either reinforce or attenuate sectarian attitudes among the Lebanese public. Sectarianism is reinforced by religious fundamentalism and foreign intervention. Counter-sectarianism, on the other hand, is enhanced by inter-confessional trust and support for liberal values

The Youth, Emotional Energy, and Political Violence: The Cases of Egypt and Saudi Arabia

This project intends to explore and explain the values and sociopolitical and cultural attitudes of young Egyptians and Saudis. In order to gather this information the project focuses on four general areas of values. The first area looks at the sources of epistemic authorities that the youths rely on in forming opinions about various social and cultural issues and deciding their career. The second area looks at the extent to which the youth are aware of developmental ideas. The third area looks at the youths’ orientations toward such issues as the relationship between religion and politics, forms of government, Western culture, and social status of women. Finally, the fourth area looks at the youths’ religiosity and attitudes toward religion. To analyze these four areas researchers conducted face-to-face interviews with 18 to 25 year old youths from Egypt (in the cities of Cairo, Alexandria, and El-Minya) and from Saudi Arabia (in the cities of Jeddah, Riyadh, and Dammam/Khobar). The research was supported by the United States Institute of Peace, the Mellon Foundation, and Eastern Michigan University