The moral fallibility of Spinoza’s exemplars : exploring the educational value of imperfect models of human behavior

The purpose of moral exemplarism is to render moral theory practically functional. It deals with how to make virtue theories about what is good for us work, and with being able to ground one’s account of virtue in a realistic understanding of human nature and of the cognitive mechanisms that govern human action. According to Linda Zagzebski’s conception of moral exemplarism, exemplars are to be understood as ‘supremely admirable persons who show us the upper reaches of human capability, and in doing so, inspire us to expect more from ourselves’ (Zagzebski, 2017, p. 1). From the point of view of Spinoza’s philosophy, the problem with hinging a practical moral theory on the emulation of “supremely admirable persons” is that it becomes an inefficient (perhaps even counter-productive) pedagogical tool insofar as it betrays a false (highly idealized) understanding of human nature. While Spinoza extrapolates on the traits of a supremely admirable person in the propositions on the “free man” in Ethics IV, this account does not seem to be intended to function as a pedagogical tool of practical relevance. Hence, it does not seem to correspond to the purpose of moral exemplarism. If we look for that kind of practical guidance, Spinoza’s political works seem more relevant. Interestingly, when we approach Spinoza’s political theory with moral exemplarism in mind, we find that instead of constructing his exemplar on the idea of a supremely admirable person, he emphasizes the concept of ingenium to chisel out an imperfect model of human behavior. The purpose for this seems to be to avoid a utopian and inefficient political theory and to work out a moral practice that is capable of assisting people (regardless of societal context and level of understanding) in ethical self-transformation

The moral fallibility of Spinoza's exemplars : Exploring the educational value of imperfect models of human behavior

While Spinoza stipulates an ideal moral person in the propositions on the ‘free man’ in Ethics IV, this account does not seem to be intended to function as a pedagogical tool of political relevance. Hence, it does not seem to correspond to the purpose of moral exemplarism. If we look for that kind of practical guidance, Spinoza’s political works seem more relevant. Interestingly, when we approach Spinoza’s political theory with moral exemplarism in mind, we find that instead of constructing his exemplar on the idea of a supremely moral person, he emphasizes the concept of ingenium to chisel out an imperfect model of human behavior. We argue that the purpose of this is to avoid a utopian and inefficient political theory and to work out a moral practice that is capable of assisting people and communities in ethical self-transformation

'Needle and Stick' save the world: Sustainable development and the universal child

This text deals with a problem concerning processes of the productive power of knowledge. We draw on so called poststructural theories challenging the classical image of thought – as hinged upon a representational logic identifying entities in a rigid sense – when formulating a problem concerning the gap between knowledge and the object of knowledge. More specifically we are looking at this problem in the contexts of sustainable development and childhood using illustrating examples in order to test the validity of these theoretical accounts. The examples we use range from internationally agreed documents claiming universality concerning environmental protection and childhood to national curricula for the pre-school to a Swedish governmentally produced and distributed TV-series called Needle and Stick save the world, addressing the issue of sustainable development. In short, we wish to problematise the rigid positions of the child and the human being in relation to natur

Evaluating life: Working with ethical dilemmas in education for sustainable development

Codifications of human rights are widely understood as politically established instruments for evaluating human life. The call for such an apparatus emerges as a response to the age-old problem of social organization, constituting – in extension – a means by which to cope with the overall problem of survival. However, evaluating life is inherently problematic. It is problematic as it presupposes an already existing framework by which to judge all instances of life. In a way then, the impartial evaluation of life seems impossible from a human point of view. Nevertheless, as the problem of survival is one of continuous relevance, attempts to formulate reasonable variables may be viewed as a necessary strategy for organizing a viable society. We aim at investigating the problem of codifying evaluations of life by looking at paradigmatic examples from the discourse of education for sustainable development, using a theoretical framework drawing on the ethics of Nietzsche and Deleuze in particular

International Environmental Law and the Search for Harmony with Nature: A Critical Inquiry into the Metaphysical Underpinnings of the Legal Discourse on Environmental Protection

For some time now, the world in general and international law in particular have witnessed one and the same widespread call for action. Both public and private interests claim that present-day standards and technology have proven insufficient for saving the natural environment. From this claim has emerged a call that entreats us to approach the problem of the deteriorating natural environment by including nature into our moral considerations. The current study focuses on analyzing what is arguably one of the most influential and widely recognized expressions of this call for action: the report series entitled Harmony with Nature: Report of the Secretary General. The study aims to argue that the Reports’ outline of a new ethics can be understood as being underpinned by the metaphysical system of early rationalist Benedict Spinoza. Given Spinoza’s understanding of nature and morality, however, there is reason to critically evaluate the plausibility of naturalizing international environmental law, as requested by the reports. The rationale behind the present study is therefore to (1) provide a thorough review of Spinoza’s metaphysical philosophy so as to arrive at an adequate understanding of his ethics and moral theory, and (2) evaluate international environmental law in light of this understanding so as to be able to assess the practical effects of including nature into the moral considerations of the international legal order