Hospital Financing and the Development and Adoption of New Technologies

We study the influence of different reimbursement systems, namely Prospective Payment System, Cost Based Reimbursement System and Mixed Reimbursement System on the development and adoption of different technologies with an endogenous supply of these technologies. We focus our analysis on technology development and adoption under two models: private R&D and R&D within the hospital. One of the major findings is that the optimal reimbursement system is a pure Prospective Payment System or a Mixed Reimbursement System depending on the market structure.Prospective Payment System; Cost Based Reimbursement; R&D

Reference Pricing Versus Co-Payment in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Firm's Pricing Strategies

Within a horizontally differentiation model and allowing for heterogeneous qualities, we analyze the effects of reference pricing reimbursement on firms’ pricing strategies. With this analysis we find inherent incentives for firms’ pricing behaviour, and consequently we shed some light on time consistency of such policy. The analysis encompasses different reference price rules. Results show that if drugs have equal quality, reference pricing may lead to higher prices. With quality differentiation both the minimum and linear policies unambiguously lead to higher prices.

Optimal Contracts and Contractual Arrangements Within the Hospital: Bargaining vs. Take-it-or-leave-it Offers

We study the impact of different contractual arrangements within the hospital on the optimal contracts designed by third party payers when severity is hospital's private information. We develop a multi-issue bargaining process between doctors and managers within the hospital. Results are then compared with a scenario where doctors and managers decide independently by maximizing their own profit, with managers proposing to doctors a take-it-or leave-it offer. Results show that, when the cost of capital is sufficiently low, the informational rent arising on information asymmetry is higher in a set up where managers and doctors decide together through a strategic bargaining process than when they act as two decision-making units.Strategic Bargaining; Optimal Contracts; Hospitals; Asymmetric Information

Reference Pricing Versus Co-Payment in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Price, Quality and Market Coverage

Within a horizontally differentiation model, we analyse the relative effects of reference pricing and copayment reimbursement on firms pricing and quality strategies as well as on market coverage under different market structures: competitive market, local monopolies and exogenous full market coverage. Results allow us to shed some light on the welfare and total drug expenditure implications of different drug reimbursement policies.Reference Pricing; Co-payment; Product Differentiation

Price Adjustment in the Hospital Sector

Prospective payment systems are currently used in many OECD countries, where hospitals are paid a fixed price for each patient treated. We develop a theoretical model to analyse the properties of the optimal fixed prices to be paid to hospitals when no lump-sum transfers are allowed and when the price can differ across providers to reflect observable exogenous differences in costs (for example land, building and staff costs). We find that: a) when the marginal benefit from treatment is decreasing and the cost function is the (commonly used) power function, the optimal price adjustment for hospitals with higher costs is positive but partial; if the marginal benefit from treatment is constant, then the price is identical across providers; b) if the cost function is exponential, then the price adjustment is positive even when the marginal benefit from treatment is constant; c) the optimal price is lower when lump-sum transfers are not allowed, compared to when they are allowed; d) higher inequality aversion of the purchaser is associated with an increase in the price for the high-cost providers and a reduction in the price of the low-cost providers.Price adjustment, Hospitals, DRGs.

Price regulation of pluralistic markets subject to provider collusion

We analyse incentives for collusive behaviour when heterogeneous providers are faced with regulated prices under two forms of yardstick competition, namely discriminatory and uniform schemes. Providers are heterogeneous in the degree to which their interests correspond to those of the regulator, with close correspondence labelled altruism. Deviation of interests may arise as a result of de-nationalisation or when private providers enter predominantly public markets. We assess how provider strategies and incentives to collude relate to provider characteristics and across different market structures. We differentiate between “pure” markets with either only self-interested providers or with only altruistic providers and “pluralistic” markets with a mix of provider type. We find that the incentive for collusion under a discriminatory scheme increases in the degree to which markets are self-interested whereas under a uniform scheme the likelihood increases in the degree of provider homogeneity. Providers’ choice of cost also depends on the yardstick scheme and market structure. In general, costs are higher under the uniform scheme, reflecting its weaker incentives. In a pluralistic market under the discriminatory scheme each provider’s choice of cost is decreasing in the degree of the other provider’s altruism, so a self-interested provider will operate at a lower cost than an altruistic provider. Under the uniform scheme providers always choose to operate at the same cost. The prospect of defection serves to moderate the chosen level of operating cost.

The incentive effects of payment by results

Recently the English NHS has introduced an activity-based payment scheme for secondary care - the Payment by Results (PbR) policy. In this paper we discuss, from an economic perspective, the main intended and unintended incentives created by this policy. We also outline the role of different NHS institutions in monitoring and analysing the impact of PbR and consider the information and data requirements for such tasks.

Establishing a Fair Playing Field for Payment by Results

The English government has encouraged private providers – known as Independent Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs) – to treat publicly funded (NHS) patients. Providers are paid a fixed price per patient treated, adjusted to reflect geographical differences in input costs. But there may be other legitimate cost variations between providers. This report considers the regulatory and production-process constraints that could cause public and private providers costs to differ. Most of these exogenous cost differentials can be rectified by adjustments to the regulatory system or to the payment method. We find evidence that ISTCs are treating different types of patients than NHS hospitals. If these differences drive costs, payments for treatment might need to be differentiated by setting.

Waiting time at health facilities and social class: Evidence from the Indian caste system.

Waiting time for non-emergency medical care in developing countries is rarely of immediate concern to policy makers that prioritize provision of basic health services. However, waiting time as a measure of health system responsiveness is important because longer waiting times worsen health outcomes and affect utilization of services. Studies that assess socio-economic inequalities in waiting time provide evidence from developed countries such as England and the United States; evidence from developing countries is lacking. In this paper, we assess the relationship between social class i.e. caste of an individual and waiting time at health facilities-a client orientation dimension of responsiveness. We use household level data from two rounds of the Indian Human Development Survey with a sample size of 27,251 households in each wave (2005 and 2012) and find that lower social class is associated with higher waiting time. This relationship is significant for individuals that visited a male provider but not so for those that visited a female provider. Further, caste is positively related to higher waiting time only if visiting a private facility; for individuals visiting a government facility the relationship between waiting time and caste is not significant. In general, caste related inequality in waiting time has worsened over time. The results are robust to different specifications and the inclusion of several confounders