30 research outputs found
Lâindignation, le mĂ©pris et le pardon dans lâĂ©mergence du cadre lĂ©gal dâOccupy Geneva
Cet article sâintĂ©resse au problĂšme de la maintenance, câest-Ă -dire au moment oĂč les membres dâun collectif social tentent dâassurer dans le temps lâexistence de leur collectif en instituant des rĂšgles pour rĂ©guler leurs comportements. Ce problĂšme se pose avec acuitĂ© lorsque certains membres ne respectent pas ces rĂšgles communes. Pour maintenir la coopĂ©ration sociale, les membres peuvent dĂ©cider dâinstituer des rĂšgles secondaires visant Ă sanctionner les transgressions des rĂšgles primaires dĂ©jĂ Ă©tablies. La maintenance dâun collectif peut ainsi reposer sur lâĂ©mergence de pouvoirs dĂ©ontiques qui donnent aux membres lâautoritĂ© de lĂ©gitimement punir et expulser les transgresseurs. Mais dâoĂč viennent ces rĂšgles ? On peut penser quâelles Ă©mergent des Ă©motions Ă©prouvĂ©es par les membres envers les transgresseurs. Je le dĂ©montre Ă lâaide dâune Ă©tude de cas qui Ă©tablit que, dans le collectif Occupy Geneva, lâinstitutionnalisation de normes pour punir, exclure et rĂ©intĂ©grer les dĂ©viants sâancraient respectivement dans lâindignation, le mĂ©pris et le pardon.
This article focuses on the problem of maintenance; that is the moment when the members of a social collective attempt to ensure the existence of their collective over time by instituting rules to regulate their behavior. This problem becomes critical when certain members do not respect the common rules. To maintain social cooperation, members can decide to institute secondary rules aimed at sanctioning the transgressions of the already established primary rules. The maintenance of a collective can thus rely on the emergence of deontic powers that give members the authority to legitimately punish and expel transgressors. But where do these rules come from? The hypothesis is that they emerge from the emotions felt by the members towards the transgressors. I show this with the help of a case study, which establishes that the institutionalization of norms allowing the punishment, the exclusion, and the reintegration of deviants within the âOccupy Genevaâ collective, was grounded in indignation, contempt, and forgiveness respectively
Emotions, Language and the (Un-)making of the Social World
What are the motivational bases that help explain the various normative judgements that social agents make, and the normative reasoning they employ? Answering this question leads us to consider the relationships between thoughts and emotions. Emotions will be described as thought-dependent and thought-directing, and as being intimately related to normativity. They are conceived as the grounds that motivate social agents to articulate their reasoning with respect to the values and norms they face and/or share in their social collective. It is argued that because they are modes of thinking, emotions generate cognitive activities that relate to the making of evaluative and deontic judgements, the utterance of speech acts, the mastering of normative concepts and the building of arguments. Furthermore, each type of emotion generates its own constitutive judgements and structures normative thinking according to its own logic. The main thesis is that emotions provide sociological explanations for social agentsâ thinking and speech, for emotions are precisely what motivate and, especially, structure normative reasoning and language. Being observable in language, emotions allow us to explain a) how social subjects reason and argue through norms and values, and b) how social subjects through their speech acts can contribute to the (un-)making of the social world
Jalousie
On conçoit souvent la jalousie comme une Ă©motion ayant pour objet les relations de proximitĂ© (amour, amitiĂ©, fratrie, etc.). Elle a gĂ©nĂ©ralement mauvaise presse et est typiquement envisagĂ©e comme une Ă©motion moralement condamnable, voire comme un vice. Or, la jalousie ne porte pas uniquement sur les relations de proximitĂ© : elle peut Ă©galement porter sur divers biens (prestige, richesses, biens matĂ©riels, privilĂšges, etc.). Par ailleurs, certains auteurs soutiennent que des cas de jalousie pourraient ĂȘtre moralement justifiĂ©s, voire que la jalousie pourrait ĂȘtre une vertu. La jalousie paraĂźt Ă©galement jouer un rĂŽle dans lâinstitution et le maintien dâinstitutions visant Ă perpĂ©tuer des inĂ©galitĂ©s entre les individus jaloux de leurs avantages et ceux quâils envisagent comme des concurrents cherchant Ă les dĂ©possĂ©der de leurs biens. De fait, la jalousie paraĂźt utile pour la thĂ©orie politique de par les liens quâelle entretient avec la justice distributive. Cet article propose, dans la premiĂšre section, une discussion portant sur la nature de la jalousie oĂč elle est contrastĂ©e avec lâenvie et lâindignation. Dans la seconde section, on se demandera si la jalousie est un vice, ou si elle peut ĂȘtre parfois moralement justifiĂ©e, ou mĂȘme ĂȘtre une vertu. La troisiĂšme section traitera les rĂŽles jouĂ©s par la jalousie collective dans la justice distributive et la fondation et le maintien dâinstitutions sociales visant Ă protĂ©ger les intĂ©rĂȘts des jaloux. Pour le faire, le cas de la jalousie Ă©conomique, telle que David Hume et Adam Smith la concevaient dans les relations commerciales entre Ătats europĂ©ens au XVIIIĂšme siĂšcle, est considĂ©rĂ©
Lâindignation : ses variĂ©tĂ©s et ses rĂŽles dans la rĂ©gulation sociale
Quâest-ce que lâindignation ? Cette Ă©motion est souvent conçue comme une Ă©motion morale quâune tierce-partie Ă©prouve vis-Ă -vis des injustices quâun agent inflige Ă un patient. Lâindignation aurait ainsi trait aux injustices et serait Ă©prouvĂ©e par des individus qui nâen seraient eux-mĂȘmes pas victimes. Cette Ă©motion motiverait la tierce-partie indignĂ©e Ă tenter de rĂ©guler lâinjustice en lâannulant et en punissant son auteur. Cet article entreprend de montrer que cette conception de lâindignation nâest que partielle. En effet, lâindignation ne porte pas que sur les injustices, mais plus gĂ©nĂ©ralement sur les torts injustifiĂ©s. Ce faisant, lâindignation peut ĂȘtre une Ă©motion morale, mais aussi une Ă©motion conventionnelle ou esthĂ©tique. De plus, elle peut ĂȘtre Ă©prouvĂ©e par les individus victime des torts : elle nâest pas uniquement Ă©prouvĂ©e par des tierces-parties. De la sorte, les individus indignĂ©s qui subissent les torts peuvent eux-mĂȘmes chercher Ă les annuler et Ă punir leurs auteurs. Puisquâelle peut ĂȘtre Ă©prouvĂ©e tant par des spectateurs que par les personnes qui subissent les torts et quâelle incline ceux qui lâĂ©prouvent Ă faire appel Ă dâautres personnes pour rĂ©guler ces torts, lâindignation vĂ©cue individuellement est partageable : elle peut devenir une Ă©motion collective jouant un rĂŽle fondamental dans la rĂ©gulation sociale en contribuant au renforcement de normes sociales existantes ou Ă lâĂ©mergence de nouvelles normes sociales associĂ©es aux idĂ©es du juste prĂ©valant dans la sociĂ©tĂ© considĂ©rĂ©e
Les Ămotions dans l'internalisation et l'Ă©mergence des normes sociales
Cet article sâintĂ©resse aux Ă©motions dans lâinternalisation et lâĂ©mergence des normes sociales. Nous y montrons comment les normes sociales ont un impact sur les Ă©motions et comment les Ă©motions ont un impact sur les normes sociales. Pour le faire, trois approches complĂ©mentaires mais souvent traitĂ©es indĂ©pendamment les unes des autres dans la littĂ©rature scientifique sont discutĂ©es. La premiĂšre a trait Ă la façon dont les normes sociales (les normes Ă©motionnelles) rĂ©gulent les Ă©motions. Cette rĂ©gulation se comprend comme lâinternalisation de la normativitĂ© sociale dans les membres dâune sociĂ©tĂ© : les normes Ă©motionnelles contribuent Ă la fabrique des dispositions Ă©motionnelles des membres qui sâajustent aux normes et aux valeurs valant dans leur sociĂ©tĂ©. La deuxiĂšme approche a trait au rĂŽle des Ă©motions dans le soutien aux normes sociales. Une fois que lâinternalisation des normes et des valeurs est opĂ©rĂ©e et que les membres ont dĂ©veloppĂ© une sensibilitĂ© affective aux normes et aux valeurs de leur collectif, les Ă©motions peuvent opĂ©rer comme des rĂ©gulateurs des comportements : les Ă©motions font que les membres se conforment aux normes et aux valeurs. Les normes internalisĂ©es suscitent des rĂ©actions Ă©motionnelles qui contribuent au maintien de lâordre normatif. La troisiĂšme approche affirme que les Ă©motions contribuent Ă lâĂ©mergence des normes sociales et des valeurs dans une sociĂ©tĂ© donnĂ©e. En ce sens, les Ă©motions peuvent contribuer Ă la transformation de lâordre normatif. Il sâagit donc de la fabrique de la sociĂ©tĂ©
Bridging the Gap between Rationality, Normativity, and Emotions
Intentional explanation, according to Elster, seeks to elucidate an action by showing that it was intentionally conducted, in order to bring about certain goals . Intentional actions furthermore, are rational actions: they imply that agents establish a connection between the goals they target and the means that are appropriate to reach them, by way of different beliefs about the means, the goals and the environment. But how should we understand intentional actions in the light of philosophical research on emotions, rationality, and normativity? This question is the departure point of this article. Various philosophers have analyzed the relationships between rationality and emotion, those between emotion and normativity, and those between emotion and intentional action. Nonetheless, their theses are scattered and do not offer an integrative view on how rationality, normativity and emotions work from the standpoint of intentional explanation. By using de Sousaâs distinction between the epistemic and the strategic modes of rationality as a theoretical framework, this article proposes therefore to remedy this deficit by unifying these philosophical insights with the goal of elaborating a theory of intentional explanation which brings together rationality, normativity and emotions
Rationality, Normativity, and Emotions: An Assessment of Max Weberâs Typology of Social Action
A view inherited from Max Weber states that purposive rational action, value rational action and affective action are three distinct types of social action that can compete, oppose, complement or substitute each other in social explanations. Contrary to this statement, I will defend the view that these do not constitute three different types of social actions, but that social actions always seem to concurrently involve rationality, normativity and affectivity. I show this by discussing the links between rational actions and consequentialism and non-consequentialism, and by elaborating on certain major relationships between rationality, normativity and emotions
From Indignation to Norms Against Violence in Occupy Geneva: A Case Study for the Problem of the Emergence of Norms
Why and how do norms emerge? Which norms emerge and why these ones in
particular? Such questions belong to the âproblem of the emergence of normsâ, which consists of an inquiry into the production of norms in social collectives. I address this question through the ethnographic study of the emergence of ânorms against violenceâ in the political collective Occupy Geneva. I do this, first, empirically, with the analysis of my field observations; and, second, theoretically, by discussing my findings. In consequence of two episodes categorized as sexual assaults that occurred in their camp, the members of Occupy Geneva decided to tackle those issues in a general assembly. Their goal was to amend their first charter of good conduct in order to reform its norms and complete it with norms aiming to regulate âfactsâ of âunjustified violenceâ. During a collective deliberation, new norms were devised, debated and consensually adopted. The writing of the new charter took place in a second general assembly during which the wording of the written norms was collectively decided. I show that indignation over the sexual assaults was the main motive that led to the collective deliberation, and that the entire process of the making of these norms was characterized by different collective emotions.
Indeed, indignation, contempt and fear played major roles in the emergence of norms prohibiting violence, allowing punishment and exclusion of wrongdoers, and prescribing collective intervention against an aggressor to neutralize the threat represented. These findings prompt me to hypothesize that social norms emerge from emotions thanks to the lattersâ internal structure; and that emotions provide causal and grounding explanations for this emergence. Thus, emotions allow us to answer the questions: âWhy do norms emerge?â and âWhy do they have their specific forms?â In short, I argue that social norms have emotional foundations
A 2-month field cohort study of SARS-CoV-2 in saliva of BNT162b2 vaccinated nursing home workers
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