The evolution and development of visual perspective taking

I outline three conceptions of seeing that a creature might possess: ‘the headlamp conception,’ which involves an understanding of the causal connections between gazing at an object, certain mental states, and behavior; ‘the stage lights conception,’ which involves an understanding of the selective nature of visual attention; and seeing-as. I argue that infants and various nonhumans possess the headlamp conception. There is also evidence that chimpanzees and 3-year-old children have some grasp of seeing-as. However, due to a dearth of studies, there is no evidence that infants or nonhumans possess the stage lights conception of seeing. I outline the kinds of experiments that are needed, and what we stand to learn about the evolution and development of perspective taking

On the theory of laminar boundary layers involving separation

This paper presents a mathematical discussion of the laminar boundary layer, which was developed with a view of facilitating the investigation of those boundary layers in particular for which the phenomenon of separation occurs. The treatment starts with a slight modification of the form of the boundary layer equation first published by Von Mises. Two approximate solutions of this equation are found, one of which is exact at the outer edge of the boundary layer while the other is exact at the wall. The final solution is obtained by joining these two solutions at the inflection points of the velocity profiles. The final solution is given in terms of a series of universal functions for a fairly broad class of potential velocity distributions outside of the boundary layer. Detailed calculations of the boundary layer characteristics are worked out for the case in which the potential velocity is a linear function of the distance from the upstream stagnation point. Finally, the complete separation point characteristics are determined for the boundary layer associated with a potential velocity distribution made up of two linear functions of the distance from the stagnation point. It appears that extensions of the detailed calculations to more complex potential flows can be fairly easily carried out by using the explicit formulae given in the paper

A Unifying Theory of Biological Function

A new theory that naturalizes biological function is explained and compared with earlier etiological and causal role theories. Etiological theories explain functions from how they are caused over their evolutionary history. Causal role theories analyze how functional mechanisms serve the current capacities of their containing system. The new proposal unifies the key notions of both kinds of theories, but goes beyond them by explaining how functions in an organism can exist as factors with autonomous causal efficacy. The goal-directedness and normativity of functions exist in this strict sense as well. The theory depends on an internal physiological or neural process that mimics an organism’s fitness, and modulates the organism’s variability accordingly. The structure of the internal process can be subdivided into subprocesses that monitor specific functions in an organism. The theory matches well with each intuition on a previously published list of intuited ideas about biological functions, including intuitions that have posed difficulties for other theories

Decision and Discovery in Defining “Disease”

This version (May 17, 2005) was published in its final form as: Schwartz PH. Decision and discovery in defining 'disease'. In: Kincaid H, McKitrick J, editors. Establishing medical reality: essays in the metaphysics and epistemology of biomedical science. Dordrecht: Springer; 2007. p. 47-63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-5216-2_5The debate over how to analyze the concept of disease has often centered on the question of whether to include a reference to values, in particular the ‘disvalue’of diseases, or whether to avoid such notions. ‘Normativists,’such as King ([1954], 1981) and Culver and Gert (1982) emphasize the undesirability of diseases, while ‘Naturalists,’ most prominently Christopher Boorse (1977, 1987, 1997), instead require just the presence of biological dysfunction. The debate between normativism and naturalism often deteriorates into stalemate, with each side able to point out significant problems with the other. It starts to look as if neither approach can work. In this paper, I argue that the standoff stems from deeply questionable assumptions that have been used to formulate the opposing positions and guide the debate. In the end, I propose an alternative set of guidelines that offer a more constructive way to devise and compare theories

Casting Light Upon The Great Endarkenment

While the Enlightenment promoted thinking for oneself independent of religious authority, the ‘Endarkenment’ (Millgram 2015) concerns deference to a new authority: the specialist, a hyperspecializer. Non-specialists need to defer to such authorities as they are unable to understand their reasoning. Millgram describes how humans are capable of being serial hyperspecializers, able to move from one specialism to another. We support the basic thrust of Millgram’s position, and seek to articulate how the core idea is deployed in very different ways in relation to extremely different philosophical areas. We attend to the issue of the degree of isolation of different specialists and we urge greater emphasis on parallel hyperspecialization, which describes how different specialisms can be embodied in one person at one time

Tomonaga-Luttinger features in the resonant Raman spectra of quantum wires

The differential cross section for resonant Raman scattering from the collective modes in a one dimensional system of interacting electrons is calculated non-perturbatively using the bosonization method. The results indicate that resonant Raman spectroscopy is a powerful tool for studying Tomonaga-Luttinger liquid behaviour in quasi-one dimensional electron systems.Comment: 4 pages, no figur

Ambiguous figures and the content of experience

Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual. I propose a counterexample to this form of representationalism that arises from the phenomenon of Gestalt switching, which occurs when viewing ambiguous figures. First, I argue that one does not need to appeal to the conceptual content of experience or to judgements to account for Gestalt switching. I then argue that experiences of certain ambiguous figures are problematic because they have different phenomenal characters but that no difference in the nonconceptual content of these experiences can be identified. I consider three solutions to this problem that have been proposed by both philosophers and psychologists and conclude that none can account for all the ambiguous figures that pose the problem. I conclude that the onus is on representationalists to specify the relevant difference in content or to abandon their position