Employment rate prognosis on the basis of the development environment trend displayed by years-clusters

The authors analyze the dynamics of the employment rate in Romania and propose a forecast model for it. In the paper we start with the hypothesis that the dynamics of the employment rate has a specific trend displayed by years-clusters differentiated on the value and the sign of the dynamics indexes of the phenomena by which we define the economic environment. The forecast method that we propose takes into consideration the environment conditions in which the studied phenomenon evolves and it implies the use of statistical methods of multivariate analysis (Principal Component Analysis and Discriminant Analysis). The application of such a forecast method supposes an algorithm that implies several stages: (1) the evaluation and synthesis of the inter-relations among the phenomena by which we describe the development environment employment rate dynamics; (2) the identification of the years-cluster to which the desired forecast horizon is classified; (3) the estimation of the employment rate dynamics for the specified forecast horizon. The proposed forecast model, examining the development environment of the influence factors, may be used for simulating forecast alternatives that can be considered for founding the economic development strategies.employment rate, transition, Romania, influence factors, principal component analysis, discriminant analysis

Economic Development and Time Use in Romania’s Regions

Time plays a proeminent role in development of a knowledge based society, in a context of changing rhythms of work, ageing of the European population, changing family structures and greater sensitiveness to time issues among European citizens. In this contribution we highlight the manner time is used for economic activities in Romania and situate it in the context of European employment strategies (Luxemburg 1997, the Lisbon and Barcelona summits in 2000 and 2001). We focus on differences existing between the Romanian regions and on the economic consequences of different patterns in time use

Economic Development and Time Use in Romania’s Regions

Time plays a proeminent role in development of a knowledge based society, in a context of changing rhythms of work, ageing of the European population, changing family structures and greater sensitiveness to time issues among European citizens. In this contribution we highlight the manner time is used for economic activities in Romania and situate it in the context of European employment strategies (Luxemburg 1997, the Lisbon and Barcelona summits in 2000 and 2001). We focus on differences existing between the Romanian regions and on the economic consequences of different patterns in time use

A game theoretic approach of war with financial influences

During history, an aggressive country seeks to force non-aggressive countries to made many concessions based on military force. In our paper we discuss the situation that one aggressive country is dissatisfied with its current position and try to obtain more concessions from a rival country. To analyze this situation we use a game theory dynamic model in complete and incomplete information. We analyze the countries behavior depending especially on aggressive or non-aggressive strategies and also on battle power. In this context we found conditions to obtain separating and pooling equilibriums for dynamic games in incomplete information. Main result shows that countries behavior depends especially on war costs and on country military power. There are many applications of these types of models, like in Israel - Palestinian war, recent Russian- Georgian conflict or US defense policy

A game theoretic approach of war with financial influences

During history, an aggressive country seeks to force non-aggressive countries to made many concessions based on military force. In our paper we discuss the situation that one aggressive country is dissatisfied with its current position and try to obtain more concessions from a rival country. To analyze this situation we use a game theory dynamic model in complete and incomplete information. We analyze the countries behavior depending especially on aggressive or non-aggressive strategies and also on battle power. In this context we found conditions to obtain separating and pooling equilibriums for dynamic games in incomplete information. Main result shows that countries behavior depends especially on war costs and on country military power. There are many applications of these types of models, like in Israel - Palestinian war, recent Russian- Georgian conflict or US defense policy

Spiking neurons with short-term synaptic plasticity form superior generative networks

Spiking networks that perform probabilistic inference have been proposed both as models of cortical computation and as candidates for solving problems in machine learning. However, the evidence for spike-based computation being in any way superior to non-spiking alternatives remains scarce. We propose that short-term plasticity can provide spiking networks with distinct computational advantages compared to their classical counterparts. In this work, we use networks of leaky integrate-and-fire neurons that are trained to perform both discriminative and generative tasks in their forward and backward information processing paths, respectively. During training, the energy landscape associated with their dynamics becomes highly diverse, with deep attractor basins separated by high barriers. Classical algorithms solve this problem by employing various tempering techniques, which are both computationally demanding and require global state updates. We demonstrate how similar results can be achieved in spiking networks endowed with local short-term synaptic plasticity. Additionally, we discuss how these networks can even outperform tempering-based approaches when the training data is imbalanced. We thereby show how biologically inspired, local, spike-triggered synaptic dynamics based simply on a limited pool of synaptic resources can allow spiking networks to outperform their non-spiking relatives.Comment: corrected typo in abstrac

Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations

Our paper considers a “negotiation game” between two players which combines the features of two-players alternating offers bargaining and repeated games. Generally, the negotiation game in general admits a large number of equilibriums but some of which involve delay and inefficiency. Thus, complexity and bargaining in tandem may offer an explanation for cooperation and efficiency in repeated games. The Folk Theorem of repeated games is a very used result that shows if players are enough patience then it is possible to obtain a cooperative equilibrium of the infinite repeated game. We proof a new folk theorem for finitely repeated games and also we find new conditions (under stage number and minimum discount factor value) such that players cooperate at least one period in cooperative-punishment repeated games. Finally we present a study-case for Cournot oligopoly situation for n enterprises behavior under finitely and infinitely repeated negotiations. We found for this situation discount factor depends only on players number, not on different player’s payoffs

Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations

Our paper considers a “negotiation game” between two players which combines the features of two-players alternating offers bargaining and repeated games. Generally, the negotiation game in general admits a large number of equilibriums but some of which involve delay and inefficiency. Thus, complexity and bargaining in tandem may offer an explanation for cooperation and efficiency in repeated games. The Folk Theorem of repeated games is a very used result that shows if players are enough patience then it is possible to obtain a cooperative equilibrium of the infinite repeated game. We proof a new folk theorem for finitely repeated games and also we find new conditions (under stage number and minimum discount factor value) such that players cooperate at least one period in cooperative-punishment repeated games. Finally we present a study-case for Cournot oligopoly situation for n enterprises behavior under finitely and infinitely repeated negotiations. We found for this situation discount factor depends only on players number, not on different player’s payoffs