1,057 research outputs found
Moral exemplars in education: a liberal account
This paper takes issue with the exemplarist strategy of fostering virtue development with the specific goal of improving its applicability in the context of education. I argue that, for what matters educationally, we have good reasons to endorse a liberal account of moral exemplarity. Specifically, I challenge two key assumptions of Linda Zagzebskiâs Exemplarist Moral Theory (2017), namely that moral exemplars are exceptionally virtuous agents and that imitating their behavior is the main strategy for acquiring the virtues. I will introduce and discuss the notions of enkratic exemplars and injustice illuminators and show that we have good reasons to consider them moral exemplars although they fail to satisfy (either of) the key assumptions
On What it Takes to be an Expert
This paper tackles the problem of defining what a cognitive expert is. Starting from a shared intuition that the definition of an expert depends upon the conceptual function of expertise, I shed light on two main approaches to the notion of an expert: according to novice-oriented accounts of expertise, experts need to provide laypeople with information they lack in some domain; whereas, according to research-oriented accounts, experts need to contribute to the epistemic progress of their discipline. In this paper, I defend the thesis that cognitive experts should be identified by their ability to perform the latter function rather than the former, as novice-oriented accounts, unlike research-oriented ones, fail to comply with the rules of a functionalist approach to expertise
For A Service Conception of Epistemic Authority: A Collective Approach
This paper attempts to provide a remedy to a surprising lacuna in the current discussion in the epistemology of expertise, namely the lack of a theory accounting for the epistemic authority of collective agents. After introducing a service conception of epistemic authority based on Alvin Goldmanâs account of a cognitive expert, I argue that this service conception is well suited to account for the epistemic authority of collective bodies on a non-summativist perspective, and I show in detail how the defining requirements of an expert can apply to epistemic groups
Epistemic Paternalism, Personal Sovereignty, and Oneâs Own Good
A recent paper by Bullock (2018) raises a dilemma for proponents of epistemic paternalism. If epistemic paternalists contend that epistemic improvements contribute to oneâs wellbeing, then their view conflates with general paternalism. Instead, if they appeal to the notion of a distinctive epistemic value, their view is unjustified, in that concerns about epistemic value fail to outweigh concerns about personal sovereignty. In this chapter, I address Bullockâs challenge in a way that safeguards the legitimacy of epistemic paternalism, albeit restricting its scope to a limited range of cognitive projects. After shedding light on a problem with how Bullock singles out cases to which the dilemma applies, I argue that there is at least one reasonable way of interpreting the notion of âpersonal autonomyâ which legitimates and justifies undertaking epistemically paternalistic interferences for oneâs epistemic good
Testing Whatâs at Stake: Defending Stakes Effects for Testimony
This paper investigates whether practical interests affect knowledge attributions in cases of testimony. It is argued that stakes impact testimonial knowledge attributions by increasing or decreasing the requirements for hearers to trust speakers and thereby gain the epistemic right to acquire knowledge via testimony. Standard, i.e. invariantist, reductionism and non-reductionism fail to provide a plausible account of testimony that is stakes sensitive, while non- invariantist versions of both traditional accounts can remedy this deficiency. Support for this conceptual analysis of stakes is found through a review of the experimental philosophy literature on stakes effects on knowledge attribution. Finally, a diagnosis is offered for what is needed to provide a more robust defense of the paperâs primary claims in terms of future experimental study
Epistemologia delle virtĂč
In this entry, I offer a critical analysis of virtue epistemology, which is a fundamental collection of recent approaches to epistemology. After a few remarks on the roots of this view, I reconstruct the key features of the two main accounts of virtue epistemology and I discuss how these accounts respond to some traditional epistemological challenges.
Questo contributo propone una disamina critica dellâepistemologia delle virtuÌ, una delle correnti piuÌ importanti della teoria della conoscenza contemporanea. Dopo un breve affondo sulle origini di questa corrente, vengono analizzate le caratteristiche dei due approcci fondamentali allâepistemologia delle virtuÌ e le risposte che essi offrono ad alcuni problemi epistemologici tradizionali
Lâesemplarismo come teoria morale: uno sguardo critico
Il problema di determinare quali siano i fondamenti dellâetica si riflette direttamente sul dibattito tra le principali etiche normative che si eÌ arricchito, in tempi molto recenti, della teoria morale detta âesemplaristaâ, proposta da Linda Zagzebski, voce illustre nel panorama della filosofia morale, della conoscenza e della religione analitiche. Lâesemplarismo, come ogni altra teoria morale fondazionalista, ha a cuore la questione del fondamento, ma si distingue dalle classiche teorie fondazionaliste sfidando lâidea che tale fondamento possa essere un concetto. Infatti, Zagzebski non fonda la sua teoria su uno dei concetti morali fondamentali (bene, virtuÌ, atto giusto), bensiÌ fa derivare la definizione di tali concetti dallâindividuazione di un esemplare morale in âquesta o quellaâ persona. In altre parole, lâesemplarismo trova la sua fondazione non-concettuale in quei soggetti che ammiriamo per la loro eccezionalitaÌ morale.
Questo contributo intende fornire una breve analisi della proposta esemplarista suddivisa in due parti: nella prima parte, ricostruiroÌ i lineamenti essenziali dellâesemplarismo tentando di definire chi sia lâesemplare e quale sia la struttura portante della teoria esemplarista; la seconda parte, invece, includeraÌ una breve critica della proposta di Zagzebski e alcune riflessioni sui vantaggi e le prospettive di ricerca che essa apre
Teorie dei vizi. Un'analisi critica
This paper offers a critical analysis of the current debate in vice theory. Its main aim is to provide the reader with the conceptual and methodological tools to navigate the discussion among reliabilist, responsibilist, and obstructivist approaches to moral and epistemic vices. After a brief exploration of the reasons underlying the recent flourishing of vice theories (§2), the responsibilist account is introduced (§3) and several critical remarks are offered to ensure that this view can accommodate the cases of malevolent and indifferent individuals (§4). The two following sections are devoted to a critical discussion of vice-reliabilism (§5) and Quassim Cassamâs obstructivism (§6). The conclusive section (§7) provides reasons to favor vice-responsibilism over vice-reliabilism and Heather Battalyâs pluralist approach, and sheds light on the innovative features of an obstructivist reading
La riscoperta dell'umiltĂ come virtĂč relazionale: la risposta della tradizione ai problemi contemporanei
Questo contributo riguarda il tema specifico dellâumiltaÌ come virtuÌ etica e nasce allâinterno di uno studio piuÌ ampio sulla relazione tra umiltaÌ in campo morale e umiltaÌ intellettuale, tema ricorrente tra i sostenitori della Virtue Epistemology. Lâintento di questo saggio eÌ quello di approfondire il recente dibattito circa la natura dellâumiltaÌ come virtuÌ e la sua definizione e il mio obiettivo eÌ quello di mostrare come la tradizione aristotelico-tomista, generalmente sottovalutata da chi si occupa di umiltaÌ nella filosofia analitica contemporanea, possa fornire una risposta soddisfacente alle problematiche piuÌ recenti relative a questo tema.
La struttura di questo breve contributo prevede un primo paragrafo in cui offriroÌ una sintetica panoramica sulla concezione di umiltaÌ di Aristotele e Tommaso dâAquino. Quindi, nel secondo paragrafo, analizzeroÌ la ricezione di questa virtuÌ allâinterno della filosofia morale contemporanea di matrice analitica, affrontando due problemi di cui qualsiasi definizione di umiltaÌ deve dare spiegazione: la compatibilitaÌ di umiltaÌ e conoscenza di seÌ, e la possibilitaÌ, per chi eccelle in un determinato ambito, di essere umile. MostreroÌ come la tradizione aristotelico-tomista possa fornire una risposta efficace a tali quesiti recenti e presenteroÌ i tratti generali della concezione di umiltaÌ come virtuÌ relazionale. Infine concluderoÌ indicando alcuni punti degni di futuri sviluppi
Epistemologia morale
This paper offers a critical introduction to moral epistemology, that is, one of the emerging disciplines within metaethics and epistemology. The main sections of this contribution are devoted to addressing the three following issues: first, whether it is possible to acquire moral knowledge; second, how â viz., through which sources â we can acquire moral knowledge; and third, which implications moral epistemology draws from empirical sciences
- âŠ