Classical Yang-Baxter Equation and Low Dimensional Triangular Lie Bialgebras

All solutions of constant classical Yang-Baxter equation (CYBE) in Lie algebra $L$ with dim $L \le 3$ are obtained and the sufficient and necessary conditions which $(L, \hbox {[ ]}, \Delta_r, r)$ is a coboundary (or triangular) Lie bialgebra are given. The strongly symmetric elements in $L\otimes L$ are found and they all are solutions of CYBE in $L$ with $dim L \le 3$.Comment: 17page

Adjusting to Austrian Life

While still in the midst of their study abroad experiences, students at Linfield College write reflective essays. Their essays address issues of cultural similarity and difference, compare lifestyles, mores, norms, and habits between their host countries and home, and examine changes in perceptions about their host countries and the United States. In this essay, Natalie Michaelis describes her observations during her study abroad program at the Austro-American Institute of Education in Vienna, Austria

The Strongly Symmetric Elements and Solutions of Yang-Baxter Equation

It is shown that all strongly symmetric elements are solutions of constant classical Yang-Baxter equation in Lie algebra, or of quantum Yang-Baxter equation in algebra. Otherwise, all solutions of constant classical Yang-Baxter equation (CYBE) in Lie algebra $L$ with dim $L \le 3$ over field $k$ of characteristic 2 are obtainedComment: 15page

Regulate us, please!: On strategic lobbying in cournot-nash oligopoly

Empirical studies on industry lobbying sometimes reveal that certain firms within an industry behave atypically in that they promote cost driving regulations like, e.g., environmental standards. For analysing this phenomenon of 'strategic lobbying1, the present paper combines a heterogeneous Cournot-Nash oligopoly with a model of endogenous policy making where two parties compete for campaign contributions spent by the regulated industry. It is shown that the existence of potential regulation gains (and consequently the incentive for strategic lobbying activities) depends on the relationship between possible cost differentials and the market structure of the industry under consideration. Based on these results, the paper examines the effects of strategic lobbying for two different scenarios. The first scenario assumes that only one firm is engaged in lobbying, whereas the second scenario looks at simultaneous (competing) lobbying activities by several firms.

The economics of greenhouse gas accumulation: A simulation approach

This article investigates efficient policies against global warming in the case of multiple greenhouse gases. In a dynamic optimization model conditions for an efficient combination of greenhouse gases are derived. The model is empirically specified and adapted to a simulation approach. By various simulation runs, the economics of greenhouse gas accumulation are illuminated; and in particular, it is shown that a CO2-policy alone would most likely lead to an allocation far from efficiency. These results indicate, that policy measures against global warming should allow for substituting between different greenhouse gases. Such a policy would mainly affect the agricultural sector because livestock and intensive farming techniques contribute significantly to the emission of greenhouse gases.

Managing waste exports when closure risks are endogenous

This paper provides a rationale for taxing waste exports when closure risks are endogenous in that they depend on the importing country's accumulated stock of waste. The paper shows that the optimal time path of waste exports requires a progressively increasing tax rate which even surmounts a Hotelling tax which tackles the problem by evaluating the expected closure stock.

Strategic Environmental Policy and the Accumulation of Knowledge

Recent political discussions about the possible advantages of first-mover behaviour in terms of environmental policy again called attention to the well-established controversy about the effects of environmental regulation on international competitiveness. Conventional theory claims that the trade-off between regulation and competitiveness will be negative while the revisionist view, also known as the Porter Hypothesis, argues for the opposite. Several previous attempts that analysed this quarrel by means of strategic trade game settings indeed support the former claim and conclude that, to increase a firm’s competitiveness, ecological dumping is the most likely outcome in a Cournot duopoly configuration. However, these results were derived from one period games in which so-called innovation offsets are unlikely to occur. The present paper considers a two-period model that includes an intertemporally growing firm-level knowledge capital. In doing so the accumulation of knowledge is modelled in a unilateral and a bilateral variant. It is shown that for both scenarios in period 1 the domestic government will set a higher emission tax rate compared to its foreign counterpart. Furthermore, we identify conditions for which the domestic tax rate will be set above the Pigouvian level in period 1 in both model variants.first-mover behaviour, Porter Hypothesis, strategic environmental policy, environmental regulation, international competitiveness

The Fixed Wage Puzzle : Why Profit Sharing Is So Hard to Implement

It is well known that profit sharing arrangements Pareto-dominate fixed wage contracts. Share agreements are (far) less than ubiquitous, however. This paper offers a solution of this „fixed wage puzzle“ by adopting a perspective of bounded rationality. We show that share arrangements that fulfill „plausible“ constraints are not generally acceptable to both firms and unions.

The Fixed Wage Puzzle: Why Profit Sharing Is So Hard to Implement

It is well known that profit sharing arrangements Pareto-dominate fixed wage contracts. Share agreements are (far) less than ubiquitous, however. This paper offers a solution of this "fixed wage puzzle“ by adopting a perspective of bounded rationality. We show that share arrangements that fulfill ”plausible“ constraints are not generally acceptable to both firms and unions.Profit Sharing, Share Economy, Remuneration Systems