Agenda Setting And The Role Of Leadership In National Health Care Reform During The Early 1990s

Health care reform was the dominant issue on the political agenda during the early 1990s. Few issues during the decade persisted on the public agenda for so long. Why did it resonate so loudly? And why did it emerge then, from 1991 to 1994, rather than earlier or later? Did public opinion drive political leaders to address health care reform, or did political leaders convince the public of health care reform’s importance

Gerrymandering and the Constitutional Norm Against Government Partisanship

This Article challenges the basic premise in the law of gerrymandering that partisanship is a constitutional government purpose at all. The central problem, Justice Scalia once explained in Vieth v. Jubilerer, is that partisan gerrymandering becomes unconstitutional only when it “has gone too far,” giving rise to the intractable inquiry into “how much is too much.” But the premise that partisanship is an ordinary and lawful purpose, articulated confidently as settled law and widely understood as such, is largely wrong as constitutional doctrine. The Article surveys constitutional law to demonstrate the vitality of an important, if implicit norm against government partisanship across a variety of settings. From political patronage, to government speech, to election administration and even in redistricting itself, Vieth is the exception in failing to bar tribal partisanship as a legitimate state interest in lawmaking. The puzzle therefore is why the Supreme Court in Vieth diverged from this overarching norm for legislative redistricting where the need for government nonpartisanship is most acute and so rarely met. The Article proposes a new approach focused on legitimate state interest and partisan purpose, building on a constitutional norm against government partisanship. The importance of consolidating and reifying this norm, in its most salient legal context, cannot be overstated at a time when hyperpolarization between the major parties dominates national politics and is at its most severe in our lifetime

De-Rigging Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of Redistricting Reform

I propose direct democracy as the best solution, a distinctly political solution, to the problems of contemporary gerrymandering. By requiring direct democratic approval by the general electorate for passage of any statewide redistricting plan, direct democracy invites the public into civic engagement about the fundamental issues of democratic governance that a democracy ought to embrace. In Part II, I briefly describe redistricting reform efforts to transfer greater responsibility for redistricting to apolitical institutions, namely courts and independent commissions. In Part III, I argue that these efforts to insulate redistricting from politics are badly misguided. I contend that redistricting, as a fundamental political matter, requires popular participation and a process of democratic debate and compromise to strike the basic value tradeoffs tied up in redistricting. I conclude that redistricting reform is needed but requires a middle path between skeptics of reform and the shape of current reform efforts. In Part IV, I propose new use of direct democracy as the viable third way for redistricting reform. I describe how a basic requirement of direct democratic approval for redistricting legislation would moderate partisan gerrymandering, induce the major parties to compete for public approval, and draw the public into a healthier political process