Variable Earnings and Nonlinear Taxation

We explore the interaction between two facts. The first is that income is variable; the second is that the tax and transfer system transforms before tax income into after tax income in highly non-linear ways. The effect is to penalize (and reward) income variability in a manner which is both substantial and capricious.

Capital Gains Taxation in an Economy with an "Austrian Sector"

This paper examines the effects of a proportional capital gains tax in an economy with an Austrian sector (with wine and trees) and an ordinary sector. We analyze the effect of capital gains taxation (on both an accrual and a realization basis) on the efficiency with which resources are used within the Austrian sector. Since time is the only input which can be varied in the Austrian sector this amounts to looking at the effect of capital gains taxation on the harvesting time or selling time of assets. Accrual taxation decreases the selling time of Austrian assets. Realization taxation decreases the selling time of some Austrian assets and leaves it unchanged for others. Inflation further reduces the selling time of assets taxed on an accrual basis; often, but not always, inflation increases .the selling time of Austrian assets taxed on a realization basis. These results suggest that the capital gains tax can reduce the holding period of an asset. However, there is a sense in which such taxes (at least when levied on a realization basis) discourage transactions and increase holding periods. It is never profitable to change the ownership of an Austrian asset between the time of the original investment and the ultimate harvesting of the asset for final use. We examine the effect of capital gains taxation on the efficiency of the allocation of investment between sectors. No neutrality principles emerge when ordinary investment income is taxed at the same rate as capital gains income. We also analyze the effect of the special tax treatment of capital gains at death and find that the current U.S. tax system, under which capital gains taxes are waived at death, encourages investors to hold assets longer than they otherwise would.

Arbitrage, Factor Structure, and Mean-Variance Analysis on Large Asset Markets

We examine the implications of arbitrage in a market with many assets. The absence of arbitrage opportunities implies that the linear functionals that give the mean and cost of a portfolio are continuous; hence there exist unique portfolios that represent these functionals. These portfolios span the mean-variance efficient set. We resolve the question of when a market with many assets permits so much diversification that risk-free investment opportunities are available. Ross 112, 141 showed that if there is a factor structure, then the mean returns are approximately linear functions of factor loadings. We define an approximate factor structure and show that this weaker restriction is sufficient for Ross' result. If the covariance matrix of the asset returns has only K unbounded eigenvalues, then there is an approximate factor structure and it is unique. The corresponding K eigenvectors converge and play the role of factor loadings. Hence only a principal component analysis is needed in empirical work.Economic

Capital Gains Taxation in an Economy with an ‘Austrian Sector’

This paper examines the effects of a proportional capital gains in an economy with an Austrian sector (with wine and trees) and an ordinary sector. We analyze the effect of capital gains taxation (on both an accrual and a realization basis) on the efficiency with which resources are used within the Austrian sector. Since time is the only input which can be varied in the Austrian sector, this amounts to looking at the effect of capital gains taxation on the harvesting time or selling time of assets. Accrual taxation decreases the selling time of Austrian assets. Realization taxation decreases the selling time of some Austrian assets and leaves it unchanged for others. Inflation further reduces the selling time of assets taxed on an accrual basis; often, but not always, inflation increases the selling time of Austrian assets taxed on a realization basis. We also examine the effect of the special tax treatment of capital gains at death and find that the current U.S. tax system, under which capital gains taxes are waived at death, encourages investors to hold assets longer

Notes on the Effect of Capital Gains Taxation on Non-Austrian Assets

This paper is an attempt to assess the effect of capital gains taxation on non-Austrian assets, such as claims to profits of continuing enterprises. As compared to taxation on an accrual basis, the capital gains tax discourages sales of appreciated assets. This is the lock-in effect. Because assets subject to capital gains taxation are generally held a long time, conventional estimates suggest that the effective rate of capital gains taxation is low. We contend that conventional estimates could seriously underestimate the effective rate of capital gains taxation because they ignore uncertainty. We construct a model which allows us to calculate the value of being able to actively manage a portfolio and use this model to calculate the effective rate of capital gains taxation. For several plausible parameter values the effective rate is significantly higher than estimates under certainty. We also discuss some of the ways in which the lock-in effect may distort the allocation of investment funds and the efficient workings of the capital market.https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/economics_books/1015/thumbnail.jp

Competition and Insurance Twenty Years Later

We are honored to address the European Group of Risk and Insurance Economists and will take the opportunity to make some reflections on the rather uneasy relationship between insurance and competition. Economists generally prescribe competition as a solution for markets that do not work well. Competition allocates resources efficiently and encourages innovation and attention to what customers want. Insurance markets differ from most other markets because in insurance markets competition can destroy the market rather than make it work better. One of the dimensions along which insurance companies compete is underwriting--trying to ensure that the risks covered are "good" risks or that if a high risk is insured, the premium charged is at least commensurate with the potential cost. The resulting partitioning of risk limits the amount of insurance that potential insurance customers can buy. In the extreme case, such competitive behavior will destroy the insurance market altogether. A simple model illustrates