The Pricing of Mortgages by Brokers: An Agency Problem?

Mortgage brokers have grown in importance in the home mortgage origination process in recent years suggesting they provide a valuable service matching borrowers and lenders, although their involvement has also been linked to the recent surge in mortgage defaults and foreclosures. As in other markets dominated by brokers, agents' incentives are often poorly aligned with those with whom they do business, in this case both the lenders who bear the risks once the loan is originated and the consumer who assumes liability for the debt and contract terms. In this paper, we describe the institutional arrangements under which mortgage brokers operate and empirically test whether loans originated by mortgage brokers are lower in cost than those that would be available directly from retail lenders. Results suggest loans originated by brokers cost borrowers about 20 basis points more, on average, than retail loans and that this premium is higher for lower-income and lower credit score borrowers.

Application of Reverse Regression to Boston Federal Reserve Data Refutes Claims of Discrimination

The topic of mortgage discrimination has received renewed interest since publication of the Boston Federal Reserve Bank study based on 1990 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data. That study used traditional direct logistic regression to assess the influence of race on the probability of mortgage loan denial and reported the parameter estimate of race to be positive and significantly different from zero across several model specifications, thereby supporting contentions of discriminatory behavior. This paper develops an alternate approach, reverse regression, a method often used in the measurement of gender discrimination in labor markets. After discussion of theoretical issues regarding model choice, results of a reverse regression on the Boston Federal Reserve Bank study dataset are reported. Contrary to results using direct methods, reverse regression does not support contentions of mortgage discrimination in the Boston mortgage market. Rather the lower overall qualifications of minority applicants are likely to account for disparities in application outcomes.

Third Party Originators and Mortgage Prepayment Risk: An Agency Problem?

We focus on an agency problem encountered by mortgage lenders and investors in mortgage-backed securities when the underlying collateral is originated by third parties. Third parties, such as mortgage brokers, have economic incentives to encourage borrowers to refinance and, accordingly, their actions may affect asset values. We sketch the principal-agent problem and examine two sets of data. Results support the argument: loans originated by third parties are significantly more likely to prepay after controlling for other known determinants of termination risk. Moreover, third party loans are about three times as sensitive to refinancing incentives, compared to retail loans.

Improving Parametric Mortgage Prepayment Models with Non-parametric Kernel Regression

Developing a good prepayment model is a central task in the valuation of mortgages and mortgage-backed securities but conventional parametric models often have bad out-of-sample predictive ability. A likely explanation is the highly non-linear nature of the prepayment function. Non-parametric techniques are much better at detecting non-linearity and multivariate interaction. This article discusses how non-parametric kernel regression may be applied to loan level event histories to produce a better parametric model. By utilizing a parsimonious specification, a model can be produced that practitioners can use in valuation routines based on Monte Carlo interest rate simulation.

Commercial Mortgage Prepayments Under Heterogeneous Prepayment Penalty Structures

Much of the literature on pricing commercial mortgages and commercial mortgage-backed securities has assumed homogeneity in prepayment penalty structure. In this paper, we provide evidence that such an assumption is inappropriate and examine the effect of penalty structures observed in actual contracts. After conducting preliminary simulations, we present hazard models estimated from data on 1,165 multifamily mortgage loans to show how empirical prepayment rates vary with alternative penalty structures. While yield maintenance and lockout provisions are relatively more effective than fixed or step down structures in reducing or postponing prepayment, none completely eliminates the risk. Our empirical results generally confirm the theoretical findings of Kelly and Slawson (2001).

Supply driven mortgage choice

Variable mortgage contracts dominate the UK mortgage market (Miles, 2004). The dominance of the variable rate mortgage contracts has important consequences for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy decisions and systemic risks (Khandani et al., 2012; Fuster and Vickery, 2013). This raises an obvious concern that a mortgage market such as that in the UK, where the major proportion of mortgage debt is either at a variable or fixed for less than two years rate (Badarinza, et al., 2013; CML, 2012), is vulnerable to alterations in the interest rate regime. Theoretically, mortgage choice is determined by demand and supply factors. So far, most of the existing literature has focused on the demand side perspective, and what is limited is consideration of supply side factors in empirical investigation on mortgage choice decisions. This paper uniquely explores whether supply side factors may partially explain observed/ex-post mortgage type decisions. Empirical results detect that lenders’ profit motives and mortgage funding/pricing issues may have assisted in preferences toward variable rate contracts. Securitisation is found to positively impact upon gross mortgage lending volumes while negatively impacting upon the share of variable lending flows. This shows that an increase in securitisation not only improves liquidity in the supply of mortgage funds, but also has the potential to shift mortgage choices toward fixed mortgage debt. The policy implications may involve a number of measures, including reconsideration of the capital requirements for the fixed, as opposed to the variable rate mortgage debt, growing securitisation and optimisation of the mortgage pricing policies