COMPETENCIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: TEACHING AN UNDERSTANDING OF OTHERS, CRITICAL THINKING, LEADERSHIP AND A SENSE OF OBLIGATION. PERCEPTIONS OF EDUCATIONAL LEADERS.

In the 18th century, utilitarian writers highlighted the importance of a sense of obligation, an understanding of others, and the ability to think critically (Daniels, Bizar, & Zemelman, 2001; Kant, 1785/2008). Additionally, scholars stressed the importance of leadership (Burns, 1978). Teacher instruction in the 19th century incorporated many of these values (Kliebard, 2004). However as the common school developed in the early 19th century there was a shift from these values toward a common curriculum meeting industrial needs (Tyack, 1974). As the 20th century ended, significant federal and state legislation further funneled school curriculum to focus on very specific instruction with a dominance of math, reading and writing (Au, 2007; Kossakoski, 2000). However, a review of current research and school practices highlighted the need to restore an education that includes 21st century competencies such as an understanding of others, critical thinking, leadership and a sense of obligation (Darling-Hammond, 2010; New England Association of Schools and Colleges, n.d.). This study examines the role of the four specific competencies, an understanding of others , critical thinking , leadership , and a sense of obligation in the public schools of New Hampshire. The scope of the research is limited to the perspective of New Hampshire education leaders (superintendents, principals, and school board members) and focuses on three primary questions concerning the four competency areas. First, is there a congruency between what is currently taught and what should be taught in regards to these four competencies? Second, what institutional factors might limit the instruction in these four areas? Third, how is this instruction incorporated into the existing curriculum? Additionally, the impact of school and educator characteristics on the three questions is considered in the study. The findings from the analysis provide insights into the research question. As perceived by superintendents, principals and school board members, there is a significant lack of congruence between what is taught and what should be taught in our schools regarding these four competencies. School leaders believe we have a significant need to increase the instruction in the four competencies. In fact, educators are from twice to almost four times more likely to believe schools should be teaching a competency at a significant or mastery level, as compared to how schools are currently teaching the competency. Superintendents lead these three groups in the perception of the magnitude of disparity between what is taught and what should be taught. School leaders also identify an increased inequity for low-income students and students in underperforming schools for teaching these competencies. These schools face limitations that block the teaching of the four competencies. Research on New Hampshire education leaders\u27 perceived difference between what is being taught and what the respondents believe should be taught regarding these four competencies may lead to change

On the evolution of U.S. foreign-exchange-market intervention: thesis, theory, and institutions

Attitudes about foreign-exchange-market intervention in the United States evolved in tandem with views about monetary policy as policy makers grappled with the perennial problem of having more economic objectives than independent instruments with which to achieve them. This paper—the introductory chapter to our history of U.S. foreign exchange market intervention—explains this thesis and summarizes our conclusion: The Federal Reserve abandoned frequent foreign-exchange-market intervention because, rather than providing a solution to the instruments-versus-objectives problem, it interfered with the Federal Reserve’s ability to credibly commit to low and stable inflation. This chapter also provides a theoretical discussion of intervention, background on U.S. institutions for conducting intervention, and a roadmap to the remainder of our book.Foreign exchange market ; Monetary policy - United States

Bretton Woods and the U.S. decision to intervene in the foreign-exchange market, 1957-1962

The deterioration in the U.S. balance of payments after 1957 and an accelerating loss of gold reserves prompted U.S. monetary authorities to undertake foreign-exchange-market interventions beginning in 1961. We discuss the events leading up to these interventions, the institutional arrangements developed for that purpose, and the controversies that ensued. Although these interventions forestalled a loss of U.S. gold reserves, in the end, they only delayed more fundamental adjustments and, in that respect, were a failure.Foreign exchange administration ; Bretton Woods Agreements Act

A brief empirical history of U.S. foreign-exchange intervention: 1973-1995

This paper assesses U.S. foreign-exchange intervention since the inception of generalized floating. We find that intervention was by and large ineffectual. We first identify which interventions were successful according to three criteria. Then, we test whether the number of observed successes significantly exceeds the amount that would randomly occur given the near-martingale nature of daily exchange-rate changes. Finally, we investigate whether the various characteristics of an intervention - its size, frequency, or coordination - can increase the probability of success. We find that intervention did tend to moderate same-day exchange-rate movements relative to the previous day, but this effect is not robust across subperiods or currencies and it occurs infrequently. Increasing the size of an intervention increases the probability of success, but no other variable consistently makes a difference, including coordinating interventions with other central banks.Foreign exchange administration

The Federal Reserve as an informed foreign-exchange trader: 1973-1995

If official interventions convey private information useful for price discovery in foreign-exchange markets, then they should have value as a forecast of near-term exchange-rate movements. Using a set of standard criteria, we show that approximately 60 percent of all U.S. foreign-exchange interventions between 1973 and 1995 were successful in this sense. This percentage, however, is no better than random. U.S. intervention sales and purchases of foreign exchange were incapable of forecasting dollar appreciations or depreciations. U.S. interventions, however, were associated with more moderate dollar movements in a manner consistent with leaning against the wind, but only about 22 percent of all U.S. interventions conformed to this pattern. We also found that the larger the size of an intervention, the greater was its probability of success, although some interventions were inefficiently large. Other potential characteristics of intervention, notably coordination and secrecy, did not seem to influence our success rates.Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) ; Foreign exchange

U.S. foreign-exchange-market intervention during the Volcker-Greenspan era

The Federal Reserve abandoned foreign-exchange-market intervention because it conflicted with the System’s commitment to price stability. By the early 1980s, economists generally concluded that, absent a portfolio-balance channel, sterilized foreign-exchange-market intervention did not provide central banks with a mechanism for systematically influencing exchange rates independent of their monetary policies. If intervention were to have anything other than a fleeting, hit-or-miss effect on exchange rates, monetary policy had to support it. Exchange rates, however, often responded to U.S. monetary-policy initiatives, so intervention to offset or reverse those exchange-rate responses can seem a contrary policy move and can create uncertainty about the strength of the System's commitment to price stability. That the U.S. Treasury maintained primary responsibility for foreign-exchange intervention only compounded this uncertainty. In addition, many FOMC participants feared that swap drawings and warehousing could contravene the Congressional appropriations process and, therefore, potentially pose a threat to System independence, a necessary condition for monetary-policy credibility.Banks and banking, Central ; Foreign exchange administration ; Monetary policy ; Federal Open Market Committee

U.S. monetary-policy evolution and U.S. intervention

The United States all but abandoned its foreign-exchange-market intervention operations in late 1995, when they proved corrosive to the credibility of the Federal Reserve?s commitment to price stability. We view this decision as the culmination of the evolution of U.S. monetary policy over the past century from a gold standard to a fiat money regime. The abandonment of intervention was necessary to secure monetary policy credibility.Foreign exchange market ; Monetary policy - United States ; Federal Open Market Committee

U.S. intervention during the Bretton Wood Era:1962-1973

By the early 1960s, outstanding U.S. dollar liabilities began to exceed the U.S. gold stock, suggesting that the United States could not completely maintain its pledge to convert dollars into gold at the official price. This raised uncertainty about the Bretton Woods parity grid, and speculation seemed to grow. In response, the Federal Reserve instituted a series of swap lines to provide central banks with cover for unwanted, but temporary accumulations of dollars and to provide foreign central banks with dollar funds to finance their own interventions. The Treasury also began intervening in the market. The operations often forestalled gold losses, but in so doing, delayed the need to solve Bretton Woods’ fundamental underlying problems. In addition, the institutional arrangements forged between the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury raised important questions bearing on Federal Reserve independence.Banks and banking, Central ; Foreign exchange administration ; Federal Open Market Committee ; Gold ; Bretton Woods Agreements Act

U.S. intervention and the early dollar float: 1973-1981

The dollar’s depreciation during the early floating rate period, 1973–1981, was a symptom of the Great Inflation. In that environment, sterilized foreign exchange interventions were ineffective in halting the dollar’s decline, but they showed a limited ability to smooth dollar movements. Only after the Volcker FOMC changed its monetary-policy approach and demonstrated a willingness to maintain a disinflationary stance despite severe economic weakness and high unemployment did the dollar begin a sustained appreciation. Also contributing to the ineffectiveness of the interventions was the Desk’s method of operation. The small, covert interventions, particularly prior to 1977, seemed inconsistent with an expectations channel of influence, and financing intervention with short-term borrowed funds seemed inconsistent with a portfolio-balance channel of influence. The Desk never clearly articulated an intervention transmission mechanism. The episode indicated the shortcomings of sterilized intervention and led to their cessation in April 1981.Banks and banking, Central ; Foreign exchange administration ; Monetary policy ; Federal Open Market Committee

Polymer membrane based electrolytic cell and process for the direct generation of hydrogen peroxide in liquid streams

An electrolytic cell for generating hydrogen peroxide is provided including a cathode containing a catalyst for the reduction of oxygen, and an anode containing a catalyst for the oxidation of water. A polymer membrane, semipermeable to either protons or hydroxide ions is also included and has a first face interfacing to the cathode and a second face interfacing to the anode so that when a stream of water containing dissolved oxygen or oxygen bubbles is passed over the cathode and a stream of water is passed over the anode, and an electric current is passed between the anode and the cathode, hydrogen peroxide is generated at the cathode and oxygen is generated at the anode