Contractions and deformations

Suppose that f is a projective birational morphism with at most one-dimensional fibres between d-dimensional varieties X and Y, satisfying ${\bf R}f_* \mathcal{O}_X = \mathcal{O}_Y$. Consider the locus L in Y over which f is not an isomorphism. Taking the scheme-theoretic fibre C over any closed point of L, we construct algebras $A_{fib}$ and $A_{con}$ which prorepresent the functors of commutative deformations of C, and noncommutative deformations of the reduced fibre, respectively. Our main theorem is that the algebras $A_{con}$ recover L, and in general the commutative deformations of neither C nor the reduced fibre can do this. As the d=3 special case, this proves the following contraction theorem: in a neighbourhood of the point, the morphism f contracts a curve without contracting a divisor if and only if the functor of noncommutative deformations of the reduced fibre is representable.Comment: Minor changes following referee comments. 22 page

Pediatric residents\u27 use of jargon during counseling about newborn genetic screening results

OBJECTIVE. The goal was to investigate pediatric residents’ usage of jargon during discussions about positive newborn screening test results. METHODS. An explicit-criteria abstraction procedure was used to identify jargon usage and explanations in transcripts of encounters between residents and standardized parents of a fictitious infant found to carry cystic fibrosis or sickle cell hemoglobinopathy. Residents were recruited from a series of educational workshops on how to inform parents about positive newborn screening test results. The time lag from jargon words to explanations was measured by using “statements,” each of which contained 1 subject and 1 predicate. RESULTS. Duplicate abstraction revealed reliability K of 0.92. The average number of unique jargon words per transcript was 20; the total jargon count was 72.3 words. There was an average of 7.5 jargon explanations per transcript, but the explained/ total jargon ratio was only 0.17. When jargon was explained, the average time lag from the first usage to the explanation was 8.2 statements. CONCLUSION. The large number of jargon words and the small number of explanations suggest that physicians’ counseling about newborn screening may be too complex for some parents

A method to quantify residents\u27 jargon use during counseling of standardized patients about cancer screening

Background Jargon is a barrier to effective patient-physician communication, especially when health literacy is low or the topic is complicated. Jargon is addressed by medical schools and residency programs, but reducing jargon usage by the many physicians already in practice may require the population-scale methods used in Quality Improvement. Objective To assess the amount of jargon used and explained during discussions about prostate or breast cancer screening. Effective communication is recommended before screening for prostate or breast cancer because of the large number of false-positive results and the possible complications from evaluation or treatment. Participants Primary care internal medicine residents. Measurements Transcripts of 86 conversations between residents and standardized patients were abstracted using an explicit-criteria data dictionary. Time lag from jargon words to explanations was measured using “statements,” each of which contains one subject and one predicate. Results Duplicate abstraction revealed reliability κ = 0.92. The average number of unique jargon words per transcript was 19.6 (SD = 6.1); the total jargon count was 53.6 (SD = 27.2). There was an average of 4.5 jargon-explanations per transcript (SD = 2.3). The ratio of explained to total jargon was 0.15. When jargon was explained, the average time lag from the first usage to the explanation was 8.4 statements (SD = 13.4). Conclusions The large number of jargon words and low number of explanations suggest that many patients may not understand counseling about cancer screening tests. Educational programs and faculty development courses should continue to discourage jargon usage. The methods presented here may be useful for feedback and quality improvement efforts

Natural Resources Damage Litigation [Appendix]

80 pages (includes illustrations). Contains references and historical notes. Appendix contains 3 attachments: 1) Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, ( CERCLA ), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq. (1980) 2) National Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. Part 440, 50 Fed. Reg. No. 224, Part III (November 20, 1985) 3) Natural Resource Damage Assessments - Proposed Rule, Department of Interior, 43 C.F.R. Part 11, 50 Fed. Reg. No. 245, Part IV (December 20, 1985

General Prohibition: A New Type of English Imperative

This paper is an investigation of the properties of what I term the general prohibitive in English. This paper is an introduction to the distribution of general prohibitives, as well as a formal analysis of general prohibition in English. This is a new type of English imperative that has previously gone unnoticed. General prohibitives are used to express banned entities such as “No smoking!” or “No pets!” I will demonstrate that general prohibitives are directives and have nearly identical distribution with imperatives. I propose this is because a null imperative mood marker is present in general prohibitives, and that restrictions on imperative mood explain the restriction on general prohibitives. Additionally, the possibility of adding the word “allowed” to these construction overtly without any change in distribution or meaning leads me to include “allowed” as an adjectival passive explicitly in the structure. The interaction between this null imperative mood marker and a negative element in the clause (“no”, “only”) licenses general prohibitives and explains their syntactic distribution

Tracing Legacy Mercury Sources in Aquatic Ecosystems Using Mercury Stable Isotopes.

Mercury (Hg) is a neurotoxic pollutant that exists in both inorganic (Hg0, Hg2+) and organo-metallic (monomethyl mercury: MMHg) chemical forms. Inorganic Hg (IHg) has been released to aquatic environments during its historical use in mining and industry. In these environments IHg can be converted to MMHg, a potent developmental neurotoxin that bioaccumulates in the food web and can pose a risk to humans and wildlife. Therefore, identifying the distribution of legacy IHg sources, and understanding their transformation to MMHg is of great interest. In this dissertation, we report Hg stable isotope ratios in sediment and food webs from North American streams contaminated by legacy Hg sources. In Chapter 2 and 3, we use Hg isotopes in stream and estuarine sediment to fingerprint multiple Hg sources and trace their transport and deposition. In Chapters 4 and 5, we measure Hg isotopes in both sediment and aquatic food webs to identify MMHg formation, degradation and exposure pathways in streams and wetlands contaminated by historical gold and mercury mining. This work demonstrates that Hg stable isotope measurements can be used to trace the spatial and temporal distribution of legacy Hg sources and identify relevant biogeochemical processes and exposure pathways leading to MMHg bioaccumulation in aquatic environments.PHDEarth and Environmental SciencesUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/113515/1/pmdon_1.pd

U.S. political intelligence and American policy on Iran, 1950-1979

This Ph.D. thesis examines United States political intelligence in regard to the regime of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, the accuracy of this intelligence, and it's influence on American policy from 1950-1979. Based on archival material, declassified documents, and interviews with relevant personalities, this thesis seeks to chronicle nearly three decades of intelligence analysis on the factors governing political stability in Iran, and establish the veracity of this analysis vis-a-vis the historical record. In the early 1950s, American intelligence operatives contributed to the overthrow of the nationalist government in Iran headed by Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq, and the restoration to a position of authority of the Shah. In its exploration of the motives behind the 1953 covert political intervention to unseat Musaddiq, the thesis finds that the Eisenhower administration acted out of a set of Cold War priorities that included the need to maintain cohesion in the Anglo-American special relationship and fears of Iranian neutrality.The United States gained a pliant ally, but one whose power base was tenuous. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, intelligence analysts concluded that, in the absence of significant economic and political reform, the Shah's regime had become so unstable as to virtually guarantee revolutionary change. Acting on a broad consensus among the intelligence community about the regime's weakness, the Kennedy administration sought to bolster the government with limited financial and political support while encouraging reform. American pressure on this front led the Shah, in 1963, to announce the "White Revolution," a six point program for reform designed to shift the monarch's base of support from the traditional ruling elite to the lower classes. The announcement of the "White Revolution" marks a rough watershed in the intelligence-policy relationship in Washington as it pertained to Iran. While American policy makers viewed the program as a progressive step forward, intelligence analysts were inclined to view the Shah's reforms as ill-conceived and, given the lack of meaningful political reform, designed largely to consolidate power in the hands of the Shah. Thus began a period during the Johnson administration where intelligence analysts emphasized the need for the diffusion of power and the inclusion of the middle classes in the decision-making process, while American policy makers placed their hopes for stability in economic determinism.an policy makers placed their hopes for stability in economic determinism. The thesis explores the reasons behind the end ofthe intelligence-policy consensus on Iran and the failure ofthe intelligence community to communicate their position in an effective way. The reasons included the decreasing standing of the intelligence community in the US domestic context, the appearance of enhanced stability in Iran, the multiplicity of opinions within the diplomatic and intelligence reporting system, and most importantly, the changing international strategic environment.The Shah's value as an ally and proxy for American interests increased substantially after the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict and the announcement, in 1968, that the British would end their presence in the Persian Gulf. The thesis concludes that sensitive analysts within the intelligence community continued to report that the regime in Tehran had failed to institutionalize itself and that the increasing economic prosperity brought about by the oil boom would eventually foster demands for democratization. By contrast, American policy became predicated on the highly personalized and prowestern policies of the Shah, and thus, the continuation of one-man rule in Iran. Consequently, policy makers in the Nixon administration sought to bolster the Shah's regime through unprecedented levels of military and diplomatic support. These policies helped to exacerbate the grievances of the Shah's domestic critics.Meanwhile, intelligence on the viability of the Shah's regime was downgraded as a priority by policy makers. Nevertheless, implicit concerns about the long-term consequences of the Shah's policies and ambitions can be found in much of the intelligence analyses of this period. Additionally, while failing to predict any imminent conflagration in Iran, this reporting did identify many of the factors that would play a decisive role in the 1978 revolution. In exploring these varying degrees of skepticism about the long-term viability of the Shah's regime, the thesis demonstrates that the intelligence community was not entirely surprised by the revolutionary forces that would bring about the downfall of the Pahlavi system, even if the exact identity of these forces were unknown. The work concludes that the intelligence community's tacit understanding of the weaknesses of the Pahlavi system enabled analysts to react more quickly to the Iranian revolution than has been previously supposed