This Ph.D. thesis examines United States political intelligence in regard to the regime of
Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, the accuracy of this intelligence, and it's influence on
American policy from 1950-1979. Based on archival material, declassified documents, and interviews
with relevant personalities, this thesis seeks to chronicle nearly three decades of intelligence analysis on
the factors governing political stability in Iran, and establish the veracity of this analysis vis-a-vis the
historical record. In the early 1950s, American intelligence operatives contributed to the overthrow of
the nationalist government in Iran headed by Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq, and the restoration to a
position of authority of the Shah. In its exploration of the motives behind the 1953 covert political
intervention to unseat Musaddiq, the thesis finds that the Eisenhower administration acted out of a set of
Cold War priorities that included the need to maintain cohesion in the Anglo-American special
relationship and fears of Iranian neutrality.The United States gained a pliant ally, but one whose power base was tenuous. By the end of
the Eisenhower administration, intelligence analysts concluded that, in the absence of significant
economic and political reform, the Shah's regime had become so unstable as to virtually guarantee
revolutionary change. Acting on a broad consensus among the intelligence community about the
regime's weakness, the Kennedy administration sought to bolster the government with limited financial
and political support while encouraging reform. American pressure on this front led the Shah, in 1963,
to announce the "White Revolution," a six point program for reform designed to shift the monarch's
base of support from the traditional ruling elite to the lower classes. The announcement of the "White
Revolution" marks a
rough watershed in the intelligence-policy relationship in Washington as it
pertained to Iran. While American policy makers viewed the program as a progressive step forward,
intelligence analysts were inclined to view the Shah's reforms as ill-conceived and, given the lack of
meaningful political reform, designed largely to consolidate power in the hands of the Shah. Thus began
a period during the Johnson administration where intelligence analysts emphasized the need for the
diffusion of power and the inclusion of the middle classes in the decision-making process, while
American policy makers placed their hopes for stability in economic determinism.an policy makers placed their hopes for stability in economic determinism.
The thesis explores the reasons behind the end ofthe intelligence-policy consensus on Iran and
the failure ofthe intelligence community to communicate their position in an effective way. The reasons
included the decreasing standing of the intelligence community in the US domestic context, the
appearance of enhanced stability in Iran, the multiplicity of opinions within the diplomatic and
intelligence reporting system, and most importantly, the changing international strategic environment.The Shah's value as an ally and proxy for American interests increased substantially after the
1967 Arab-Israeli conflict and the announcement, in 1968, that the British would end their presence in
the Persian Gulf. The thesis concludes that sensitive analysts within the intelligence community
continued to report that the regime in Tehran had failed to institutionalize itself and that the increasing
economic prosperity brought about by the oil boom would eventually foster demands for
democratization. By contrast, American policy became predicated on the highly personalized and prowestern policies of the Shah, and thus, the continuation of one-man rule in Iran. Consequently, policy
makers in the Nixon administration sought to bolster the Shah's regime through unprecedented levels of
military and diplomatic support. These policies helped to exacerbate the grievances of the Shah's
domestic critics.Meanwhile, intelligence on the viability of the Shah's regime was downgraded as a priority by
policy makers. Nevertheless, implicit concerns about the long-term consequences of the Shah's policies
and ambitions can be found in much of the intelligence analyses of this period. Additionally, while
failing to predict any imminent conflagration in Iran, this reporting did identify many of the factors that
would play a decisive role in the 1978 revolution. In exploring these varying degrees of skepticism
about the long-term viability of the Shah's regime, the thesis demonstrates that the intelligence
community was not entirely surprised by the revolutionary forces that would bring about the downfall of
the Pahlavi system, even if the exact identity of these forces were unknown. The work concludes that
the intelligence community's tacit understanding of the weaknesses of the Pahlavi system enabled
analysts to react more quickly to the Iranian revolution than has been previously supposed
