NMDA Receptor in Vasopressin 1b Neurons Is Not Required for Short-Term Social Memory, Object Memory or Aggression

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.The arginine vasopressin 1b receptor (Avpr1b) plays an important role in social behaviors including aggression, social learning and memory. Genetic removal of Avpr1b from mouse models results in deficits in aggression and short-term social recognition in adults. Avpr1b gene expression is highly enriched in the pyramidal neurons of the hippocampal cornu ammonis 2 (CA2) region. Activity of the hippocampal CA2 has been shown to be required for normal short-term social recognition and aggressive behaviors. Vasopressin acts to enhance synaptic responses of CA2 neurons through a NMDA-receptor dependent mechanism. Genetic removal of the obligatory subunit of the NMDA receptor (Grin1) within distinct hippocampal regions impairs non-social learning and memory. However, the question of a direct role for NMDA receptor activity in Avpr1b neurons to modulate social behavior remains unclear. To answer this question, we first created a novel transgenic mouse line with Cre recombinase knocked into the Avpr1b coding region to genetically target Avpr1b neurons. We confirmed this line has dense Cre expression throughout the dorsal and ventral CA2 regions of the hippocampus, along with scattered expression within the caudate-putamen and olfactory bulb (OB). Conditional removal of the NMDA receptor was achieved by crossing our line to an available floxed Grin1 line. The resulting mice were measured on a battery of social and memory behavioral tests. Surprisingly, we did not observe any differences between Avpr1b-Grin1 knockout mice and their wildtype siblings. We conclude that mice without typical NMDA receptor function in Avpr1b neurons can develop normal aggression as well as short-term social and object memory performance

The career competencies of self-initiated and assigned expatriates: assessing the development of career capital over time

Building on a modern careers approach, we assess the effects of working abroad on individuals’ career capital. Given the dearth of longitudinal studies, we return to a sample of economics graduates in Finland eight years later. We measure changes in three dimensions of career capital; ‘knowing how’, ‘knowing whom’, ‘knowing why’ and find that company assigned expatriates learn more than self-initiated expatriates. All three career capital areas benefit from international experience and all are increasingly valued over time. Based on our findings we conclude that a dynamic notion of career capital acquisition and use is needed. Managerial implications include the need for a wider view of talent management for international businesses

Us knows us in the UK: On director networks and CEO compensation

We analyze the relation between CEO compensation and networks of executive and non-executive directors for all listed UK companies over the period 1996-2007. We examine whether networks are built for reasons of information gathering or for the accumulation of managerial influence. Both indirect networks (enabling directors to collect information) and direct networks (leading to more managerial influence) enable the CEO to obtain higher compensation. Direct networks can harm the efficiency of the remuneration contracting in the sense that the performance sensitivity of compensation is then lower. We find that in companies with strong networks and hence busy boards the directors' monitoring effectiveness is reduced which leads to higher and less performance-sensitive CEO compensation. Our results suggest that it is important to have the 'right' type of network: some networks enable a firm to access valuable information whereas others can lead to strong managerial influence that may come at the detriment of the firm and its shareholders. We confirm that there are marked conflicts of interest when a CEO increases his influence by being a member of board committees (such as the remuneration committee) as we observe that his or her compensation is then significantly higher. We also find that hiring remuneration consultants with sizeable client networks also leads to higher CEO compensation especially for larger firms. © 2011 Elsevier B.V