Munkapiaci rugalmasság és ifjúsági foglalkoztathatóság

Az ifjúsági munkanélküliség napjaink egyik legégetőbb problémája világszerte, amely tovagyűrűző hatásai révén nem csak a fiatalokat érinti. A jelenség hátterében rejlő strukturális és intézményi tényezők döntő többsége összefüggésbe hozható a munkapiaci rugalmatlanság különböző dimenzióival, a túlzott mértékben szabályozott munkafeltételekkel. Ezért a cikk a munkapiaci rugalmasság és az ifjúsági munkanélküliség összefüggéseire világít rá. Mind a rugalmasság, mind az ifjúsági munkanélküliség kérdéseit áttekintve, elmondható hogy rugalmasabb munkapiacokon a pályakezdő fiatalok könnyebben és gyorsabban találnak állást, azonban ez a rugalmasság minden korosztály számára csökkenti a munkavállalói biztonságot. Ezért egyszerre szükséges a gazdasági változásokhoz jól alkalmazkodó munkapiac megteremtése, az aktív munkapiaci politika alkalmazása és a szociális biztonság megőrzése is, ahogyan azt a rugalmas biztonság (flexicurity) megközelítés hangsúlyozza. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: J21, J64

Effects of the debt crisis on the EU-China relations

The economic (debt) crisis has become serious in the EU and in the Eurozone especially in the last few months. The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was created as an instrument to handle this situation. But the financial contributions of the EU Member States seem not to be enough and China appears as a potential contributor. It is often cited that China offered Portugal and Spain in March 2011 to support their crisis management. However, recently, there are attempts from the side of the EU to convince China take part in the EFSF. Thus the question raised often in Europe is the following: Will China contribute to the EFSF? If yes, what conditions will the country raise? What are the arguments of the Chinese capital both in China and the EU? Consequently, our research is focusing on the impacts of the global financial and economic crisis on the new relations between the European Union and China. China’s enormous reserves enable the Asian financial assistance to European countries in crisis management but there are a number of questions related to this. The main findings of this study are that China can benefit from its European crisis management from many aspects, as the EU is the largest market for the Chinese products. Furthermore, reserve currency diversification and political considerations cannot be neglected, either. But the assistance may have serious risks for China: not only the expected return on investment is at a stake, but internal social and political tensions can emerge from helping the Europeans who still live in significantly higher wealth than most of the Chinese people. Adopting Chinese capital raises questions for the European Union, as well. China may impose such terms by which the EU may become vulnerable and get into a dependent position, then presumably it will be difficult to solve the cooperation

Crisis management in the Baltic States

The economic and financial recession started in 2008 brought serious difficulties for every European country, although not to the same extent. The previous situation of countries plays a major role in the course of the crisis and crisis management. The three Baltic countries showed a relatively prominent economic growth after their accession to the European Union in 2004. Their performance over these years often cited as Baltic Miracle. But this growth went hand in hand with serious macroeconomic imbalances, since the main moving factor of growth was the foreign direct investment flowing into the tertiary sector and the boom of internal consumption. These factors led to unsustainable current account deficit. The problems of these overheated economies would have needed solution even before the global downturn; however the recession put inevitable pressure on the Baltics to take actions. In the Baltic States most of the macroeconomic indicators deteriorated in the year 2008: GDP and consumer demand decreased, unemployment increased drastically, general government expenditures and government gross debt also grew. One of the most serious problems was the significant amount of debt denominated in foreign currency, which was responsible for the financial „bubbles” popped simultaneously with the outbreak of the crisis. The paper examines the main macroeconomic effects of the global economic crisis on the Baltic States and presents their governments’ economic policy measures taken to combat the crisis. The reactions of dealing with the recession in these three countries can be a lesson to other European countries as well

A válság meglepetése - Lengyelország = Surprise of the crisis - Poland

A pénzügyi és gazdasági válság gyors növekedési szakaszban érte el a lengyel gazdaságot. S bár a növekedés üteme a válság hatására lassult, Lengyelországnak Európában egyedülálló módon még a legkritikusabb időszakban, 2007 és 2009 között is sikerült pozitív növekedési eredményeket produkálnia. Eredményes keynes-i anticiklikus gazdaságpolitikájával ellensúlyozni tudta a negatív hatásokat, és állami támogatásokkal élénkítette nagyméretű, zárt, önellátásra képes belső gazdaságát. Végül – megkésve ugyan, de – a válságjelenségek Lengyelországban is jelentkeztek – azonban ezek már nem voltak olyan súlyosak, és nem húzódtak el annyira, mint az Európai Unió más tagállamaiban. A válságkezelés rövidtávon sikeresnek bizonyult, ami elsősorban a szerencsés kiindulási helyzetnek és a megfelelő időben bevezetett kormányzati intézkedéseknek: a gyors, hatékony és eredményes reformoknak köszönhető. Azonban a közép- és hosszú távú hatásokat illetően már árnyaltabb a kép. The economic and financial crisis reached the Polish economy at its fast growing period. Although the economic growth has slowed down as a consequence of the crisis, the Polish economy – in a unique way in Europe – managed to show positive results even at the most critical period between 2007 and 2009. The Keynesian anti-cycle policy of the Polish government could successfully offset the negative effects of the global crisis. The government managed to stimulate the large, closed and self-supplying internal economy by financial supports. Finally, the impacts of the crisis reached Poland, but only in 2009, and they were not so serious and permanent as in other member states of the European Union. The short run success of the Polish crisis management is due to the fast, efficient and effective reforms and to the government measures introduced at the right time. However, the impacts in medium and long term are not so unambiguous

Crisis Management in the Baltic States

The economic and financial recession started in 2008 brought serious difficulties for every European country, although not to the same extent. The previous situation of countries plays a major role in the course of the crisis and crisis management. The three Baltic countries showed a relatively prominent economic growth after their accession to the European Union in 2004. Their performance over these years often cited as Baltic Miracle. But this growth went hand in hand with serious macroeconomic imbalances, since the main moving factor of growth was the foreign direct investment flowing into the tertiary sector and the boom of internal consumption. These factors led to unsustainable current account deficit. The problems of these overheated economies would have needed solution even before the global downturn; however the recession put inevitable pressure on the Baltics to take actions. In the Baltic States most of the macroeconomic indicators deteriorated in the year 2008: GDP and consumer demand decreased, unemployment increased drastically, general government expenditures and government gross debt also grew. One of the most serious problems was the significant amount of debt denominated in foreign currency, which was responsible for the financial „bubbles” popped simultaneously with the outbreak of the crisis. The paper examines the main macroeconomic effects of the global economic crisis on the Baltic States and presents their governments’ economic policy measures taken to combat the crisis. The reactions of dealing with the recession in these three countries can be a lesson to other European countries as well

Crisis management in the Baltic States

The economic and financial recession started in 2008 brought serious difficulties for every European country, although not to the same extent. The previous situation of countries plays a major role in the course of the crisis and crisis management. The three Baltic countries showed a relatively prominent economic growth after their accession to the European Union in 2004. Their performance over these years often cited as Baltic Miracle. But this growth went hand in hand with serious macroeconomic imbalances, since the main moving factor of growth was the foreign direct investment flowing into the tertiary sector and the boom of internal consumption. These factors led to unsustainable current account deficit. The problems of these overheated economies would have needed solution even before the global downturn; however the recession put inevitable pressure on the Baltics to take actions. In the Baltic States most of the macroeconomic indicators deteriorated in the year 2008: GDP and consumer demand decreased, unemployment increased drastically, general government expenditures and government gross debt also grew. One of the most serious problems was the significant amount of debt denominated in foreign currency, which was responsible for the financial „bubbles” popped simultaneously with the outbreak of the crisis. The paper examines the main macroeconomic effects of the global economic crisis on the Baltic States and presents their governments’ economic policy measures taken to combat the crisis. The reactions of dealing with the recession in these three countries can be a lesson to other European countries as well

Effects of the debt crisis on the EU-China relations

The economic (debt) crisis has become serious in the EU and in the Eurozone especially in the last few months. The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was created as an instrument to handle this situation. But the financial contributions of the EU Member States seem not to be enough and China appears as a potential contributor. It is often cited that China offered Portugal and Spain in March 2011 to support their crisis management. However, recently, there are attempts from the side of the EU to convince China take part in the EFSF. Thus the question raised often in Europe is the following: Will China contribute to the EFSF? If yes, what conditions will the country raise? What are the arguments of the Chinese capital both in China and the EU? Consequently, our research is focusing on the impacts of the global financial and economic crisis on the new relations between the European Union and China. China’s enormous reserves enable the Asian financial assistance to European countries in crisis management but there are a number of questions related to this. The main findings of this study are that China can benefit from its European crisis management from many aspects, as the EU is the largest market for the Chinese products. Furthermore, reserve currency diversification and political considerations cannot be neglected, either. But the assistance may have serious risks for China: not only the expected return on investment is at a stake, but internal social and political tensions can emerge from helping the Europeans who still live in significantly higher wealth than most of the Chinese people. Adopting Chinese capital raises questions for the European Union, as well. China may impose such terms by which the EU may become vulnerable and get into a dependent position, then presumably it will be difficult to solve the cooperation

A görög válság - az euróövezet drámája = The Greek crisis - drama of the euro area

A jelenlegi görög válság – bár a globális pénzügyi válsággal egy időben bontakozott ki – legfőképpen tartós és krónikus belső problémákból ered. Ezeket egészítette ki a külső válság negatív hatása, mely kezdetben indirekt volt, és amelyet a görög gazdaság gyengeségei, a nagy strukturális egyensúlytalanságok tovább erősítettek. Görögország emellett óriási fizetési mérleg hiányban is szenved, ami az euró bevezetése után növekedett meg igazán. A nagy költségvetési hiány – a több éves gyors gazdasági növekedés ellenére – további jele volt a szerkezeti gyengeségeknek. Görögország helyzete láthatóan fenntarthatatlan, így az ország tragédiája várható volt, ahol a válság kialakulására sok jel utalt, és ahol az évek során számos korrekciós lehetőséget elszalasztott a görög vezetés. A tanulmány elsősorban ezekre a problémákra mutat rá, valamint a válság kezelésének eddigi lépéseit ismerteti. The current Greek crisis springs mainly from persistent and chronic internal problems – although evolved parallel to the global financial crisis. The initial negative effects of the global economic crisis were indirect, triggered by the weaknesses of the country arose from the enormous structural imbalances. The Greek economy also experiences an enormous current account deficit, which expanded strongly after the adoption of the euro. In spite of several years of rapid growth, the huge budget deficit was an additional sign of the structural weaknesses. Greece’s circumstances were clearly unsustainable, thus the Greek crisis was an expectable tragedy where there were several signs for a possible serious crisis and many missed opportunities to handle the problems as well. The study concerns with these factors and investigates the steps of the Greek crisis management