Epistemic Emotions: a Natural Kind?

The general aim of this article is to consider whether various affective phenomena – feelings like the feeling of knowing, of familiarity, of certainty, etc., but also phenomena like curiosity, interest, surprise and trust – which have been labelled “epistemic emotions” in fact constitute a unified kind, i.e., the kind of the so-called “epistemic emotions”. Obviously, for an affective phenomenon to belong to the kind of the epistemic emotions, it has to meet two conditions: it has to qualify, first, as an emotion, and, second, as an epistemic one. The paper is structured accordingly. The first part is devoted to the question whether the aforementioned affective phenomena really are emotions, while the second part bears on their hypothetical common epistemicity

The Value Problem of Knowledge. An Axiological Diagnosis of the Credit Solution

The value problem of knowledge is one of the prominent prolems that philosophical accounts of knowledge are expected to solve. According to the credit solution, a well-known solution to this problem, knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because the former is creditable to a subject's cognitive competence. But what is "credit value"? How does it connect to the already existing distinctions between values? The purpose of the present paper is to answer these questions. Its most important conclusion is that credit value is not-contrary to what the upholders of the credit solution have frequently claimed-final value

In defence of the normative account of ignorance

The standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard’s alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it

Refusing the COVID-19 vaccine: what’s wrong with that?

COVID-19 vaccine refusal seems like a paradigm case of irrationality. Vaccines are supposed to be the best way to get us out of the COVID-19 pandemic. And yet many people believe that they should not be vaccinated even though they are dissatisfied with the current situation. In this paper, we analyze COVID-19 vaccine refusal with the tools of contemporary philosophical theories of responsibility and rationality. The main outcome of this analysis is that many vaccine-refusers are responsible for the belief that they should not be vaccinated and epistemically rational in holding it. This is an important result because it provides insights into the legitimacy of certain public health policies. In particular, this result shows that a public health policy that would abandon the project of convincing certain vaccine-refusers with reasons – e.g., by simply making vaccination compulsory – is prima facie illegitimate

The Hedonic Value of Justification

Our thesis is that there is a notion of justification, corresponding to the active exercise of a competence in order to attain truth, whose value is explained neither by reliabilism, nor by the usual versions of credit theory

Developmental habitat.

70 p. : ill., maps ; 26 cm.The existence of ontogenetic shifts in habitat by marine turtles, and of immature-dominated assemblages in "developmental habitat," were important concepts first proposed by Archie Carr in 1956. Results of long-term, in-water capture programs in Caribbean Panama (17 yr) and Bermuda (37 yr) allow the testing and refinement of these ideas, in particular the developmental habitat hypothesis for Chelonia mydas, Eretmochelys imbricata, and Caretta caretta. A literature survey reviews worldwide studies on these species, and also incorporates Lepidochelys kempii. The studies in Panama and Bermuda reported in this paper use netting, mark/recapture, laparoscopy, and satellite telemetry to investigate size distributions, maturity status, residency, site fidelity, and developmental migrations of three species of sea turtles at three study sites. Characteristics of benthic developmental habitat of C. mydas, E. imbricata, L. kempii, and, to a lesser extent, C. caretta in the Atlantic Ocean usually include benthic feeding; exclusive or nearly exclusive occupation by immature animals; seasonal or multiyear residency and site fidelity in specific areas; developmental migration from the habitat before maturation; and high genetic diversity. Variation of these traits worldwide, contradictory evidence regarding the concept of developmental habitat, and evolution of this life stage are presented. Laparoscopic data provide information concerning the process of sexual maturation; mean size and size range are presented for three maturity stages of C. mydas from Panama and Bermuda, and for size at onset of puberty and maturity for Eretmochelys and Caretta in the West Atlantic. Nicaragua is the primary site of recovery of immature green turtles tagged in Bermuda, representing a developmental migration of at least 2800 km. To the extent that tag returns and stranding data represent good proxies for mortality, transitions between life stages appear to be periods of decreased survivorship

Refusing the COVID-19 Vaccine: what's wrong with that?

COVID-19 vaccine refusal seems like a paradigm case of irrationality. Vaccines are supposed to be the best way to get us out of the COVID-19 pandemic. And yet many people believe that they should not be vaccinated even though they are dissatisfied with the current situation. In this paper, we analyse COVID-19 vaccine refusal with the tools of contemporary philosophical theories of responsibility and rationality. The main outcome of this analysis is that many vaccine-refusers are responsible for the belief that they should not be vaccinated and epistemically rational in holding it. This is an important result because it provides insights into the legitimacy of certain public health policies. In particular, this result shows that a public health policy that would abandon the project of convincing certain vaccine-refusers with reasons, e.g., by simply making vaccination compulsory, is prima facie illegitimate