Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in SADC

Regional powers are not always benevolent leaders when it comes to the building of regional institutions. While powerful states – particularly the “new” rising powers – may have a vested interest in regionalism as a means of projecting influence, regional powers may behave as coercive or benevolent leaders, or alternatively display an absence of leadership altogether. The drivers of varying regional power behavior can be attributed to their competing concerns regarding (economic) power, functional efficiency, international legitimacy, and neopatrimonial networks. This paper explores the varying behavior of Nigeria and South Africa in relation to the institutionalization of free trade areas and regional courts within their respective regions. Nigeria has displayed little leadership in ECOWAS trade integration due to domestic opposition; however, a newly-democratic Nigeria’s search for international legitimacy drove the establishment of the ECOWAS Court of Justice. Likewise, South Africa’s search for legitimacy drove its support for the SADC Tribunal, but the competing demands of different audiences led it to abandon this support. South Africa has also displayed leadership in relation to the SADC Free Trade Area; however, its neighbors perceive it as a self-interested, almost coercive actor. The findings suggest that the motivations for regional powers’ behavior vary across time and policy sectors, and that inconsistent behavior is driven by a change in the priority granted to different drivers

Regional powers and leadership in regional institutions: Nigeria in ECOWAS and South Africa in SADC

Regional powers are not always benevolent leaders when it comes to the building of regional institutions. While powerful states - particularly the "new" rising powers - may have a vested interest in regionalism as a means of projecting influence, regional powers may behave as coercive or benevolent leaders, or alternatively display an absence of leadership altogether. The drivers of varying regional power behavior can be attributed to their competing concerns regarding (economic) power, functional efficiency, international legitimacy, and neopatrimonial networks. This paper explores the varying behavior of Nigeria and South Africa in relation to the institutionalization of free trade areas and regional courts within their respective regions. Nigeria has displayed little leadership in ECOWAS trade integration due to domestic opposition; however, a newly-democratic Nigeria's search for international legitimacy drove the establishment of the ECOWAS Court of Justice. Likewise, South Africa's search for legitimacy drove its support for the SADC Tribunal, but the competing demands of different audiences led it to abandon this support. South Africa has also displayed leadership in relation to the SADC Free Trade Area; however, its neighbors perceive it as a self-interested, almost coercive actor. The findings suggest that the motivations for regional powers' behavior vary across time and policy sectors, and that inconsistent behavior is driven by a change in the priority granted to different drivers

Including women's voices? Gender mainstreaming in EU and SADC development strategies for Southern Africa

This article examines gender mainstreaming in European Union (EU) development policy towards southern Africa. The aim is to detect how gender (in) equality in southern Africa is framed by the EU, and the extent to which this overlaps with Southern African Development Community (SADC) and civil society framing of gender (in) equality. We also explore potential reasons for the overlap and mismatch of frames. Using the methodology of critical frame analysis, EU policy programming documents are analysed and compared to SADC's Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, and civil society texts on gender equality. We conclude that the EU approach to gender mainstreaming in its development aid towards southern Africa is to a large extent instrumentalist, predominantly integrationist and only partially participatory. Gender mainstreaming is framed as a way of more effectively achieving existing policy goals, and civil society groups are poorly integrated in the drafting process. Although the EU approach has significant overlap with the frames used by SADC, the latter seem to hold a broader, more holistic conception of gender mainstreaming. A major gap exists between civil society organisations' views on gender (in) equality and those expressed by the EU. This gap might be harmful for the relevance of EU policies and may compromise their effectiveness