NIR spectroscopy of the most massive open cluster in the Galaxy: Westerlund 1

Using ISAAC/VLT, we have obtained individual spectra of all NIR-bright stars in the central 2'x2' of the cluster Westerlund 1 (Wd 1) with a resolution of R~9000 at a central wavelength of 2.30 micron. This allowed us to determine radial velocities of ten post-main-sequence stars, and from these values a velocity dispersion. Assuming virial equilibrium, the dispersion of sigma=8.4 km/s leads to a total dynamical cluster mass of 1.25x10^5 solar masses, comparable to the photometric mass of the cluster. There is no extra-virial motion which would have to be interpreted as a signature of cluster expansion or dissolution.Comment: To appear in the proceedings of IAU 246: "Dynamical Evolution of Dense Stellar Systems" (E. Vesperini, M. Giersz, A. Sills, eds.

Never change a winning team: The effect of substitutions on success in football tournaments

We identify a strong and significant negative effect of substitutions in (irrelevant) early games in worldcup and olympic football tournaments on performance in later rounds. We argue that this effect is due to the psychological consequences of such a decision and evaluate alternative possible explanations.Economics (Jel: A)

A MODEL OF IMMIGRATION, INTEGRATION AND CULTURAL TRANSMISSION OF SOCIAL NORMS

I present and study an evolutionary model of immigration and culturaltransmission of social norms in a set-up where agents are repeatedly matchedto play a one-shot interaction prisoner´s dilemma. Matching can be non-randomdue to limited integration (or population viscosity). The latter refers to atendency of individuals to have a higher rate of interaction with individuals oftheir type than with similar numbers of other agents. I derive a culturaltransmission mechanism in order to examine the influence of viscosity and ofother institutional characteristics of society on the evolutionary selection of prosocialnorms. The main findings are that strict norms, sustained by stronginternal punishment, need either viscosity or strong institutional pressures topersist, while norms of intermediate strength persist under a variety ofinstitutional characteristics. Endogenizing norm strength allows to identify twoscenarios in which pro-social norms survive: One of rigidity in whichseparation (high viscosity) leads to monomorphic equilibria with strict normsfor cooperation. And one of integration (low viscosity) where intermediatenorms persist in polymorphic equilibria. Furthermore, with endogenous norms,viscosity and cooperation are not linked in a monotone way.Cultural Evolution, Game Theory, Social Norms, Cooperation, Population Viscosity.

Learning by (limited) forward looking players

We present a model of adaptive economic agents that are k periods forward looking. Agents in our model are randomly matched to interact in finitely repeated games. They form beliefs by relying on their past experience in the same situation (after the same recent history) and then best respond to these beliefs looking k periods ahead. We establish almost sure convergence of our stochastic process and characterize absorbing sets. These can be very different from the predictions in both the fully rational model and the adaptive, but myopic case. In particular we find that also Non-Nash outcomes can be sustained almost all the time whenever they are individually rational and satisfy an efficiency condition. We then characterize stochastically stable states in 2×2 games and show that under certain conditions the efficient action in Prisoner''s Dilemma games and Coordination games can be singled out as uniquely stochastically stable. We show that our results are consistent with typical patterns observed in experiments on finitely repeated Prisoner''s Dilemma games. Finally, if populations are composed of some myopic and some forward looking agents parameter constellations exists such that either might obtain higher average payoffs.Economics (Jel: A)

The Logic of Counting Query Answers

We consider the problem of counting the number of answers to a first-order formula on a finite structure. We present and study an extension of first-order logic in which algorithms for this counting problem can be naturally and conveniently expressed, in senses that are made precise and that are motivated by the wish to understand tractable cases of the counting problem

A Trichotomy in the Complexity of Counting Answers to Conjunctive Queries

Conjunctive queries are basic and heavily studied database queries; in relational algebra, they are the select-project-join queries. In this article, we study the fundamental problem of counting, given a conjunctive query and a relational database, the number of answers to the query on the database. In particular, we study the complexity of this problem relative to sets of conjunctive queries. We present a trichotomy theorem, which shows essentially that this problem on a set of conjunctive queries is either tractable, equivalent to the parameterized CLIQUE problem, or as hard as the parameterized counting CLIQUE problem; the criteria describing which of these situations occurs is simply stated, in terms of graph-theoretic conditions

Counting Answers to Existential Positive Queries: A Complexity Classification

Existential positive formulas form a fragment of first-order logic that includes and is semantically equivalent to unions of conjunctive queries, one of the most important and well-studied classes of queries in database theory. We consider the complexity of counting the number of answers to existential positive formulas on finite structures and give a trichotomy theorem on query classes, in the setting of bounded arity. This theorem generalizes and unifies several known results on the complexity of conjunctive queries and unions of conjunctive queries.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1501.0719