141 research outputs found
Optimal Unemployment Insurance in a Matching Equilibrium
This paper considers the optimal design of unemployment insurance (UI) within an equilibrium matching framework when wages are determined by strategic bargaining. Unlike the Nash bargaining approach, reducing UI payments with duration is welfare increasing. A co-ordinated policy approach, however, one that chooses job creation subsidies and UI optimally, implies a much greater welfare gain than one which considers optimal UI alone. Once job creation subsidies are chosen optimally, the welfare value of making UI payments duration dependent is small.
Duration Dependent Unemployment Insurance and Stabilisation Policy
In the context of a standard equilibrium matching framework, this paper shows how a duration dependent unemployment insurance (UI) system stabilises unemployment levels over the business cycle. It establishes that re-entitlement effects induced by a finite duration UI program generate intertemporal tranfers from firms that hire in future booms to firms that hire in current recessions. These transfers imply a net hiring subsidy in recessions which stabilises unemployment levels over the cycle.
A Test Between Unemployment Theories Using Matching Data
This paper tests whether aggregate matching is consistent with unemployment being mainly due to search frictions or due to job queues. Using U.K. data and correcting for temporal aggregation bias, estimates of the random matching function are consistent with previous work in this field, but random matching is formally rejected by the data. The data instead support 'stock-flow' matching. Estimates find that around 40 per cent of newly unemployed workers match quickly - they are interpreted as being on the short-side of their skill markets. The remaining workers match slowly, their re-employment rates depending statistically on the inflow of new vacancies and not on the vacancy stock. Having failed to match with existing vacancies, these workers wait for the arrival of new job vacancies. The results have important policy implications, particularly with reference to the design of optimal unemployment insurance programs.Matching, Unemployment, Temporal aggregation
Tenure and Experience Effects on Wages: A Theory
This paper investigates equilibria in a labor market where firms post wage/tenure contracts and risk-averse workers, both employed and unemployed, search for better paid job opportunities. Different firms typically offer different contracts. Workers accumulate general human capital through learning-by-doing. With on-the-job search, a worker’s wage evolves endogenously over time through experience effects, tenure effects and quits to better paid employment. This equilibrium approach suggests how to identify econometrically between experience and tenure effects on worker wages.experience, tenure, search, equilibrium
Re-entitlement Effects with Duration Dependent Unemployment Insurance in a Stochastic Matching Equilibrium
In the context of a standard equilibrium matching framework, this paper considers how a duration dependent unemployment insurance (UI) system affects the dynamics of unemployment and wages in an economy subject to stochastic job-destruction shocks. It establishes that re-entitlement effects induced by a finite duration UI program generate intertemporal transfers from firms that hire in future booms to firms that hire in current recessions. These transfers imply a net hiring subsidy in recessions which stabilizes unemployment levels over the cycleMatching frictions, Unemployment, Duration Dependent UI.
Wage/Tenure Contracts with Heterogeneous Firms
This paper investigates equilibria in a labor market where heterogeneous firms post wage/tenure contracts and risk-averse workers, both employed and unemployed, search for new job opportunities. Different firms, even those with the same productivity, typically offer different contracts. Equilibrium finds workers never quit from higher productivity firms to lower productivity firms, but turnover is inefficiently low as employees with large tenures at low productivity firms may reject job offers from more productive firms. A worker who quits to a more productive firm may take a wage cut in anticipation of better wage promotion prospects. Wages within a firm might also increase by a discrete amount at the end of an initial "probationary" spell.
Equilibrium Wage and Employment Dynamics in a Model of Wage Posting without Commitment
A rich but tractable variant of the Burdett-Mortensen model of wage setting behavior is formulated and a dynamic market equilibrium solution to the model is defined and characterized. In the model, firms cannot commit to wage contracts. Instead, the Markov perfect equilibrium to the wage setting game, characterized by Coles (2001), is assumed. In addition, firm recruiting decisions, firm entry and exit, and transitory firm productivity shocks are incorporated into the model. Given that the cost of recruiting workers is proportional to firm employment, we establish the existence of an equilibrium solution to the model in which wages are not contingent on firm size but more productive employers always pay higher wages. Although the state space, the distribution of workers over firms, is large in the general case, it reduces to a scalar that can be interpreted as the unemployment rate in the special case of homogenous firms. Furthermore, the equilibrium is unique. As the dimension of the state space is equal to the number of firms types in general, an (approximate) equilibrium is computable.wage dispersion, wage setting, rank-preserving equilibrium
A Microfoundation for Increasing Returns in Human Capital Accumulation and the Under-Participation Trap
This paper considers educational investment, wages and hours of market work in an imperfectly competitive labour market with heterogeneous workers and home production. It investigates the degree to which there might be both underemployment in the labour market and underinvestment in education. A central insight is that the ex-post participation decision of workers endogeneously generates increasing marginal returns to education. Although equilibrium implies underinvestment in education, optimal policy is not to subsidise education. Instead it is to subsidise labour market participation which we argue might be efficiently targeted as state provided childcare support.Education, home production, hours of work, imperfect competition.
Tax Policy and Returns to Education
This paper considers how asymmetric tax treatment, where labour market earnings are taxed but household production is untaxed, aspects educational choice and labour supply. We show that taxes on labour market earnings can generate a large (non-marginal) switch to home production and the ensuing deadweight losses are large. Using a cross-country panel, we find that gender differences in labour supply responses to tax policy can explain differences in aggregate labour supply and years of education across countries.Increasing returns; tax policy; gender; labour supply; education
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