Prospects for the 2011 BTWC Review Conference

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So you want to do ‘something’ on science and technology reviews in the biological weapons convention?

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Countering CBW Proliferation

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Reviewing science and technology in the context of the Biological Weapons Convention

There is evidence of the emergence of a consensus amongst a number of States Parties to the BWC and NGOs on the principle of changing the process of S&T review as part of the wider quinquennial review process of the BWC. However, there is little evidence of agreement on the details of what needs to be done, how, by whom and to what end. Wrestling with these questions will be essential if state parties wish to capitalise on the momentum that has built up around changing S&T reviews and convert this into an evolution of the practice. With the review conference less than a year away, thinking needs to begin sooner, rather than later

The Impact of Dual Use Controls on UK Science: Results from a Pilot Study

Concerns about the proliferation of biological weapons and the threat posed by bioterrorism have assumed greater political prominence in recent years. In response, governments are actively attempting to frustrate the diffusion of technologies, relevant to the production of biological weapons, to regimes and non-state actors which might develop and use such weapons. Their most recent efforts have involved the introduction of a range of new national measures to control access to materials, knowledge and technologies. Preventing the diffusion of the necessary knowledge and technologies used to develop biological weapons is complicated because the underlying technologies often have legitimate and socially beneficial applications. Any controls to prevent their hostile application can also potentially disrupt legitimate activity, thereby generating social costs. For example, anecdotal evidence suggests that the introduction of biosecurity controls in the US and Germany are adversely affecting scientific research in those countries. Governments therefore need to balance these costs against the security benefits that such controls generate. To do this policy makers need information on the impact of these new ‘biosecurity’ measures. However, this is a new area of policy and few impact assessments have been performed. This pilot project, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council3, developed and validated new methods for assessing the impact that UK government biosecurity policies, introduced to prevent legitimate scientific research from being misused, are having on the practice of science. This short report briefly explains the project and outlines a sample of the initial results.biological weapons, bioterrorism, knowledge, control of proliferation, biosecurity

The evolving governance of science and technology: implications for stakeholder relations with the OPCW and the National Authorities

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Novi-whats and the Chemical Weapons Convention

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Effective ACtion to Strengthen the BTWC Regime: The Impact of Dual Use Controls on UK Science

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The Geneva Protocol at 90: some notes from history

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Introduction: a web of prevention?

Published version reproduced with permission