Laboratory experiments from the toy store

The following is a laboratory experiment designed to further understanding of materials science. This material could be taught to a typical student of materials science or manufacturing at the high school level or above. The objectives of this experiment are as follows: (1) to qualitatively demonstrate the concepts of elasticity, plasticity, and the strain rate and temperature dependence of the mechanical properties of engineering materials; (2) to qualitatively demonstrate the basics of extrusion including material flow, strain rate dependence of defects, lubrication effects, and the making of hollow shapes by extrusion (the two parts may be two separate experiments done at different times when the respective subjects are covered); and (3) to demonstrate the importance of qualitative observations and the amount of information which can be gathered without quantitative measurements

AI and affordances for mental action

To perceive an affordance is to perceive an object or situation as presenting an opportunity for action. The concept of affordances has been taken up across wide range of disciplines, including AI. I explore an interesting extension of the concept of affordances in robotics. Among the affordances that artificial systems have been engineered to detect are affordances to deliberate. In psychology, affordances are typically limited to bodily action, so the it is noteworthy that AI researchers have found it helpful to extend the concept to encompass mental actions. I propose that psychologists can learn from this extension, and argue that human subjects can perceive mental affordances, such as affordances to attend, affordances to imagine and affordances to count

Gappiness and the Case for Liberalism about Phenomenal Properties

. Conservatives claim that all phenomenal properties are sensory. Liberals countenance non-sensory phenomenal properties such as what it's like to perceive some high-level property, and what it's like to think that p. A hallmark of phenomenal properties is that they present an explanatory gap, so to resolve the dispute we should consider whether experience has non-sensory properties that appear 'gappy'. The classic tests for 'gappiness' are the invertibility test and the zombifiability test. I suggest that these tests yield conflicting results: non-sensory properties lend themselves to zombie scenarios but not to inversion scenarios. Which test should we trust? Against Carruthers & Veillet, I argue that invertibility is not a viable condition of phenomenality. In contrast, being zombifiable is credibly necessary and sufficient for phenomenality. I conclude that there are non-sensory properties of experience that are 'gappy' in the right way, and that liberalism is therefore the most plausible position.This paper was completed with the support of ERC grant 31355