Active radiation detectors for use in space beyond low earth orbit: spatial and energy resolution requirements and methods for heavy ion charge classification

2017 Summer.Includes bibliographical references.Space radiation exposure to astronauts will need to be carefully monitored on future missions beyond low earth orbit. NASA has proposed an updated radiation risk framework that takes into account a significant amount of radiobiological and heavy ion track structure information. These models require active radiation detection systems to measure the energy and ion charge Z. However, current radiation detection systems cannot meet these demands. The aim of this study was to investigate several topics that will help next generation detection systems meet the NASA objectives. Specifically, this work investigates the required spatial resolution to avoid coincident events in a detector, the effects of energy straggling and conversion of dose from silicon to water, and methods for ion identification (Z) using machine learning. The main results of this dissertation are as follows: 1. Spatial resolution on the order of 0.1 cm is required for active space radiation detectors to have high confidence in identifying individual particles, i.e., to eliminate coincident events. 2. Energy resolution of a detector system will be limited by energy straggling effects and the conversion of dose in silicon to dose in biological tissue (water). 3. Machine learning methods show strong promise for identification of ion charge (Z) with simple detector designs

Prosecute the Cheerleader, Save the World?: Asserting Federal Jurisdiction Over Child Pornography Crimes Committed Through “Sexting”

This comment explores the possible scenarios in which sexting could give rise to prosecution under Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 (“PCASEA”) for transporting, distributing, receiving, or possessing child pornography.2 Part II provides background information on the practice and prevalence of sexting. Part III discusses the definition of child pornography within the meaning of federal law and applies that definition to sexting. Part IV presents the concept of the transporting or shipping in interstate or foreign commerce jurisdictional hook and its potential relation to sexting. Part V applies the principles of statutory interpretation to the relevant provisions of the PCASEA to determine the proper application of the statute’s current jurisdictional language. Part VI discusses the application of sexting to the particular offenses of transporting, distributing, receiving, or possessing child pornography under the PCASEA, including distinct jurisdictional issues for each offense.3 Part VII delineates issues that are collateral to the jurisdictional question, but that are necessarily raised by attempting to resolve it. Part VIII concludes that prosecution of child pornography offenses committed through sexting is within the purview of the PCASEA and future judicial interpretations of the PCASEA will result in broad subject matter jurisdiction to do so

The Unavoidable Ecclesiastical Collision in Virginia

Section 5 7-9(A) of the Code of Virginia is a statute that purports to resolve church property disputes. There is, however, a significant amount of controversy as to whether the statute encroaches on the free exercise rights of hierarchical churches located in Virginia and enmeshes Virginia courts in the ecclesiastical thicket. Given the debate surrounding Section 57-9(A) and the controversial shift of several mainstream denominations in matters of substantive church doctrine, Virginia is a fertile breeding ground for church property disputes. Accordingly, the Commonwealth is in the midst of an ecclesiastical crisis. The impact of the crisis is evidenced by the recent division within the Episcopal Church\u27s Diocese of Virginia and the subsequent church property litigation that ensued following the division. This Comment examines the constitutional standards surrounding various courses of action states may pursue to resolve church property disputes and provides a specific analysis of Virginia\u27s statutory scheme for doing so. Current Supreme Court of the United States precedent establishes that courts have three constitutional options they can rely on in resolving church property disputes. Courts may defer to the decision of the religious organization\u27s adjudicatory body, a method of resolution known as the deference approach. Courts may also decide the case on the basis of a neutral principle of law such as property law or contact law. Finally, states may enact special statutes to direct courts on how to resolve church property disputes. This article argues that Section 57-9(A) does not operate as a constitutional method of resolving church property disputes within the Supreme Court\u27s established framework for doing so. Accordingly, due to the constitutional issues with Section 57- 9(A), the law in Virginia regulating church property disputes is on a path leading to an unavoidable ecclesiastical collision

The Unavoidable Ecclesiastical Collision in Virginia

Section 5 7-9(A) of the Code of Virginia is a statute that purports to resolve church property disputes. There is, however, a significant amount of controversy as to whether the statute encroaches on the free exercise rights of hierarchical churches located in Virginia and enmeshes Virginia courts in the ecclesiastical thicket. Given the debate surrounding Section 57-9(A) and the controversial shift of several mainstream denominations in matters of substantive church doctrine, Virginia is a fertile breeding ground for church property disputes. Accordingly, the Commonwealth is in the midst of an ecclesiastical crisis. The impact of the crisis is evidenced by the recent division within the Episcopal Church\u27s Diocese of Virginia and the subsequent church property litigation that ensued following the division. This Comment examines the constitutional standards surrounding various courses of action states may pursue to resolve church property disputes and provides a specific analysis of Virginia\u27s statutory scheme for doing so. Current Supreme Court of the United States precedent establishes that courts have three constitutional options they can rely on in resolving church property disputes. Courts may defer to the decision of the religious organization\u27s adjudicatory body, a method of resolution known as the deference approach. Courts may also decide the case on the basis of a neutral principle of law such as property law or contact law. Finally, states may enact special statutes to direct courts on how to resolve church property disputes. This article argues that Section 57-9(A) does not operate as a constitutional method of resolving church property disputes within the Supreme Court\u27s established framework for doing so. Accordingly, due to the constitutional issues with Section 57- 9(A), the law in Virginia regulating church property disputes is on a path leading to an unavoidable ecclesiastical collision

The Unaviodable Ecclesiastical Collision in Virginia

Section 57-9(A) of the Code of Virginia is a statute that purports to resolve church property disputes. There is, however, a significant amount of controversy as to whether the statute encroaches on the free exercise rights of hierarchical churches located in Virginia and enmeshes Virginia courts in the ecclesiastical thicket. Given the debate surrounding Section 57-9(A) and the controversial shift of several mainstream denominations in matters of substantive church doctrine, Virginia is a fertile breeding ground for church property disputes. Accordingly, the Commonwealth is in the midst of an ecclesiastical crisis. The impact of the crisis is evidenced by the recent division within the Episcopal Church’s Diocese of Virginia and the subsequent church property litigation that ensued following the division. This Comment examines the constitutional standards surrounding various courses of action states may pursue to resolve church property disputes and provides a specific analysis of Virginia’s statutory scheme for doing so. Current Supreme Court of the United States precedent establishes that courts have three constitutional options they can rely on in resolving church property disputes. Courts may defer to the decision of the religious organization’s adjudicatory body, a method of resolution known as the deference approach. Courts may also decide the case on the basis of a neutral principle of law such as property law or contact law. Finally, states may enact special statutes to direct courts on how to resolve church property disputes. This article argues that Section 57-9(A) does not operate as a constitutional method of resolving church property disputes within the Supreme Court’s established framework for doing so. Accordingly, due to the constitutional issues with Section 57- 9(A), the law in Virginia regulating church property disputes is on a path leading to an unavoidable ecclesiastical collision

Much Ado About Nothing Much: Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Virginia v. Truro Church

This essay reviews the issues the Supreme Court of Virginia resolved in Truro and notes important issues it did not resolve. Part II supplies the factual background and procedural history ofthe dispute. Part III summarizes the court\u27s opinion and the reasoning underlying its determination that Virginia Code section57-9(A) is not applicable to this particular action. Part IV critiques the opinion, noting the issues the court resolved and how it resolved them. Part V briefly addresses issues that remain unresolved by the court\u27s decision and discusses the implications of leaving those issues unresolved. Part VI presents the authors\u27 conclusions

The relationship between regional pain with or without neuropathic symptoms and chronic widespread pain.

This study was performed to test whether the risk of developing chronic widespread pain (CWP) in those with regional pain was augmented in those with symptoms of neuropathic pain (NP). Persons free of CWP completed the Douleur Neuropathique 4 (scores ≥3 indicating NP); demographics; Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale; Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index; and pain medications. Participants were classified as having no pain, regional pain with no symptoms of NP (NP-), or regional pain with symptoms of NP (NP). At the 12-month follow-up, participants with CWP were identified. Logistic regression estimated the odds ratio, with 95% confidence intervals, of CWP in the NP- and NP groups compared with no pain, and NP compared with NP-. Partial population attributable risks estimated the proportion of CWP attributable to baseline NP- or NP exposure. One thousand one hundred sixty-two participants completed the baseline DN4 and provided pain data at follow-up: 523 (45.0%) had no baseline pain, 562 (48.4%) NP-, and 77 (6.6%) NP. One hundred fifty-three (13.2%) had CWP at 12 months: 19 (3.6%) no pain, 108 (19.2%) NP-, and 26 (33.8%) NP. NP- (2.9 [1.9-4.3]) and NP (2.1 [1.1-4.0]) predicted CWP after adjusting for demographics, Hospital Anxiety and Depression scale, Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index, and medications. The partial population attributable risk was 41.3% (25.2-54.0) for NP- and 6.0% (0.1-11.6) for NP. The NP group were not more likely to develop CWP when compared directly with NP- (1.5 [0.8-2.8]). Neuropathic pain was relatively rare and predicted a small number of new-onset CWP cases. Using these estimates, treatments targeting NP would at best prevent 6% of CWP cases