Bitwy pod Fredericksburgiem i Gettysburgiem w świetle Sztuki Wojny Sun Tzu

What do the Civil War battles of Fredericksburg and Gettysburg have to do with the Art of War, the military strategy treatise written by ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu (ca. 544 – ca. 496 BC)? Very much, in fact. The Art of War’s timeless advice and principles can explain the results of battles and entire wars in every historical period, including the 19th century. The unorthodox way of war advocated therein allowed Sun Tzu, the commander of the army of Wu, to defeat a much larger army of the neighboring state of Chu, but due to a lack of English translation until 1910 was unknown to the English-speaking world, including Generals Ambrose Burnside and Robert Lee, who, ignorant of its sage advice, made catastrophic blunders at Fredericksburg and Gettysburg, respectively. Burnside attempted a rapid crossing of the Rappahannock river at Fredericksburg, but pontoon bridges did not arrive in time, so the element of surprise was lost, and even when they did, he hesitated to cross until December 1862 when Confederates had already dug themselves in at Marye’s Heights; he sent his men like swarming ants towards the Confederate trenches on the heights, losing thousands of them. Lee evidently didn’t learn from his enemy’s mistakes and repeated them at Gettysburg in July 1863. Although no river crossing was involved, Lee wrongly abandoned his original plan to capture Harrisburg and Camp Curtin (which would have been a huge prestigeous blow to President Lincoln and might have encouraged a European recognition of the Confederacy) and, upon hearing that Union divisions were at Gettysburg, he moved his entire army there. At Gettysburg, he first issued unclear orders to subordinate Gen. Richard Ewell, then, the next day, clarified these by ordering multiple suicidal assaults on fortified Union positions on Cemetery Ridge. Sun Tzu counseled against attacking an enemy’s strong positions and especially against charging uphill to attack. He also stressed the importance of clarity of orders and of not trying the same type of attack over and over again. As Burnside’s and Lee’s examples show, generals who ignore Sun Tzu’s advice do so at their own peril.Można zadać pytanie, co bitwy wojny secesyjnej pod Gettysburgiem i Fredericksburgiem mają wspólnego z traktatem strategii wojskowej napisanym przez starożytnego chińskiego generała Sun Tzu (ca. 544 – ca. 496 p.n.e.). Okazuje się, że bardzo dużo. Dzieło to zawiera ponadczasowe porady, dzięki którym można wyjaśnić wyniki bitew i wojen w każdym okresie historycznym, łącznie z XIX w. Ze względu na brak tłumaczenia na język angielski do 1910 r. traktat ten był nieznany dla świata zachodniego, w tym dla generałów Ambrose’a Burnside’a i Roberta Lee. Dowódcy ci, nie znając jego porad, doświadczyli katastrofalnych porażek militarnych. Burnside próbował szybkiego przekraczania rzeki Rappahannock pod Fredericksburgiem, ponieważ we właściwym czasie nie zostały dostarczone dla armii mosty pontonowe. Zamiar się nie powiódł i element zaskoczenia został utracony. Generał Lee niewiele się nauczył na błędach przeciwnika i powtórzył je pod Gettysburgiem w lipcu 1863 r

Photoluminescence of Ce3+ and Eu2+ in low-P ternesite from the Negev Desert, Israel

For the first time, the photoluminescence of ions of Ce3+ and Eu2+ in natural low-P ternesite has been measured. The emission bands of Ce3+ ions at 405, 426, and 440 nm and the corresponding excitation wavelengths suggest the presence of Ce3+ ions in three different cationic sites. In the photoluminescence spectra of Eu2+, emission bands at 530 and 620 nm can be seen that originate from two different cationic sites. In addition, it is demonstrated that an energy transfer occurs between Ce3+ and Eu2+ ions situated in those cationic sites where the force of the crystallic field is weakest. The photoluminescence spectra were obtained for a thin section sample with low contents of these two elements (41.2 ppm Ce, 2.11 ppm Eu)

The absorption- and luminescence spectra of Mn3+ in beryl and vesuvianite

This research project was supported by the Polish National Science Centre (Grant DEC-2011/03/B/ ST10/06320) and by statutory funding from the Faculty of Earth Sciences at the University of Silesia. Dr. Padhraig S. Kennan (University College Dublin, Ireland) is thanked for help with language.The electron absorption-, photoluminescence- and electron paramagnetic-resonance spectra of Mn3+ in red beryl from Wah Wah Mountains (Utah USA) and of pink- and purple vesuvianite from Jeffrey Mine (Asbestos, Canada) were measured at room- and low temperatures. The crystal field stabilization energies are equal to 130.9 kJ/mol for the red beryl, and 151.5–158.0 and 168.0 kJ/mol for for the pink- and the purple vesuvianite, respectively. The red photoluminescence of Mn3+ was not intensive either at room- or at low temperatures. The high Mn content in the crystals caused the emergence of an additional emission band and short photoluminescence-decay lifetimes. The latter are only 183 μs for beryl and 17 μs for vesuvianite.Narodowe Centrum Nauk

Luminescence and other spectroscopic properties of purple and green Cr-clinochlore

For the first time ever, the luminescence spectra of Cr3+ centers in two chlorite crystals are presented. Chromium ions occupy the strong crystal-field site M4 in the brucite sheet and the intermediate crystal-field site in the inner octahedral sheet for purple and green chlorite, respectively. We discuss the influence of an effective positive charge on the Cr3+ ion and an effective negative charge of ligands on the differences in the values of the Dq and B parameters. It is concluded that the presence of Fe2+ ions and other point defects, as well as concentration quenching, causes the very short luminescence lifetimes of chromium ions

The Mossbauer spectra of prasiolite and amethyst crystals from Poland

Mössbauer spectroscopy of green (prasiolite) and violet (amethyst) quartz crystals from the Sudety Mountains (Poland) has shown that neither Fe2+ nor Fe4+ ions are present in them. Only Fe3+ ions have been identified and only in interstitial positions in channels parallel or perpendicular to the c-axis. The valence of Fe3+ ions did not change as a result of irradiation or annealing. Instead, we believe that the Fe3+ ions move within channels or between them

Bitwy pod Fredericksburgiem i Gettysburgiem w świetle Sztuki Wojny Sun Tzu

What do the Civil War battles of Fredericksburg and Gettysburg have to do with the Art of War, the military strategy treatise written by ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu (ca. 544 – ca. 496 BC)? Very much, in fact. The Art of War’s timeless advice and principles can explain the results of battles and entire wars in every historical period, including the 19th century. The unorthodox way of war advocated therein allowed Sun Tzu, the commander of the army of Wu, to defeat a much larger army of the neighboring state of Chu, but due to a lack of English translation until 1910 was unknown to the English-speaking world, including Generals Ambrose Burnside and Robert Lee, who, ignorant of its sage advice, made catastrophic blunders at Fredericksburg and Gettysburg, respectively. Burnside attempted a rapid crossing of the Rappahannock river at Fredericksburg, but pontoon bridges did not arrive in time, so the element of surprise was lost, and even when they did, he hesitated to cross until December 1862 when Confederates had already dug themselves in at Marye’s Heights; he sent his men like swarming ants towards the Confederate trenches on the heights, losing thousands of them. Lee evidently didn’t learn from his enemy’s mistakes and repeated them at Gettysburg in July 1863. Although no river crossing was involved, Lee wrongly abandoned his original plan to capture Harrisburg and Camp Curtin (which would have been a huge prestigeous blow to President Lincoln and might have encouraged a European recognition of the Confederacy) and, upon hearing that Union divisions were at Gettysburg, he moved his entire army there. At Gettysburg, he first issued unclear orders to subordinate Gen. Richard Ewell, then, the next day, clarified these by ordering multiple suicidal assaults on fortified Union positions on Cemetery Ridge. Sun Tzu counseled against attacking an enemy’s strong positions and especially against charging uphill to attack. He also stressed the importance of clarity of orders and of not trying the same type of attack over and over again. As Burnside’s and Lee’s examples show, generals who ignore Sun Tzu’s advice do so at their own peril.Można zadać pytanie, co bitwy wojny secesyjnej pod Gettysburgiem i Fredericksburgiem mają wspólnego z traktatem strategii wojskowej napisanym przez starożytnego chińskiego generała Sun Tzu (ca. 544 – ca. 496 p.n.e.). Okazuje się, że bardzo dużo. Dzieło to zawiera ponadczasowe porady, dzięki którym można wyjaśnić wyniki bitew i wojen w każdym okresie historycznym, łącznie z XIX w. Ze względu na brak tłumaczenia na język angielski do 1910 r. traktat ten był nieznany dla świata zachodniego, w tym dla generałów Ambrose’a Burnside’a i Roberta Lee. Dowódcy ci, nie znając jego porad, doświadczyli katastrofalnych porażek militarnych. Burnside próbował szybkiego przekraczania rzeki Rappahannock pod Fredericksburgiem, ponieważ we właściwym czasie nie zostały dostarczone dla armii mosty pontonowe. Zamiar się nie powiódł i element zaskoczenia został utracony. Generał Lee niewiele się nauczył na błędach przeciwnika i powtórzył je pod Gettysburgiem w lipcu 1863 r