Human Worth as Collateral

Human worth has taken on a surprising new role: that of market asset. Specifically, lenders in radically different contexts are using their borrowers’ human worth as collateral in loan transactions. The two examples of this new collateralization that I examine are credit card lending in the United States and microlending programs in the Third World. I conclude that the use of human worth in these two contexts is too similar to be coincidental. Rather, this new collateralization is a product of globalization. For those interested in the effect of law on globalization, this convergence in the market for credit teaches important lessons. In both the contexts I examine, the laws governing secured and unsecured lending fail to recognize human worth as collateral. For this reason, the new collateralization serves as a counter-example to the claimed centrality of the rule of law in economic development

Walking Cautiously Into the Collatz Wilderness: Algorithmically, Number Theoretically, Randomly

Building on theoretical insights and rich experimental data of our preprints, we present here new theoretical and experimental results in three interrelated approaches to the Collatz problem and its generalizations: algorithmic decidability, random behavior, and Diophantine representation of related discrete dynamical systems, and their cyclic and divergent properties

Polymorphous Public Law Litigation: The Forgotten History of Nineteenth Century Public Law Litigation

Recent debates about popular constitutionalism and judicial supremacy have focused on the question of who interprets the Constitution. This article reframes the debate by asking what legal sources courts apply to protect individual rights from government infringement. Throughout the nineteenth century, federal courts applied a mix of international law, statutes and common law to protect fundamental rights and restrain government action. This article uncovers the forgotten history of nineteenth century public law litigation.Professors Post and Siegel have advocated “policentric constitutional interpretation,” wherein the Supreme Court shares authority for constitutional interpretation with other actors. By analogy, this article introduces the concept of “polymorphous public law litigation.” Under the polymorphous model, instead of fixating on constitutional law as the dominant public law discourse, courts apply international law, statutes, and common law — and occasionally constitutional law — to decide public law controversies. The article demonstrates that nineteenth century federal courts applied a polymorphous model of public law litigation.During the twentieth century, the polymorphous model was supplanted by a constitutionalized model of public law litigation, wherein courts rely primarily on constitutional law to decide public law cases. The process of constitutionalization exacerbated the tension between judicial review and popular sovereignty. When the Supreme Court applies constitutional law to decide a case, the Court does not merely decide the case; it also creates or modifies a legal rule that is not subject to revision by legislative majorities. In contrast, when the Court applies other types of law, Congress or state legislatures retain the power to modify the controlling legal rule. Hence, revival of a polymorphous model would help mitigate the tension between judicial review and popular sovereignty