On the Rationality of Escalation

Escalation is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools conceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriving from coinduction are essential. Here we use coinduction, or backward coinduction (to show its connection with the same concept for finite games) to study carefully and formally the infinite games especially those called dollar auctions, which are considered as the paradigm of escalation. Unlike what is commonly admitted, we show that, provided one assumes that the other agent will always stop, bidding is rational, because it results in a subgame perfect equilibrium. We show that this is not the only rational strategy profile (the only subgame perfect equilibrium). Indeed if an agent stops and will stop at every step, we claim that he is rational as well, if one admits that his opponent will never stop, because this corresponds to a subgame perfect equilibrium. Amazingly, in the infinite dollar auction game, the behavior in which both agents stop at each step is not a Nash equilibrium, hence is not a subgame perfect equilibrium, hence is not rational.Comment: 19 p. This paper is a duplicate of arXiv:1004.525

Exploration de l’expressivité des sous-systèmes de la logique linéaire caractérisant le temps polynomial

Implicit computational complexity is the characterization of complexity classes by syntactic restrictions on computation models. Several subsystems of linear logic characterizing polynomial time have been defined : these systems are sound (terms normalize in polynomial time) and complete (it is possible to simulate a Turing machine during a polynomial number of steps). One of the long term goals is to statically prove complexity bounds. This is why we are looking for the most expressive characterizations possible. Our main tool is context semantics : tokens travel across proof-nets (programs of linear logic) according to some rules. The paths defined by these tokens represent the reduction of the proof-net.Contrary to previous works, we do not directly define subsystems of linear logic. We first define relations -> on subterms of proof-nets such that: B -> C means \the number of copies of B depends on the number of copies of C". The acyclicity of -> allows us to bound the number of copies of any subterm, this bounds the complexity of the term. Then, we define subsystems of linear logic guaranteeing the acyclicity of ->. We also study characterizations of elementary time and primitive recursive time. In orderto adapt our linear logic subsystems to richer languages, we adapt the context semantics to interaction nets, used as a target language for small programming languages. We use this context semantics to define a denotational semantics on interaction nets.La complexité implicite est la caractérisation de classes de complexité par des restrictions syntaxiques sur des modèles de calcul. Plusieurs sous-systèmes de la logique linéaire caractérisant le temps polynomial ont été définis: ces systèmes sont corrects (les termes normalisent en temps polynomial) et complets (il est possible de simuler une machine de Turing pendant un nombre polynomial d'étapes). Un des buts sur le long terme est de donner statiquement des bornes de complexité. C’est pourquoi nous cherchons les caractérisations du temps polynomial les plus expressives possible. Notre principal outil est la sémantique des contextes: des jetons voyagent à travers le réseau selon certaines règles. Les chemins définis par ces jetons représentent la réduction du réseau. Contrairement aux travaux précédents, nous ne définissons pas directement des sous-systèmes de la logique linéaire. Nous définissons d'abord des relations -> sur les sous-termes des réseaux de preuves tel que: B -> C ssi ”le nombre de copies de B dépend du nombre de copies de C”. L’acyclicité de -> borne le nombre de copies de chaque sous-terme, donc la complexité du terme. Ensuite nous définissons des sous-systèmes de la logique linéaire assurant l’acyclicité de ->. Nous étudions aussi des caractérisations du temps élémentaire et primitif récursif. Dans le but d’adapter nos sous-systèmes de la logique linéaire à des langages plus riches, nous adaptons la sémantique des contextes aux réseaux d’interaction, utilisés comme langage cible pour de petits langage de programmation. Nous utilisons cette sémantique des contexte pour définir une sémantique dénotationnelle sur les réseaux d’interactions

Paths-based criteria and application to linear logic subsystems characterizing polynomial time

International audienc

''Backward'' Coinduction, Nash equilibrium and the Rationality of Escalation

International audienceWe study a new application of coinduction, namely escalation which is a typical feature of infinite games. Therefore tools conceived for studying infinite mathematical structures, namely those deriving from coinduction are essential. Here we use coinduction, or backward coinduction (to show its connection with the same concept for finite games) to study carefully and formally infinite games especially the so-called dollar auction, which is considered as the paradigm of escalation. Unlike what is commonly admitted, we show that, provided one assumes that the other agent will always stop, bidding is rational, because it results in a subgame perfect equilibrium. We show that this is not the only rational strategy profile (the only subgame perfect equilibrium). Indeed if an agent stops and will stop at every step, we claim that he is rational as well, if one admits that his opponent will never stop, because this corresponds to a subgame perfect equilibrium. Amazingly, in the infinite dollar auction game, the behavior in which both agents stop at each step is not a Nash equilibrium, hence is not a subgame perfect equilibrium, hence is not rational. The right notion of rationality we obtain fits with common sense and experience and removes all feeling of paradox