Meta-analysis of fertilization experiments indicates multiple limiting nutrients in northeastern deciduous forests

It is widely accepted that nitrogen limits primary production in temperate forests, although co-limitation by N and P has also been suggested, and on some soils Ca and base cations are in short supply. I conducted a meta-analysis to assess the strength of existing experimental evidence for limitation of primary production by N, P, and Ca in hardwood forests of the northeastern United States and southeastern Canada, using data from 35 fertilization experiments in deciduous forests on glaciated soils across the region. There is strong evidence for N limitation (formal meta-analysis weighted mean response ratio = 1.51, p \u3c 0.01; simple mean = 1.42, p \u3c 0.001). Forest productivity also tends to increase with additions of P (simple mean = 1.15, p = 0.05) and Ca (simple mean = 1.36 p \u3c 0.001). Across all treatments, 85% of response ratios were positive. Multiple-element additions had larger effects than single elements, but factorial experiments showed little evidence of synergistic effects between nutrient additions. Production responses correlated positively with the rate of N fertilization, but this effect was reduced at high rates of ambient N deposition

Epistemological Aspects of Hope

Hope is an attitude with a distinctive epistemological dimension: it is incompatible with knowledge. This chapter examines hope as it relates to knowledge but also to probability and inductive considerations. Such epistemic constraints can make hope either impossible, or, when hope remains possible, they affect how one’s epistemic situation can make hope rational rather than irrational. Such issues are especially relevant to when hopefulness may permissibly figure in practical deliberation over a course of action. So I consider cases of second-order inductive reflection on when one should, or should not, be hopeful for an outcome with which one has a long record of experience: in other words, what is the epistemology behind when one should, if ever, stop hoping for outcomes which have failed one many times in the past

Subprime Education: For-Profit Colleges and the Problem with Title IV Federal Student Aid

Federal student-aid policy is designed with the goal of expanding access to higher education for all students. It has been enormously successful in achieving that goal. Yet, for many students, federal student aid has served only to burden them with oppressive student-debt obligations. These obligations are a particular problem with respect to the for-profit higher-education sector, which receives a large and ever-growing proportion of federal aid. This Note examines the interaction between federal student-aid policy and for-profit institutions, arguing that the noble goals of modern federal student-aid policy enable the very practices that lead to negative outcomes for many students by creating a lucrative market for subprime education. This Note analyzes a continuum of approaches to reducing the negative student outcomes caused by many for-profit institutions, concluding that the blame lies not with for-profit institutions but with federal student-aid policy. Ultimately, the modern federal student-aid regime requires regulators to choose between abetting negative student outcomes and reducing access to higher education. This dilemma can be avoided only by deemphasizing the student-oriented aid model in favor of an institution-centered model that is focused on reducing the price of education

Nitrogen, Phosphorus, and Suspended Solids Concentrations in Tributaries to the Great Bay Estuary Watershed in 2014

Nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment loads to the Great Bay Estuary are a constant concern. The Piscataqua Region Estuaries Partnership (PREP) calculates the nitrogen load from tributaries to the Great Bay Estuary for its State of Our Estuaries reports. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to collect representative data on nitrogen, phosphorus, and suspended sediment concentrations in tributaries to the Great Bay Estuary in 2014. The study design followed the tributary sampling design which was implemented by the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services between 2001 and 2007 and sustained by the University of New Hampshire from 2008 to the present, so as to provide comparable data to the previous loading estimates. The purpose of this memorandum is to document the results of quality assurance checks on the 2014 water quality data collected by UNH, so that PREP can calculates the nitrogen load from tributaries to the Great Bay Estuary. DES reviewed these data to ensure that they met data quality objectives for PREP and for Section 305b water quality assessment

The Disparity Between Scientific Consensus and American Public Opinion of Genetically Modified Organisms and Genetic Engineering

Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and genetic engineering (GE) are accepted as safe and useful by the consensus of the scientific community. Their diverse utility has shown promise in addressing major challenges of the 21st century, including world hunger, global warming, and the prevalence of diet-related diseases (e.g. heart disease, cancer, diabetes, etc.). A 2014 Pew Research Center survey revealed that while 88% of scientists agreed that GM foods were safe to eat, only 37% of American consumers agreed. Furthermore, only 35% of U.S. adults trusted scientists to accurately inform the public about GMOs. To explain this disparity, I synthesize information about stakeholders in GMOs and GE, demographics linked to acceptance and denial, interpretation of scientific consensus, psychological mechanisms controlling bias, and poor practice of science. Analysis reveals that the disparity in GMO and GE perception between the scientific community and the American public was caused by bad science, foreign political agendas, profit-driven media, and psychological factors, such as intuitive expectations, soft attitudes, and the backfire effect; furthermore, I show that despite innate conduits for bias development, educated, high income, and youthful demographics will shrink the gap between scientific consensus and public opinion if GMO education and equal access to education increase

The Pinkerton Doctrine and Murder

[Excerpt] Suppose that A hires B to rob a bank in Massachusetts and A then hires C to rob a bank in Rhode Island. B and C have not met face to face, but each knows he is part of a conspiracy to rob banks in more than one state. All agree that no one will be killed in the robberies. A then procures D to get a car for use in the robberies. B uses D’s car to rob his bank. During the robbery of C’s bank, C pulls out a gun and shoots and kills the bank guard. Clearly, A, B, C, and D are all guilty of conspiracy to rob banks, the act to which they agreed. Clearly too, A, B, C, and D are not guilty of conspiracy to murder, because they never agreed to kill anyone. C, however, is guilty of murder, since he intentionally killed the bank guard without justification or excuse. But can A, B, and D also be charged with this murder? There are, of course, several ways in which one person may be guilty of a murder committed by another person. One is by the felony-murder rule, which historically has meant that one is guilty of murder if, in the course of committing a felony, one causes the death of another person. In this example, if the felony-murder rule applies, A, B, and D could be guilty of felony murder of the bank guard – a murder committed by their cofelon, C. But if the felony-murder rule is not applicable, either because the state has rejected the rule, as most commentators have long been urging states to do, or because the state legislature has defined felony murder as second degree murder and the prosecution wants to convict A, B, and D, as well as C of first degree murder of the guard, is there another basis for finding A, B, and D guilty? The doctrine of complicity, also known as aiding and abetting, is, of course, another way to make a person guilty of a murder committed by someone else. But would A, B, and D be guilty of murder of the bank guard on an aiding and abetting theory in this instance? On mens rea grounds, A, B, and D intended at most to encourage a robbery by C. In Model Penal Code terms, that was their purpose or “conscious objective.” But their purpose was not to encourage C to kill anyone. They had expressly agreed that no one would be killed. They did not know that C would kill during the robbery. If aiding and abetting requires a purpose to facilitate the particular crime at issue, A, B, and D would not be guilty of murder of the bank guard by aiding and abetting. On actus reus grounds, there also would be a problem with complicity. A did hire C to rob the bank. He did actively set in motion the crime which resulted in the killing of the guard. But what did B and D really do to assist or encourage the robbery by C, much less C’s murder of the guard? All they did was to agree to be part of a larger conspiracy to rob banks. One could argue that they never facilitated C’s specific robbery, and that they did nothing to facilitate his killing of the guard. There is, however, an alternative way in which A, B, and D can be convicted of C’s murder of the guard. If the court finds that A, B, C, and D were in a conspiracy to rob the banks, and if C committed murder in furtherance of that conspiracy, then A, B, and D are all also guilty of murder, as long as they could reasonably have foreseen that such an event would occur in the course of their conspiracy. They could all be guilty of first degree murder, even though A, B, and D never met the bank guard, never assisted or encouraged C to kill him, never wanted C to kill him or knew C would kill him, and never even visited the bank or entered the state in which the bank was located! The rule by which this result is reached, called the Pinkerton rule, is one of the most controversial doctrines in modern criminal law. Broadly stated, the rule is that “any conspirator in a continuing conspiracy is responsible for the illegal acts committed by his cohorts in furtherance of the conspiracy, within the scope of the conspiracy, and reasonably foreseeable by the conspirators as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.” This rule permits conviction of a crime that the accused did not intend, plan, want, or even know about, committed against a victim whom the defendant did not know or want to harm. The rule applies throughout the life of the conspiracy to all who originally agreed to join the conspiracy, unless the defendant overtly acted to disavow and/or defeat the conspiracy. The Pinkerton rule “is not universally followed.” It is rejected in the Model Penal Code. Many state courts have interpreted their statutes to require more than membership in a conspiracy for complicity in substantive crimes committed in the course of that conspiracy. Commentary on Pinkerton in the academic world, much like commentary on felony murder and on conspiracy in general, is overwhelmingly negative. On the contrary, this article argues that the Pinkerton doctrine, far from being an aberration, is rather more an illustration of our existing criminal law and of some of the important theoretical assumptions behind it. [...

Assertion, knowledge and predictions

John N. Williams (1994) and Matthew Weiner (2005) invoke predictions in order to undermine the normative relevance of knowledge for assertions; in particular, Weiner argues, predictions are important counterexamples to the Knowledge Account of Assertion (KAA). I argue here that they are not true counterexamples at all, a point that can be agreed upon even by those who reject KAA