In which sense is Intellective Knowledge said to be "more true" than Scientific Knowledge? – A problematic comparison in Aristotle, An. Post. II 19.

At the very end of Posterior Analytics, Aristotle writes that “nothing apart from intel- lective knowledge (noûs) can be truer than scientific knowledge (epistēmē)”. This claim may sound problematic in consideration of the Aristotelian Principle of Exluded-Mid- dle, which states that there are no intermediate degrees between truth and falsity. In fact, Aristotle's logic leaves no room for incremental truths, so that a more circumstan- tial understanding of such alleged superior truth is needed. After a critical discussion of some literature on the topic, the meaning of Aristotle’s alēthésteron (‘more true’) shall be understood here as meaning: (1) more exact because of its unitary object, (2) more certain and convincing, (3) more orientative and guiding, (4) conceptually antecedent, and, finally, (5) more causative of truth. Intellective knowledge will emerge as a non-in- ferential way of understanding, whose positive truth-value will always be the same as the one guaranteed by scientific knowledge

Introduction. History of Modern Logic in a New Key

"We like to think of the aim of the book as doing for modern logic what John Corcoran did for the work of George Boole, namely to make sense of and do justice to the idea that Aristotelian syllogistic logic contributed to its creation. More specifically, the chapters show that the period between the nineteenth and early twentieth century saw a parallel development of modern logicians reshaping syllogism and reflections on syllogism shaping modern logic. This might sound odd as it stands in striking contrast to the standard narrative about the history of modern logic, which says that its creation and development happened in spite of, or in direct opposition to, the old logic. W. V. Quine, for one, wrote that Aristotelian logic is to modern logic what the ‘arithmetic of primitive tribes’ is to modern mathematics: not even a scientific predecessor but a ‘pre-scientific fragment’.", p. 1

Il discorso astrologico sulla “cometa” del 1572 del carmelitano Francesco Giuntini: aspettative e inquietudini dal cielo alla terra nell’epoca della Controriforma

The nova star that appeared in 1572 (known today as T ycho’ s supernova) was considered to be a comet, rather than a star, by many astronomers and observers of that time. Francesco Giuntini (1522-1590), a Florentine man of letters, Carmelite theologian, and skilled astrologer, was among those who regarded the unexpected nocturnal light as a sublunary comet, albeit with some inconsistencies. The identification of the nova with a cometary phenomenon was in accordance with the “standard physics” of the late Renaissance, namely Aristotelian natural philosophy, which was still being taught and learned as the common basis of knowledge in universities and colleges all across Europe. From this point of view, Giuntini conformed his understanding of the nova to the general scientific framework of his age, even though in the end he mixed up his own interpretation with a different view, which had been advanced in the meantime by the Flemish astronomer Cornelius Gemma (1535-1578). Nevertheless, the short astrological discourse, or giudicio, that Giuntini composed on the topic and published in Venice in the immediate aftermath of the stunning astronomical sighting does present a few original elements, which are briefly examined and discussed in the present contribution. Giuntini’s Discorso sopra la cometa apparsa nel mese di novembre 1572 fully belongs to the genre literature of vernacular prognostications on comets with prophetic overtones. As late as the end of the sixteenth century, this kind of literature was still in high demand among a wide range of readers and patrons, whose anxieties in this case were as deep as their fear of an impending threat from the sky. For us today the astrological plaquette by Giuntini works like a prism of those fears, disquietudes and old beliefs, which were widespread among both laymen and the learned society of the Italian peninsula and France in the age of the Counter-reformation

Colour evolution of Betelgeuse and Antares over two millennia, derived from historical records, as a new constraint on mass and age

After core hydrogen burning, massive stars evolve from blue-white dwarfs to red supergiants by expanding, brightening, and cooling within few millennia. We discuss a previously neglected constraint on mass, age, and evolutionary state of Betelgeuse and Antares, namely their observed colour evolution over historical times: We place all 236 stars bright enough for their colour to be discerned by the unaided eye (V ≤ 3.3 mag) on the colour-magnitude-diagram (CMD), and focus on those in the Hertzsprung gap. We study pre-telescopic records on star colour with historically critical methods to find stars that have evolved noticeably in colour within the last millennia. Our main result is that Betelgeuse was recorded with a colour significantly different (non-red) than today (red, B − V = 1.78 ± 0.05 mag). Hyginus (Rome) and Sima Qian (China) independently report it two millennia ago as appearing like Saturn (B − V = 1.09 ± 0.16 mag) in colour and ‘yellow’ (quantifiable as B − V = 0.95 ± 0.35 mag), respectively (together, 5.1σ different from today). The colour change of Betelgeuse is a new, tight constraint for single-star theoretical evolutionary models (or merger models). It is most likely located less than one millennium past the bottom of the red giant branch, before which rapid colour evolution is expected. Evolutionary tracks from MIST consistent with both its colour evolution and its location on the CMD suggest a mass of ∼14 M⊙ at ∼14 Myr. The (roughly) constant colour of Antares for the last three millennia also constrains its mass and age. Wezen was reported white historically, but is now yellow

The Florence Psychiatric Interview

The Florence Psychiatric Interview (FPI) is an interviewing instrument for evaluating psychopathology in the community. The FPI is designed to be completed by clinical interviewers, and focuses on single episodes of illness where the symptoms are assessed and graded according to their severity on five-point scales. Psychiatric symptoms are evaluated regardless of their diagnostic collocation, and period and lifetime diagnoses may be generated by combining the episodes and using the appropriate algorithms (the information provided by the FPI covers the requirements of all the present diagnostic systems). Other aspects of psychiatric disorders that are usually ignored in other interviews are investigated (for example, costs of illness, use of health facilities, life events, and personality traits). Data on reliability (inter-rater agreement and test-retest reliability) and agreement with other instruments such as the Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI) and the Structured Clinical Interview for the Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders (SCID) seem encouraging. The FPI's ability to collect lifetime symptoms by combining episodes matches that of an interview (the CIDI) that uses the lifetime approach. Agreement between fully qualified psychiatrists and trained residents was excellent. The ability of the cases to recall symptoms experienced several years before was also acceptable. This instrument is therefore proposed for clinical studies at the epidemiological level. Copyright © 2001 Whurr Publishers Ltd

Loan Loss Provision: Some Empirical Evidence for Italian Banks

This paper uses data from a panel of more than 400 Italian banks for the period 2001 - 2012 to examine the main determinants of loan loss provision (LLP), which are classified as either discretionary (income smoothing, capital management, signalling) or non-discretionary (related to the business cycle). The results suggest that LLP in Italian banks is driven mainly by non-discretionary components, especially during the recession of 2008-2012, and is consistent with a countercyclical behavior of LLP. Further, it is generally less pro cyclical (although not during the recent economic crisis) in the case of local banks: since their loans are more collateralised, their behaviour is more strongly affected by supervisory activity, their initial coverage ratio being lower than for other banks

Aristotle's Syllogism and the Creation of Modern Logic: Between Tradition and Innovation, 1820s-1930s

Offering a bold new vision on the history of modern logic, Lukas M. Verburgt and Matteo Cosci focus on the lasting impact of Aristotle's syllogism between the 1820s and 1930s. For over two millennia, deductive logic was the syllogism and syllogism was the yardstick of sound human reasoning. During the 19th century, this hegemony fell apart and logicians, including Boole, Frege and Peirce, took deductive logic far beyond its Aristotelian borders. However, contrary to common wisdom, reflections on syllogism were also instrumental to the creation of new logical developments, such as first-order logic and early set theory. This volume presents the period under discussion as one of both tradition and innovation, both continuity and discontinuity. Modern logic broke away from the syllogistic tradition, but without Aristotle's syllogism, modern logic would not have been born. A vital follow up to The Aftermath of Syllogism, this book traces the longue durée history of syllogism from Richard Whately's revival of formal logic in the 1820s through the work of David Hilbert and the Göttingen school up to the 1930s. Bringing together a group of major international experts, it sheds crucial new light on the emergence of modern logic and the roots of analytic philosophy in the 19th and early 20th centuries

Verità e comparazione in Aristotele

This research aims to study the Aristotelian notion of truth (ἀλήϑεια) in relation to the development of the so called logic of comparison from a historical and philosophical standpoint. The logic of comparison (or comparative logic) is defined as the proportioning way to make comparisons between different terms through major, minor or equal measure (Casari 1984; 1985). The main thesis of this research is that the Aristotelian notion of truth is not a gradable value, i. e. declinable by “more” or “less”, but, because of that, it could be considered as the ultimative reference of validity for comparative logic. This is argued through the analysis of three chosen key-concepts: gradationism, truth and comparison. Firstly, it is shown how some Aristotelian conceptions about “more” or “less” were unduly taken over with ontological (mis)understanding by later metaphisics, up to consider them as logical justification of existence for degrees of being and corresponding truths, despite Aristotle’s thought, from faulty sensibility to a highest level of absolute Truth. Some recent authoritative studies about the subject of the Aristotelian theory of ἀλήϑεια are been considered here and the result is that none of those allows to attribute such a gradable notion to Aristotle. Then it is proposed a critique evaluation about the problem of the origins of the ancient comparative logic, showing that presumed degrees of truth are not detectable at all in the Aristotelian dialectic, but only more or less sound arguments always based on the criterion of bivalence (truth/false) provided by the Principle of Excluded Middle. Finally, the research ends arguing the groundlessness for attributing to Aristotle the idea of an intuitive and pre-predicative truth as different, prior and superior to an alleged predicative truth through the contextual critique of the interpretations of A. Trendelenburg (1846), F. Brentano (1862) and M. Heidegger (1930) and their common Neo-Scholastic background. - From a theoretical point of view, the whole thesis can be read as a critique to the idea of «truer»La presente ricerca mira a studiare da un punto di vista storico-filosofico la nozione aristotelica di verità (ἀλήϑεια) in relazione allo sviluppo della cosiddetta logica della comparazione. La logica della comparazione (o comparativa) è definita come la procedura di proporzionamento atta ad effettuare confronti tra diversi termini di paragone secondo maggiore, minore o uguale misura (Casari 1984; 1985). La tesi centrale di questa ricerca è che la nozione aristotelica di verità non sia un valore gradazionistico, declinabile cioè secondo “più” e “meno”, ma che, proprio in virtù di questo, possa costituire il riferimento di validità per una comparazione logica. Tre sono i concetti chiave attorno ai quali si articola l’esposizione: gradazionismo, verità, comparazione. In tema di gradazionismo, si mostra come alcune concezioni logiche aristoteliche siano state poi equivocate in senso ontolgico dalle metafisiche successive, fino a giustificare, malgrado Aristotele, l’esistenza di livelli di essere-verità culminanti in un Vero assoluto. In tema di verità, si prendono in analisi alcune recenti autorevoli interpretazioni sul tema dell’ἀλήϑεια aristotelica e si dimostra come nessuna di queste autorizzi ad attribuire ad Aristotele una nozione gradazionistica di verità. In tema di comparazione, si cerca di offrire un bilancio critico riguardo all’origine della logica comparativa antica, mostrando come nella dialettica aristotelica non siano rilevabili gradi di verità, quanto piuttosto modi più o meno fondati di argomentare, sempre basati comunque sulla presupposizione del criterio di bivalenza (vero/falso) ben definito dal principio del terzo escluso. Infine, la ricerca si conclude sostenendo l’implausibilità di attribuzione ad Aristotele dell’idea di una nozione di verità intuizionistica ed antepredicativa come differente, prioritaria e superiore rispetto ad una verità del giudizio, attraverso la critica contestuale di A. Trendelenburg (1846), F. Brentano (1862) e M. Heidegger (1930) e alla loro comune impostazione neoscolastica. - Da un punto di vista teoretico, questa tesi può essere letta come una critica all’idea di «più vero

Parti del Diverso. Genesi di una nozione di negazione nel ‘Sofista’ di Platone

In the Sophist Plato proposed his account of ontological negation. His dialogical definition rested upon a complex philosophical background. This paper aims to retrace that underlying philosophical background in order to fully appreciate Plato’s original solution. Both external and internal theoretical assumptions are identified in the text as conditional, operating constraints. The necessity of avoiding any commitment to absolute non-being, absolute relativism or radical skepticism, or even complete indiscernibility on the matter of negation can be listed among the external constraints at work in the discussion. At the same time, Plato was probably compelled to avoid any commitment to the introduction of the so called ‘negative Forms’ to save his own account from possible inconsistencies that emerged in discussions within his Academy. In particular the critical role played by Aristotle’s De Ideis is envisaged here as the implicit and provocative incitement for the new direction taken by the Sophist in regard of the famous definition of Non-being as Otherness. The constant belonging of each item of reality to the kind of Otherness, whose natural parts for Plato lay at the core of the very notion of negation, will be presented at the end as the only way to provide grounds to the otherwise inconceivable notion of Non-Being. Here it is argued that Plato managed to develop this conclusion despite and beyond all external and internal philosophical constraints that he found along his way towards the daring definition of ‘what is not’

Paolo Veneto, principe dei dialettici

La vita e le opere di Paolo Nicoletti Veneto presentate da un punto di vista filosofico nel contesto della storia dell'università di Padova