A Two-Step Theory and Test of Democratic Waves *

Abstract Scholars, observing clustering in transitions to democracy, argue that democratization diffuses across borders as citizens in autocracies demand the same reforms they witness in neighboring states. We disagree. The present paper asserts that the diffusion of democracy literature rests on weak theoretical foundations and does not properly test for diffusion. We advance an alternative two-step argument to explain clustering of democratization: (1) economic shocks, which are clustered spatially and temporally, induce the breakdown of authoritarian regimes; then (2) democratic diffusion, in turn, influences whether a fallen dictatorship will be replaced by a democracy or a new autocracy. Diffusion, despite playing an important role, is insufficient to explain the clustering of transitions, notably because it cannot account for the timing of the waves. Using data on 125 autocracies from 1875 to 2004, we show that economic crises trigger authoritarian breakdowns, while diffusion determines whether the new regime is democratic or authoritarian. * Thanks t

31st Annual Meeting and Associated Programs of the Society for Immunotherapy of Cancer (SITC 2016) : part two

Background The immunological escape of tumors represents one of the main ob- stacles to the treatment of malignancies. The blockade of PD-1 or CTLA-4 receptors represented a milestone in the history of immunotherapy. However, immune checkpoint inhibitors seem to be effective in specific cohorts of patients. It has been proposed that their efficacy relies on the presence of an immunological response. Thus, we hypothesized that disruption of the PD-L1/PD-1 axis would synergize with our oncolytic vaccine platform PeptiCRAd. Methods We used murine B16OVA in vivo tumor models and flow cytometry analysis to investigate the immunological background. Results First, we found that high-burden B16OVA tumors were refractory to combination immunotherapy. However, with a more aggressive schedule, tumors with a lower burden were more susceptible to the combination of PeptiCRAd and PD-L1 blockade. The therapy signifi- cantly increased the median survival of mice (Fig. 7). Interestingly, the reduced growth of contralaterally injected B16F10 cells sug- gested the presence of a long lasting immunological memory also against non-targeted antigens. Concerning the functional state of tumor infiltrating lymphocytes (TILs), we found that all the immune therapies would enhance the percentage of activated (PD-1pos TIM- 3neg) T lymphocytes and reduce the amount of exhausted (PD-1pos TIM-3pos) cells compared to placebo. As expected, we found that PeptiCRAd monotherapy could increase the number of antigen spe- cific CD8+ T cells compared to other treatments. However, only the combination with PD-L1 blockade could significantly increase the ra- tio between activated and exhausted pentamer positive cells (p= 0.0058), suggesting that by disrupting the PD-1/PD-L1 axis we could decrease the amount of dysfunctional antigen specific T cells. We ob- served that the anatomical location deeply influenced the state of CD4+ and CD8+ T lymphocytes. In fact, TIM-3 expression was in- creased by 2 fold on TILs compared to splenic and lymphoid T cells. In the CD8+ compartment, the expression of PD-1 on the surface seemed to be restricted to the tumor micro-environment, while CD4 + T cells had a high expression of PD-1 also in lymphoid organs. Interestingly, we found that the levels of PD-1 were significantly higher on CD8+ T cells than on CD4+ T cells into the tumor micro- environment (p < 0.0001). Conclusions In conclusion, we demonstrated that the efficacy of immune check- point inhibitors might be strongly enhanced by their combination with cancer vaccines. PeptiCRAd was able to increase the number of antigen-specific T cells and PD-L1 blockade prevented their exhaus- tion, resulting in long-lasting immunological memory and increased median survival

The Organization of Factions: Interest Mobilization and the Group Theory of Politics

Abstract Theories of interest group mobilization are central to political science but current research on interest organizations has not proven useful for scholars in related fields. I argue that, by adapting organizational theory to account for the particular function of interest organizations, scholars can build a widely applied theoretical framework. The key step is an analysis of the role that organizations play in the mobilization of influence: they are intermediaries, reliant on their constituents and their lobbying targets. Reviewing research on ethnic politics and political economy, I demonstrate that this intermediary view of interest organizations encourages theoretical ideas to travel between subfields. Keywords Interest groups . Factions . Intermediary organizations Political scientists once believed that they could construct a general theory of political competition. Research on interest group mobilization and conflict was the proposed starting point. The questions of politics were BWho gets what, when, and how?&apos;&apos; and the answers were to be found by studying how social groups mobilize to influence political institutions

The Organization of Factions: Interest Mobilization and the Group Theory of Politics

Theories of interest group mobilization are central to political science but current research on interest organizations has not proven useful for scholars in related fields. I argue that, by adapting organizational theory to account for the particular function of interest organizations, scholars can build a widely applied theoretical framework. The key step is an analysis of the role that organizations play in the mobilization of influence: they are intermediaries, reliant on their constituents and their lobbying targets. Reviewing research on ethnic politics and political economy, I demonstrate that this intermediary view of interest organizations encourages theoretical ideas to travel between subfields. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2006Interest groups, Factions, Intermediary organizations,

Campaigning as an Industry: Consulting Business Models and Intra-Party Competition

American political campaigns have become a multi-billion dollar industry. Rather than assume that only political factors affect the campaigns that voters see, scholars must assess the importance of the business incentives associated with political consulting. Economic competition does not match political competition; firms compete for clients within the two major parties, against their political allies. I argue that the supply of firms in each party, the revenue models in the industry, the diversification of client types, and the cooperative structure in each party all may affect political campaigns. The way the industry operates and the different patterns of behavior within each party create incentives and practices that may alter campaigns in response to economic factors having little to do with optimal political strategy. Using two original surveys and a network analysis, I analyze how the industry is changing and how consultants in each party cooperate and compete.

Campaigns & Elections

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