'Re-Using' Qualitative Data: on the Merits of an Investigative Epistemology

This article is written to accompany and respond to the articles that form the special issue of Sociological Research Online on \'Re-using qualitative data\'. It argues that the articles are a welcome contribution, because they help to move the debate beyond moralistic and polarised positions, to demonstrate instead with what sociologists can achieve by \'re-using\' qualitative data. The article argues for an investigative epistemology and investigative practices to guide qualitative data use and \'re-use\', and suggests that this is particularly important in the current social research climate.Qualitative Research / Re-Using Qualitative Data / Secondary Analysis / Investigative Epistemology

Demographic Dividends, Human Capital, and Saving.

The objective of this paper is to provide new evidence about the development effects of changes in population age structure and human and physical capital. This extends our previous work by developing and employing a more comprehensive model of demographic dividends. In addition, we extend earlier analysis about the quantity-quality tradeoff using newly available NTA data for 39 countries, in contrast to the nineteen with the necessary data in our 2010 study. This permits a more detailed analysis, treating public expenditures and private expenditures separately, and considering the role of per capita income as well as fertility and child dependency in relation to human capital spending. The analysis is used in a simulation with realistic demography to show how human capital investment has varied in relation to the changing demography from 1950 to the present, and how it might be expected to change over the rest of this century. These new estimates are then used in a more comprehensive model that incorporates both human and physical capital. The analysis provides estimates of the first and second demographic dividends and how they are affected by speed of fertility decline. The timing of the effects is documented and the relative importance of investment in physical and human capital is assessed. This improves our understanding of the economic implications of the demographic dividend and particularly the “second demographic dividend”

The Scope of Congress\u27s Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement Power After City of Boerne v. Flores

Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Supreme Court held that Section 2 permits Congress to define the badges and incidents of slavery and pass all laws necessary and proper for their abolition. Congress has passed a number of civil rights laws under this understanding of its Section 2 power. Several commentators have urged Congress to define the badges and incidents of slavery expansively and to use Section 2 to address everything from racial profiling to discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual orientation. Jones, however, is in serious tension with City of Boerne v. Flores, which held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s virtually identical enforcement language permits only prophylactic legislation that is congruent and proportional to violations of judicially determined rights. Even more critically, Jones’s grant to Congress of substantive interpretive power runs afoul of the principles of separation of powers, judicial supremacy, and federalism that drove the Court in City of Boerne. Thus, the time is ripe to reconsider Jones and the proper scope of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power. This Article does precisely that, delving into the text, history, and structural implications of Section 2. Ultimately, this Article considers three ways to approach Section 2: as a limited power to prevent and remedy coerced labor; as a broad power to define the badges and incidents of slavery and to protect a wide array of civil rights; and as a prophylactic power to prevent the de facto reemergence of slavery by addressing the historical incidents and badges of the slave system. This Article concludes that the prophylactic reading of Section 2 best comports with both the original meaning of the provision and the structural principles of separation of powers, judicial supremacy, and federalism

McCulloch and the Thirteenth Amendment

Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress the “power to enforce” the ban on slavery and involuntary servitude “by appropriate legislation.” The conventional view of Section 2 regards this language as an allusion to McCulloch v. Maryland’s explication of Congress’s executory powers, and holds that Congress has substantial, and largely unreviewable, power to determine both the ends and the means of Section 2 legislation. This Essay argues that the conventional view departs from the original meaning of Section 2. It demonstrates that McCulloch preserved a role for judicial review with respect to both the ends and means of federal legislation. This role was clearly part of the understanding and anticipated application of McCulloch by the time the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 enacted. This Essay concludes that Section 2 preserves a role for meaningful judicial review and grants Congress power to regulate conduct that threatens the reinvigoration of slavery or involuntary servitude, but not near-plenary power over all civil or human rights

The Scope of Congress\u27s Thirteenth Amendment Enforcement Power After City of Boerne v. Flores

Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress power “to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Supreme Court held that Section Two permits Congress to define the “badges and incidents of slavery” and pass “all laws necessary and proper” for their abolition. Congress has passed a number of civil rights laws under this understanding of its Section Two power. Several commentators have urged Congress to expansively define the “badges and incidents of slavery” and use Section Two to address everything from racial profiling to discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual orientation. Jones, however, is in serious tension with City of Boerne v. Flores, which held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s virtually identical enforcement language permits only prophylactic legislation that is congruent and proportional to violations of judicially-determined rights. Even more critically, Jones’s grant to Congress of substantive interpretive power runs afoul of the principles of separation of powers, judicial supremacy, and federalism that drove the Court in City of Boerne. Thus, the time is ripe to reconsider Jones and the proper scope of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power. This Article does precisely that, delving into the text, history, and structural implications of Section Two. Ultimately, this Article considers three ways to approach Section Two: as a limited power to prevent and remedy coerced labor; as a broad power to define the badges and incidents of slavery and protect a wide array of civil rights; and as a prophylactic power to prevent the de facto reemergence of slavery by addressing the historical incidents and badges of the slave system. This article concludes that the prophylactic reading of Section Two best comports with both the original meaning of the provision and the structural principles of separation of powers, judicial supremacy, and federalism

Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery

Most agree that Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment empowers Congress to legislate regarding the “badges and incidents of slavery.” Few, however, have explored in depth the precise meaning of this concept. The goal of this Article is to provide a historical and conceptual framework for interpreting and identifying the badges and incidents of slavery. It examines the original public meaning of the terms “badge of slavery” and “incident of slavery” as well as how the “badges and incidents” concept has been incorporated into and used in Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence. It considers several analytical variables from historical, jurisprudential, and policy perspectives, including what populations Congress can protect; what actors Congress can regulate; and what types of conduct Congress can target under its Section Two power. Ultimately, this Article concludes that the best understanding of the “badges and incidents of slavery” refers to public or widespread private action, aimed at any racial group or population that has previously been held in slavery or servitude, that mimics the law of slavery and has significant potential to lead to the de facto reenslavement or legal subjugation of the targeted group. This limited definition will assist Congress in identifying ways in which it can fulfill the Thirteenth Amendment’s promise of universal civil and political freedom. At the same time, it will provide judicially enforceable limits for the exercise of the Section Two power. thirteenth amendment, section two power, slavery, badges and incidents of slaver

Good Faith and Narrow Tailoring in Fisher

This piece considers three issues relating to the Supreme Court’s upcoming decision in Fisher v. University of Texas: First, how should the Court perform the narrow tailoring inquiry? Is any deference due the University with respect to its choice of means by which it seeks to diversify its class? Second, how should the relatively modest impact of the university’s racial preference impact the Court’s assessment of narrow tailoring? Third, what is the constitutional relevance of Texas’s Top Ten Percent Program? Does the relative success of the program make it a workable race-neutral alternative that constitutionally precludes the school from adding additional race-conscious diversity-seeking measures