Perfect-information games with lower-semicontinuous payoffs

We prove that every multiplayer perfect-information game with bounded and lower-semicontinuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille [Solan, E., N. Vieille. 2003. Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games. J. Math. Econom. 39 911-929], which shows that a subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in pure strategies need not exist when the payoffs are not lower-semicontinuous. In addition, if the range of payoffs is finite, we characterize in the form of a Folk Theorem the set of all plays and payoffs that are induced by subgame-perfect 0-equilibria in pure strategies

Borel games with lower-semi-continuous payoffs

We prove that every two-player non-zero-sum Borel game with lower-semi-continuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille (2003), which shows that a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium need not exists when the payoffs are not lower-semi-continuous.

Glucose Monitoring During Pregnancy

Self-monitoring of blood glucose in women with mild gestational diabetes has recently been proven to be useful in reducing the rates of fetal overgrowth and gestational weight gain. However, uncertainty remains with respect to the optimal frequency and timing of self-monitoring. A continuous glucose monitoring system may have utility in pregnant women with insulin-treated diabetes, especially for those women with blood sugars that are difficult to control or who experience nocturnal hypoglycemia; however, continuous glucose monitoring systems need additional study as part of larger, randomized trials

Subgame maxmin strategies in zero-sum stochastic games with tolerance levels

We study subgame φ-maxmin strategies in two-player zero-sum stochastic games with finite action spaces and a countable state space. Here φ denotes the tolerance function, a function which assigns a non-negative tolerated error level to every subgame. Subgame φ-maxmin strategies are strategies of the maximizing player that guarantee the lower value in every subgame within the subgame-dependent tolerance level as given by φ. First, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a strategy to be a subgame φ-maxmin strategy. As a special case we obtain a characterization for subgame maxmin strategies, i.e. strategies that exactly guarantee the lower value at every subgame. Secondly, we present sufficient conditions for the existence of a subgame φ-maxmin strategy. Finally, we show the possibly surprising result that the existence of subgame φ-maxmin strategies for every positive tolerance function φ is equivalent to the existence of a subgame maxmin strategy

Modalities of use of oral propranolol in proliferative infantile haemangiomas: an international survey among practitioners

International audienc