Hau

The article presents reflections on some issues encountered when combining traditional Maori and Western concert music. These issues include tradition and repertoire versus innovation, control versus freedom, collaboration versus appropriation, and the overlapping roles of creator and performer. Focal to the article is "Hau," a Maori word meaning breath or wind. The author also presents a comparison of Western music with traditional Maori instrumental music

An environmental disaster in Brazil raises highly problematic risk and regulation issues

In this regulatory regime, parent companies are seen as responsible and the federal regulator as weak, writes Martin Lodg

Illuminations: a proposed taxonomy for death-inspired works in Western art music

Throughout the history of Western art music, death has been a major stimulus for composers, and it continues to be so for contemporary musicians. Composer responses to death have been predominantly associated with emotions of grief, sadness and loss. An examination of responses in the Western art music repertoire of the past five hundred years, however, reveals that there is a diversity of composer reactions, from mourning through prophetic imaginings to resignation, and extending to spiritual affirmation or theological affirmation of an afterlife. Informed by surveying a number of composers’ diverse responses, this article outlines differences found in order to propose a taxonomy of varying creative musical approaches to death

Regulating Infrastructures: The limits of the regulatory state

This paper points to the centrality of the infrastructure industry in the study of regulation, in general, and the regulatory state, in particular. It progress in three steps. First, it considers the particular attributes that make infrastructure industries a unique site for the exploration of policy trajectories and the limits of statehood. Second, it discusses, in brief, cross-national and cross-sectoral experiences in regulating infrastructure industries to highlight the diversity and instability that have characterized their regulation over the past three decades. Finally, the paper takes the problem-solving capacity of the regulatory state into question in the face of inherent 'wicked issues'. In conclusion, the paper develops three scenarios for the future of the regulatory state in infrastructure industries, noting that it is likely to be one of high instability and high politics

Comparing blunders in Government

Much attention has been paid to ‘blunders’ and ‘policy disasters’. Some argue, on the one hand, that the UK’s political and administrative system is disproportionately prone to generating disasters, but offer no systematic evidence on the record of failures of policies and major public projects in other political systems. On the other hand, research on cognitive biases and other failures of collective decision-making has developed highly generic frameworks that are used to assess cases of perceived policy failure. Both of these perspectives rely on post-hoc assessments of failure and intentions, often from those actors involved in the process. This paper develops a comparative perspective on ‘blunders’ in government. It does so by (a) developing theory-driven expectations as to the factors that are said to encourage ‘failure’, and (b) by devising a systematic framework for the assessment of policy processes and outcomes. The paper applies this novel approach to a set of similar ‘failures’ in particular domains (i.e. in public buildings, transport infrastructure, IT projects, benefits/tax systems, and aerospace/defence projects) to assess whether different political-administrative systems are prone to different kinds of ‘blundering’ or whether there are universal patterns in the occurrence of costly and avoidable policy mistakes across policy domain

Bureaucracy may be the solution, rather than the problem, for issues of European governance

The European Union is often criticised from the perspective that it has created a layer of bureaucracy or ‘red tape’ which has a damaging effect on European governance. Martin Lodge and Kai Wegrich write that while it is particularly common for political parties to make these arguments in the run up to European elections, legitimate and effective administration is at the heart of addressing the key governance challenges European countries must face in the future. They argue that any meaningful discussion about bureaucracy should focus on the question of ‘why’ certain interventions seem to work, and not simply on ‘what’ initiatives have previously worked in other contexts

The reputational basis of public accountability

This article proposes a reputation‐based approach to account for two core puzzles of accountability. The first is the misfit between behavioral predictions of the hegemonic political science framework for talking about accountability, namely, principal–agent, and empirical findings. The second puzzle is the unrivaled popularity of accountability, given evidence that supposedly accountability‐enhancing measures often lead to opposite effects. A “reputation‐informed” theoretical approach to public accountability suggests that accountability is not about reducing informational asymmetries, containing “drift,” or ensuring that agents stay committed to the terms of their mandate. Accountability—in terms of both holding and giving—is about managing and cultivating one's reputation vis‐à‐vis different audiences. It is about being seen as a reputable actor in the eyes of one's audience(s), conveying the impression of competently performing one's (accountability) roles, thereby generating reputational benefits

The rationality paradox of Nudge: rational tools of government in a world of bounded rationality

Nudge and the wider behavioural economics approach has become increasingly dominant in contemporary political and policy discourse. While much attention has been paid to the attractions and criticisms of Nudge (such as ‘liberal paternalism’), this paper argues that Nudge is based on a rationality ‘paradox’ in that it represents an approach that despite its emphasis on bounded rationality does not reflect on its own ‘limits to rationality’. The paper considers the implications of this paradox by considering mechanisms that influence government decision-making, and mechanisms that lead to unintended consequences in the context of policy interventions

Behavioural insights and regulatory authorities

The rise of behavioural insights has been well-documented. This chapter focuses on economic regulators in Britain to explore in greater detail the initial appeal and (unintended) consequences of a behavioural insights-influenced agenda for regulatory agencies. The chapter suggests that rather than providing ‘low cost’ (and straightforward ‘evidence-based’) solutions to problems, the application of behavioural insights has generated a more sophisticated understanding of the unintended consequences of regulatory interventions and of the varied responses of consumers to regulation. This chapter first considers the contextual background that led to the adoption of behavioural insights across economic regulators, it then explores a number of ‘discoveries’ that emerged in the context of applying behavioural insights to issues in economic regulation and concludes by pointing to the broader implications of the British experience for regulation and to pathways for further research

Machinery of Government Reforms in New Zealand: continuous improvement or hyper-innovation?

This article assesses the reasons for frequent national-level administrative reforms in New Zealand and reflects on their potential consequences. It explores three potential reasons: the particularities of Wellington as a highly conducive place for ideas to be shared between decision makers and academics; the characteristics of New Zealand institutions; and the effects of innovations themselves as drivers of disappointment and more innovation. The article reflects on reforms as drivers of continuous and incremental improvements as opposed to a hyper-innovative, politically driven administrative system. It concludes by stressing the importance of incorporating experiences ‘from the bottom’ in reform processes, and reliance on reflective mechanisms capable of creating opportunities for incremental, piecemeal and often ‘inelegant’ administrative adjustments