CEO Turnover and Firm Performance in China’s Listed Firms (CRI 2009-012)

Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This study investigates the relation between CEO turnover and firm performance in China’s listed firms. The study examines how the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is moderated by the private control of firms, the presence of a majority shareholder and the presence of independent directors on the board. Research Findings/Insights: Using a panel of about 1200 Chinese firms per year from 1999 to 2006 we find significant changes in the ownership and control of firms. The private control of firms and the fraction of independent directors on the board have increased considerably over time. The study finds a significant negative association between CEO turnover and firm performance consistent with the agency model. There is evidence that the CEO turnover sensitivity for poor performance is greater in firms that are privately controlled, or have a majority shareholder, or have a greater fraction of independent directors on the board. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study provides empirical support for the agency model and the importance of internal corporate governance to attenuate agency costs. It provides important insights into firm governance in transition economies. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study offers insights to policy makers interested in enhancing the design of internal corporate governance within transition economies

Executive Compensation and CEO Equity Incentives in China’s Listed Firms (CRI 2009-006)

This study investigates the economic, ownership and governance determinants of executive compensation and CEO equity incentives in China’s listed firms. Consistent with the agency theory, we find that executive compensation is positively correlated with firm size, performance, and growth opportunities. CEO incentives are negatively associated with firm size, positively linked with firm performance and growth opportunity. Firm risk has a negative effect on pay and incentives. Compensation and CEO incentives are significantly greater in privately-controlled firms compared to state-run firms and are lower in firms with concentrated ownership structures. Boardroom governance is important: firms with compensation committees or a greater fraction of independent directors on the board have higher executive pay and greater CEO equity incentives

Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China

We investigate executive compensation and corporate governance in China’s publicly traded firms. We also compare executive pay in China to the USA. Consistent with agency theory, we find that executive compensation is positively correlated to firm performance. The study shows that executive pay and CEO incentives are lower in State controlled firms and firms with concentrated ownership structures. Boardroom governance is important. We find that firms with more independent directors on the board have a higher pay-for-performance link. Non-State (private) controlled firms and firms with more independent directors on the board are more likely to replace the CEO for poor performance. Finally, we document that US executive pay (salary and bonus) is about seventeen times higher than in China. Significant differences in US-China pay persist even after controlling for economic and governance factors

A review of teacher evaluation beliefs

Teacher evaluation beliefs have received a substantial amount of attention in the educational literature, but comparatively little attention from the belief research topics specially. As the driving force, evaluation resembles belief mention but lack the systemic description. On the base of the student-centered and teacher-centered philosophy, in the present paper, we provide a literature review to explore the essential factors of teacher evaluation beliefs (why, what, who, when and how), followed by the key problems of Chinese New Curriculum Reform as “why-aim”, “what-content”, “who-student-teacher relationship”, “how-method” and “when- time”. In line with the discussion of five factors of evaluation beliefs, we proposed six perspectives to inform educational researchers for the further researches

Minimal area surfaces in AdS_{n+1} and Wilson loops

The AdS/CFT correspondence relates the expectation value of Wilson loops in N=4 SYM to the area of minimal surfaces in AdS_5 In this paper we consider minimal area surfaces in generic Euclidean AdS_{n+1} using the Pohlmeyer reduction in a similar way as we did previously in Euclidean AdS_3. As in that case, the main obstacle is to find the correct parameterization of the curve in terms of a conformal parameter. Once that is done, the boundary conditions for the Pohlmeyer fields are obtained in terms of conformal invariants of the curve. After solving the Pohlmeyer equations, the area can be expressed as a boundary integral involving a generalization of the conformal arc-length, curvature and torsion of the curve. Furthermore, one can introduce the \lambda-deformation symmetry of the contours by a simple change in the conformal invariants. This determines the \lambda-deformed contours in terms of the solution of a boundary linear problem. In fact the condition that all \lambda deformed contours are periodic can be used as an alternative to solving the Pohlmeyer equations and is equivalent to imposing the vanishing of an infinite set of conserved charges derived from integrability.Comment: 29 pages, LaTeX, 1 figur