Four Work-Ins by Australian Journalists, 1944-80

During industrial disputes with employers between 1944 and 1980 the Australian Journalist's Association occasionally turned to the tactic of the work-in, producing wild cat newspapers during strikes in Sydney. These newspapers (The News, and The Clarion) exemplified problematic elements of the work-in as a working-class strategy. While single incident studies of the work-in have been conducted in Australia, the Australian Journalist Association work-ins present a time series of struggle. This time series allows for a broader evaluation of the radical content of the work-in and indicates that the tactic can become systematised, less radical, and less participatory when not connected to a broader generation of workplace radical behaviour by workers. In short: the work-in, much like the strike or go slow, can become a tame cat tactic – it is not inherently transgressive or opposed to capitalist production. Expectedly, the first work-ins were more radical in scope, presenting a newspaper which fully duplicated the commodity produced under capitalist control and in some ways exceeded the scope presented by capitalist organised journalism in both a material and a cultural sense. However, this radical economic potential dissipated by the end of the time series of work-ins. Instead of providing an alternative commodity fit for market, the tactic produced propaganda pieces aimed primarily at the members of the community who would be predisposed to favour the journalist's case. The 1980s Clarion was not a daily newspaper of news, sport, racing, women's interest, classifieds, and general opinion. This change will be explained in terms of human causes such as skills loss, production process causes such as computerisation and wire services, and broader social causes such as the changing role of the newspaper in Australian society.The symposium is organised on behalf of AAHANZBS by the Business and Labour History Group, The University of Sydney, with the financial support of the University’s Faculty of Economics and Business

Does the Prudent Investor Need the Uniform Prudent Investor Act - An Empirical Study of Trust Investment Practices

The “prudent man” or “prudent person” rule governing trust investments is one of the oldest rules in American trust law. Despite undergoing modifications over the years, the fundamentals of the rule did not greatly change from its first expression in 1830 until 1990. Since 1990, however, trust investment law has undergone a revolution. Major criticisms of the prudent man rule in the late 1980s led to the formulation and adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts: Prudent Investor Rule in 1990. In 1994, the Uniform Law Commissioners promulgated the Uniform Prudent Investor Act (UPIA) for adoption by the states. Already a number of states have adopted the Act. The significance of the change is symbolized by the change from “prudent man” or “prudent person” to “prudent investor.” The reformers advocated the use of the lessons of modern financial theory in formulating trust portfolios. Many aspects of the law developed under the prudent man rule are radically changed under the prudent investor formulation. Commentary is beginning to speculate on changes to investment and tax planning under the new rule and what difficulties trustees will face under the prudent investor formulation. The prudent investor rule, in both the Restatement formulation and the Uniform Act, removes many of the restrictions and limitations of the prudent man rule. As a practical matter, the crucial question concerning the prudent investor rule would appear to be whether, if the Uniform Act (or some similar form of the prudent investor rule) were adopted, trustees of personal trusts would formulate trust portfolios on the basis of modern financial theory, free of any inhibitions previously held concerning the illegality of particular investments or investment strategies. That is, if the prudent investor rule is adopted, would trustees of personal trusts invest in accordance with modern financial and economic theory (modified by beneficiary concerns and tax situations) unimpeded by the restrictive law developed under the prudent man rule? This question is extremely difficult to answer, yet it is crucial for a state legislature considering adoption of the prudent investor rule. There are at present few cases involving the new statutes which provide guidance as to trustees\u27 investment practices under modern statutes. This Article attempts to help to answer this question

First Let\u27s Sue All the Lawyers--What Will We Get: Damages for Estate Planning Malpractice

Much has been written on malpractice in estate planning, but little or nothing on the damages recoverable from the attorney in such cases. A possible reason is that many of the cases consider only the issues involved in whether a cause of action exists, such as privity and the statute of limitations. In addition, many of the cases are decided on motions for summary judgment, precluding any discussion of damages. Professor Begleiter\u27s article attempts to fill that gap. Following a brief review of the development and current status of the law of malpractice in estate planning, Professor Begleiter discusses the two measures of damages- the lost bequest measure and the cost to fix measure. On examination, these measures are really alternate expressions of the same damage remedy rather than separate measures. The bifurcation, however, appropriately allows the beneficiary, who is the injured party, to choose whether or not to remedy the attorney\u27s error. The American rule, disallowing attorney fees as damages in the malpractice action, has caused some confusion. The proper rule is that attorney fees to discover the error or cure it are recoverable as damages. Several cases where this distinction is correctly applied are discussed. The article then discusses the major problem in the area - the dismissal of the action - if damage has not yet occurred or is speculative. This is a larger problem in the estate planning area than in some other areas as the article illustrates. After discussing cases applying this rule, and recognizing that the rule wrongly rewards attorneys and penalizes injured parties, the article examines possible remedies. The remedy of postponing accrual of the statute of limitations, the major alternative to dismissal because of speculative damages, is rejected because of the delay inherent in that remedy. Following a brief discussion of damages awarded in cases similar to the speculative damage case, the article then proposes a remedy that is equitable to both the attorney and the intended beneficiaries