Private Equity Valuation and IRR Algorithm

An algorithm is developed that calculates the IRR for various private equity entities within a private equity leveraged transaction. The algorithm calculates the total anticipated value for a transaction and then produces the associated IRRs based on the exit EBITDA, the EBITDA multiple, and the available cash. The benefits of the algorithm are that multiple programming formats become available, insights emerge that are difficult to perceive using an equivalent spreadsheet pro forma analysis, and other types of analyses become possible for examining individual parameters

Required Minimum Distribution (RMD) Spreadsheet Calculators Based on the SECURE Act of 2019

The Setting Every Community Up for Retirement Enhancement Act (SECURE Act) of 2019 made significant changes to the required minimum distribution (RMD) schedule for individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and defined contribution retirement plans. Excel spreadsheet calculators are developed to calculate annual RMD cash flows throughout retirement for those who are retired and for those who are planning to retire. Unlike internet calculators, the spreadsheet calculators allow savings to earn monthly interest throughout retirement. Further, the calculators are easy to use and allow individuals to forecast long horizon RMD distributions for subsequent tax or reinvestment planning purposes

Required Minimum Distribution (RMD) Spreadsheet Calculators Based on the SECURE Act of 2022

Required Minimum Distribution (RMD) Spreadsheet Calculators Based on the SECURE Act of 2022 The Setting Every Community Up for Retirement Enhancement Act (SECURE Act) of 2022 made a second round of changes (relative to the SECURE Act of 2019) to the required minimum distribution (RMD) schedule for individual retirement accounts (IRAs) and defined contribution retirement plans. Excel spreadsheet calculators are developed to calculate the new annual RMD cash flows throughout retirement for those who are retired and for those who are planning to retire. The spreadsheet calculators also allow savings to accrue with interest if the RMD is in excess of expected annual costs. KEY TAKEAWAYS: The spreadsheet calculators require only basic inputs and can be updated and applied at any point in time during the planning period. The spreadsheet calculators allow for interest to accumulate before and after retirement in the IRA and in a savings account if the RMD is in excess of expected annual costs. The spreadsheet calculators allow for additional monthly contributions up to retirement

Developmental transitions in body color in chacma baboon infants: Implications to estimate age and developmental pace

International audienc

Identifying Farming Strategies Associated With Achieving Global Agricultural Sustainability

Sustainable agroecosystems provide adequate food while supporting environmental and human wellbeing and are a key part of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Some strategies to promote sustainability include reducing inputs, substituting conventional crops with genetically modified (GM) alternatives, and using organic production. Here, we leveraged global databases covering 121 countries to determine which farming strategies—the amount of inputs per area (fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation), GM crops, and percent agriculture in organic production—are most correlated with 12 sustainability metrics recognized by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. Using quantile regression, we found that countries with higher Human Development Indices (HDI) (including education, income, and lifespan), higher-income equality, lower food insecurity, and higher cereal yields had the most organic production and inputs. However, input-intensive strategies were associated with greater agricultural greenhouse gas emissions. In contrast, countries with more GM crops were last on track to meeting the SDG of reduced inequalities. Using a longitudinal analysis spanning 2004–2018, we found that countries were generally decreasing inputs and increasing their share of agriculture in organic production. Also, in disentangling correlation vs. causation, we hypothesize that a country's development is more likely to drive changes in agricultural strategies than vice versa. Altogether, our correlative analyses suggest that countries with greater progress toward the SDGs of no poverty, zero hunger, good health and wellbeing, quality education, decent work, economic growth, and reduced inequalities had the highest production of organic agriculture and, to a lesser extent, intensive use of inputs

Effect of angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitor and angiotensin receptor blocker initiation on organ support-free days in patients hospitalized with COVID-19

IMPORTANCE Overactivation of the renin-angiotensin system (RAS) may contribute to poor clinical outcomes in patients with COVID-19. Objective To determine whether angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitor or angiotensin receptor blocker (ARB) initiation improves outcomes in patients hospitalized for COVID-19. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS In an ongoing, adaptive platform randomized clinical trial, 721 critically ill and 58 non–critically ill hospitalized adults were randomized to receive an RAS inhibitor or control between March 16, 2021, and February 25, 2022, at 69 sites in 7 countries (final follow-up on June 1, 2022). INTERVENTIONS Patients were randomized to receive open-label initiation of an ACE inhibitor (n = 257), ARB (n = 248), ARB in combination with DMX-200 (a chemokine receptor-2 inhibitor; n = 10), or no RAS inhibitor (control; n = 264) for up to 10 days. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES The primary outcome was organ support–free days, a composite of hospital survival and days alive without cardiovascular or respiratory organ support through 21 days. The primary analysis was a bayesian cumulative logistic model. Odds ratios (ORs) greater than 1 represent improved outcomes. RESULTS On February 25, 2022, enrollment was discontinued due to safety concerns. Among 679 critically ill patients with available primary outcome data, the median age was 56 years and 239 participants (35.2%) were women. Median (IQR) organ support–free days among critically ill patients was 10 (–1 to 16) in the ACE inhibitor group (n = 231), 8 (–1 to 17) in the ARB group (n = 217), and 12 (0 to 17) in the control group (n = 231) (median adjusted odds ratios of 0.77 [95% bayesian credible interval, 0.58-1.06] for improvement for ACE inhibitor and 0.76 [95% credible interval, 0.56-1.05] for ARB compared with control). The posterior probabilities that ACE inhibitors and ARBs worsened organ support–free days compared with control were 94.9% and 95.4%, respectively. Hospital survival occurred in 166 of 231 critically ill participants (71.9%) in the ACE inhibitor group, 152 of 217 (70.0%) in the ARB group, and 182 of 231 (78.8%) in the control group (posterior probabilities that ACE inhibitor and ARB worsened hospital survival compared with control were 95.3% and 98.1%, respectively). CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE In this trial, among critically ill adults with COVID-19, initiation of an ACE inhibitor or ARB did not improve, and likely worsened, clinical outcomes. TRIAL REGISTRATION ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT0273570

Three essays on corporate governance

This dissertation explores whether certain incentives faced by managers and directors of firms entice them to uphold their duty of loyalty to shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) posit that 'corporate governance deals with the ways suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.' Strong corporate governance depends on the firm being able to provide managers and directors with proper incentives to ensure that shareholder funds are not expropriated or wasted on unattractive investments. Agency problems such as managerial opportunism and inefficient monitoring by directors are the focus of the three essays in this dissertation. The specific corporate governance mechanisms studied are those that provide (1) incentives for directors to dissent in boardroom disagreements, (2) incentives to commit insider trading by top managers, and (3) the incentives for directors to punish CEOs for perpetuating accounting fraud. In my first essay, I focus on director incentives to dissent in boardroom conflicts by exploring whether directors who resign in dissent from their board are rewarded in the labor market for directors. Using a hand collected sample of 278 boardroom disputes reported in 8-K filings during 1995–2006, I show that firms which have disputes are small, highly levered, have poor profitability, and have boards dominated by management. I find that dissent is not rewarded. For all types of directors across all types of disputes, directors who resign in protest experience a net loss in board seats of 85% and a net loss in director compensation of 46% over the five year period following the dispute. This means dissenting directors are not able to recover the seat or the compensation they give up. However, the dissenting directors who do obtain new board seats go to better firms (better performance, stronger corporate governance) that pay them more. For these dissenting directors it appears that dissent is its own reward. In my second essay I focus on the incentives of managers to commit illegal insider trading. Using a sample of all top management who were indicted for illegal insider trading in the United States for trades during the period 1989–2002, we explore the economic rationality of this white-collar crime. If this crime is an economically rational activity in the sense of Becker (1968), where a crime is committed if its expected benefits exceed its expected costs, "poorer" top management should be doing the most illegal insider trading. This is because the "poor" have less to lose (present value of foregone future compensation if caught is lower for them.) We find in the data, however, that indictments are concentrated in the "richer" strata after we control for firm size, industry, firm growth opportunities, executive age, the opportunity to commit illegal insider trading, and the possibility that regulators target the "richer" strata. We thus rule out the economic motive for this white-collar crime, and leave open the possibility of other motives. My third essay considers the incentives of directors to punish CEOs who perpetuate accounting fraud. We re-examine why CEOs remain in power in over half of the firms that intentionally misreport earnings. The failure of directors to use CEO dismissal as a reputation-cleansing device is even more puzzling after SOX, as regulators adopt non-prosecution policies for firms that self-police. We find that CEOs are more likely to remain when conventionally independent directors and CEOs appear to collude. That is, when both benefit from selling as insiders before the delinquent accounting is revealed, and when directors ratify one or more value-destroying mergers during the restatement period. We find retention is less likely when the misreporting is more severe and directors fear greater penalties from owners, lenders, and the SEC. Our results are robust to controlling for explanations based on the cost of replacing CEOs, the effectiveness of corporate governance, and the use of CFOs as scapegoats—that have been offered in prior research. Overall, our analysis of directors' personal incentives increases the explanatory power of the retention decision by approximately 30%. It suggests collusive trading and merger ratification as additional (and observable) means of assessing the independence of outside directors