20 research outputs found
Die typisierende BerΓΌcksichtigung der persΓΆnlichen Steuerbelastung des Anteilseigners beim squeeze out
Die Bewertung eines Unternehmens verlangt eine BerΓΌcksichtigung der
individuellen Besteuerung der Anteilseigner. Bei squeeze-outs, in denen die
Anteilseigner einer unterschiedlichen Steuerbelastung unterliegen, wΓΌrde diese
BerΓΌcksichtigung zu individuell unterschiedlichen Kompensationszahlungen
fΓΌhren - was das deutsche Aktienrecht nicht zulΓ€sst. In dieser Arbeit
diskutieren wir, wie dieses Problem angemessen gelΓΆst werden kann. Dazu
bestimmen wir die durchschnittlichen GrenzsteuersΓ€tze, die sich aus Daten der
Einkommensteuerstatistik 1998 ergeben. Die vom IDW vorgeschlagene Typisierung
lΓ€sst sich mit der Tariffunktion des Jahres 1998 empirisch rechtfertigen, wenn
als Grenzsteuersatz des typischen Abzufindenden gerade der ungewichtete
Grenzsteuersatz aller Steuerpflichtigen mit DividendeneinkΓΌnften verstanden
wird.For the valuation of a company it is necessary to take the income tax of its
owners into account. When looking at a squeeze-out with investors who have
different wealth this implies that fair compensation payments will be
different. This is in contradiction to the German Stock Companies Act. In this
paper we discuss how this problem can be solved in an acceptable manner and we
determine different average income tax rates using German tax data. It can be
shown that using particular weighted averages indeed lead to the proposal of
an income tax rate of 35% which is required by the Association of German CPAs
ΠΠ°ΠΏΡΠ΅Ρ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π΄ΠΎΠΊΠ°Π·Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΡΠ² ΠΏΡΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΎΠΏΡΡΠΊΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΡΠΎΠΊΠ° (ΠΏΡΠ΅ΠΊΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΈΡ) Π² ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅ Π°Π΄ΠΌΠΈΠ½ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎ-ΡΡΠ΄Π΅Π±Π½ΠΎΠΉ Π·Π°ΡΠΈΡΡ Π² ΠΠ΅ΡΠΌΠ°Π½ΠΈΠΈ
The subject. The article describes preclusion in German Administrative Law.The purpose of the paper is to confirm or disprove hypothesis that the preclusion is an integral part of the administrative and judicial practice of Germany, despite its low efficiency.The main results and scope of their application. There are relations of between the constitutional principle of legal protection (Art. 19 Abs. of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany) and preclusion. It is shown that there are different types of preclusion in German Administrative Law, depending on the status of the administrative procedure. It can occur in the administrative process between citizen and the administrative authority and in the administrative court process. In both acts there is to differ between those who plea an infringement of their own rights and those who consider the rights of third parties.Examples for preclusion from different areas of the law like tax or environmental law are given. Another aspect is the difference between formal and material preclusion. While formal preclusion is limited to the administrative process and does not affect the administrative court case, material preclusion effects both acts, the administrative process and the court case.The next part concentrates on the limits set by the constitution and European law. A decision by the European Court of Justice and by the Federal constitutional court of Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht) are presented to specify these limits. The ECJ has a stricter approach than the German constitutional court, which ruled, that preclusion does not violate the constitutional principles of legal protection and fair hearing. Nonetheless the ECJ also agreed laws that hinder abusive pleas.Conclusions. The last part contemplates the practicability of preclusion and concludes, that the effects are relatively modest and the target of acceleration is often not attained. However, the German model of preclusion has a disciplining effect on participants in administrative procedures and the judicial process; has firmly entered German administrative and judicial practice and does not contradict the constitutional guarantee of legal protection.Π Π°ΡΡΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ²Π°Π΅ΡΡΡ ΠΏΡΠ΅ΠΊΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΈΡ Π² Π½Π΅ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠΌ Π°Π΄ΠΌΠΈΠ½ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΠΌ ΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π΅. Π Π·Π°Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΠΌΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΎΡ ΡΡΠ°ΡΡΡΠ° Π°Π΄ΠΌΠΈΠ½ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΡ ΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²ΡΡΡ ΡΠ°Π·Π»ΠΈΡΠ½ΡΠ΅ ΡΠΈΠΏΡ Π·Π°ΠΏΡΠ΅ΡΠ° Π½Π° ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Π΄ΠΎΠΊΠ°Π·Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΡΠ². ΠΡΠ΅ΠΊΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΈΡ ΠΌΠΎΠΆΠ΅Ρ ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΡΡΡΡ ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ Π² Π΄ΠΎΡΡΠ΄Π΅Π±Π½ΡΡ
Π°Π΄ΠΌΠΈΠ½ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΡΡ
ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΠ°Ρ
, ΡΠ°ΠΊ ΠΈ Π² Π°Π΄ΠΌΠΈΠ½ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΠΌ ΡΡΠ΄Π΅Π±Π½ΠΎΠΌ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ΅. ΠΡΠΈ ΡΡΠΎΠΌ Π² ΠΎΠ±ΠΎΠΈΡ
ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΡΡ
ΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΡΠ΅Ρ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΡ ΡΠ°Π·Π³ΡΠ°Π½ΠΈΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΌΠ΅ΠΆΠ΄Ρ ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠΈ, ΠΊΡΠΎ Π·Π°ΡΠ²Π»ΡΠ΅Ρ ΠΎ Π½Π°ΡΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΈ ΡΠ²ΠΎΠΈΡ
ΡΠΎΠ±ΡΡΠ²Π΅Π½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΏΡΠ°Π², ΠΈ ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠΈ, ΠΊΡΠΎ Π²ΡΡΡΡΠΏΠ°Π΅Ρ Π² Π·Π°ΡΠΈΡΡ ΠΏΡΠ°Π² ΡΡΠ΅ΡΡΠΈΡ
Π»ΠΈΡ. ΠΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΠ΄ΡΡΡΡ ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅ΡΡ ΠΏΡΠ΅ΠΊΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΈΠ²Π½ΡΡ
ΡΠ°Π½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΉ Π² ΡΠ°Π·Π»ΠΈΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΡΠ΅ΡΠ°Ρ
, Π² ΡΠ°ΡΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ Π² Π½Π°Π»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠΌ ΠΈ ΡΠΊΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΎΠΌ ΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π΅. ΠΡΠ΅ΠΊΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΈΡ ΡΠ°Π·Π³ΡΠ°Π½ΠΈΡΠΈΠ²Π°Π΅ΡΡΡ ΠΏΠΎ ΡΠΎΠ΄Π΅ΡΠΆΠ°Π½ΠΈΡ Π½Π° ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ ΠΈ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ ΠΏΡΠ΅ΠΊΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΈΡ: Π² ΡΠΎ Π²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΏΡΠ΅ΠΊΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΈΠΈ ΠΎΠ³ΡΠ°Π½ΠΈΡΠΈΠ²Π°Π΅ΡΡΡ Π°Π΄ΠΌΠΈΠ½ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΡΠΌΠΈ Π²Π½Π΅ΡΡΠ΄Π΅Π±Π½ΡΠΌΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΠ°ΠΌΠΈ (ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°Π»ΡΠ½Π°Ρ ΠΏΡΠ΅ΠΊΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΈΡ Π½Π΅ Π΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΡΠ΅Ρ Π² Π°Π΄ΠΌΠΈΠ½ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΠΌ ΡΡΠ΄Π΅Π±Π½ΠΎΠΌ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ΅), ΠΌΠ°ΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΠ°Π»ΡΠ½Π°Ρ ΠΏΡΠ΅ΠΊΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΈΡ ΠΎΡ
Π²Π°ΡΡΠ²Π°Π΅Ρ ΠΈ ΡΠΎ, ΠΈ Π΄ΡΡΠ³ΠΎΠ΅. Π Π°ΡΡΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΡΡΡ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄Π΅Π»Ρ ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΡΠ΅ΠΊΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΈΠ²Π½ΡΡ
ΡΠ°Π½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΉ, ΡΡΡΠ°Π½ΠΎΠ²Π»Π΅Π½Π½ΡΠ΅ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΡΠΈΡΡΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΠΌ ΠΏΡΠ°Π²ΠΎΠΌ ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠ°Π²ΠΎΠΌ ΠΠ²ΡΠΎΠΏΠ΅ΠΉΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π‘ΠΎΡΠ·Π°: Π‘ΡΠ΄ ΠΠ‘ Π²ΡΡΠΊΠ°Π·Π°Π»ΡΡ Π·Π° Π±ΠΎΠ»Π΅Π΅ ΡΡΡΠΎΠ³ΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΊΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΡΠ΅ΠΊΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΈΠΈ, Π² ΠΎΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΠ΅ ΠΎΡ Π€Π΅Π΄Π΅ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΠΎΠ½ΡΡΠΈΡΡΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π‘ΡΠ΄Π° ΠΠ΅ΡΠΌΠ°Π½ΠΈΠΈ, ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΠΉ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ½ΡΠΈΠΏΠΈΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎ ΠΎΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π΄ΡΠ²Π°Π΅Ρ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΡΠΈΡΡΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΡΡΡ ΠΏΡΠ΅ΠΊΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΈΠΈ ΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΠ»Π°Π³Π°Π΅Ρ, ΡΡΠΎ ΠΏΡΠ΅ΠΊΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΈΡ Π½Π΅ Π½Π°ΡΡΡΠ°Π΅Ρ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΡΠΈΡΡΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ½ΡΠΈΠΏΡ Π½Π°Π΄Π»Π΅ΠΆΠ°ΡΠ΅ΠΉ ΠΏΡΠ°Π²ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠΉ Π·Π°ΡΠΈΡΡ ΠΈ ΡΠΏΡΠ°Π²Π΅Π΄Π»ΠΈΠ²ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΡΠ΄Π΅Π±Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠ°Π·Π±ΠΈΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π»ΡΡΡΠ²Π°. Π’Π΅ΠΌ Π½Π΅ ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π΅ Π‘ΡΠ΄ ΠΠ‘ ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΆΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ·Π½Π°Π΅Ρ ΡΠΎΠΎΡΠ²Π΅ΡΡΡΠ²ΡΡΡΠΈΠΌΠΈ ΡΡΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΈΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠΌ Π΄ΠΎΠΊΡΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΠ°ΠΌ ΠΠ²ΡΠΎΠΏΠ΅ΠΉΡΠΊΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π‘ΠΎΡΠ·Π° Π½Π°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠ΅ Π·Π°ΠΊΠΎΠ½Ρ, ΠΏΡΠ΅ΠΏΡΡΡΡΠ²ΡΡΡΠΈΠ΅ Π·Π»ΠΎΡΠΏΠΎΡΡΠ΅Π±Π»Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΡΠ°Π²ΠΎΠΌ Π½Π° ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅. ΠΠΎ ΡΠ΅Π·ΡΠ»ΡΡΠ°ΡΠ°ΠΌ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠΌΠΎΡΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
Π°ΡΠΏΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΎΠ² ΠΏΡΠ΅ΠΊΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΈΠΈ Π΄Π΅Π»Π°Π΅ΡΡΡ Π²ΡΠ²ΠΎΠ΄, ΡΡΠΎ ΡΡΡΠ΅ΠΊΡ ΠΎΡ ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΏΡΠ΅ΠΊΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΈΠ²Π½ΡΡ
ΡΠ°Π½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΉ Π²Π΅ΡΡΠΌΠ° ΡΠΊΡΠΎΠΌΠ½ΡΠΉ, ΠΈ ΡΠ΅Π»ΠΈ ΡΡΠΊΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π°Π΄ΠΌΠΈΠ½ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΈ ΡΡΠ΄Π΅Π±Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ° ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ ΡΡΠΈΡ
ΡΠ°Π½ΠΊΡΠΈΠΉ Π½Π΅ Π΄ΠΎΡΡΠΈΠ³Π°ΡΡΡΡ. ΠΠ΄Π½Π°ΠΊΠΎ Π½Π΅ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΊΠ°Ρ ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»Ρ ΠΏΡΠ΅ΠΊΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΈΠΈ ΠΎΠΊΠ°Π·ΡΠ²Π°Π΅Ρ Π΄ΠΈΡΡΠΈΠΏΠ»ΠΈΠ½ΠΈΡΡΡΡΠ΅Π΅ Π²ΠΎΠ·Π΄Π΅ΠΉΡΡΠ²ΠΈΠ΅ Π½Π° ΡΡΠ°ΡΡΠ½ΠΈΠΊΠΎΠ² Π°Π΄ΠΌΠΈΠ½ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΡΡ
ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡ ΠΈ ΡΡΠ΄Π΅Π±Π½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ°, ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎ Π²ΠΎΡΠ»Π° Π² Π½Π΅ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΊΡΡ Π°Π΄ΠΌΠΈΠ½ΠΈΡΡΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΡΡ ΠΈ ΡΡΠ΄Π΅Π±Π½ΡΡ ΠΏΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΈΠΊΡ ΠΈ Π½Π΅ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΡ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΡΠΈΡΡΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ Π³Π°ΡΠ°Π½ΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΏΡΠ°Π²ΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠΉ Π·Π°ΡΠΈΡΡ
Preclusion in German administrative proceedings
The subject. The article describes preclusion in German Administrative Law.The purpose of the paper is to confirm or disprove hypothesis that the preclusion is an integral part of the administrative and judicial practice of Germany, despite its low efficiency.The main results and scope of their application. There are relations of between the constitutional principle of legal protection (Art. 19 Abs. of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany) and preclusion. It is shown that there are different types of preclusion in German Administrative Law, depending on the status of the administrative procedure. It can occur in the administrative process between citizen and the administrative authority and in the administrative court process. In both acts there is to differ between those who plea an infringement of their own rights and those who consider the rights of third parties.Examples for preclusion from different areas of the law like tax or environmental law are given. Another aspect is the difference between formal and material preclusion. While formal preclusion is limited to the administrative process and does not affect the administrative court case, material preclusion effects both acts, the administrative process and the court case.The next part concentrates on the limits set by the constitution and European law. A decision by the European Court of Justice and by the Federal constitutional court of Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht) are presented to specify these limits. The ECJ has a stricter approach than the German constitutional court, which ruled, that preclusion does not violate the constitutional principles of legal protection and fair hearing. Nonetheless the ECJ also agreed laws that hinder abusive pleas.Conclusions. The last part contemplates the practicability of preclusion and concludes, that the effects are relatively modest and the target of acceleration is often not attained. However, the German model of preclusion has a disciplining effect on participants in administrative procedures and the judicial process; has firmly entered German administrative and judicial practice and does not contradict the constitutional guarantee of legal protection