Buffer funding of unemployment insurance in a dynamic labour union model

In this paper we study the implications of the unemployment insurance (UI) financing system on wage levels and employment when labour markets are unionised and the revenues of the firms are stochastic. We use the basic monopoly union approach of wage and employment determination and assume that unemployment benefits are financed by employees’ UI contributions to the union’s UI fund and by the government’s tax revenue. The main focus of this paper is on the effects of UI buffer funding on employment fluctuations. We show that, compared with the pay-as-you-go financing system, buffer funding stabilises the economy by decreasing employment fluctuations where wages are flexible. If wages are rigid, buffer funding stabilises net wage variations, but has hardly any effect on employment fluctuations.unemployment insurance; unions; stabilisation; buffer funding

Buffer funding of unemployment insurance in a dynamic labour union model

In this paper we study the implications of the unemployment insurance (UI) financing system on wage levels and employment when labour markets are unionised and the revenues of the firms are stochastic. We use the basic monopoly union approach of wage and employment determination and assume that unemployment benefits are financed by employees’ UI contributions to the union’s UI fund and by the government’s tax revenue. The main focus of this paper is on the effects of UI buffer funding on employment fluctuations. We show that, compared with the pay- as-you-go financing system, buffer funding stabilises the economy by decreasing employment fluctuations where wages are flexible. If wages are rigid, buffer funding stabilises net wage variations, but has hardly any effect on employment fluctuations.unemployment insurance, unions, stabilisation, buffer funding

Are risk preferences dynamic? : Within-subject variation in risk-taking as a function of background music

This paper investigates whether preference interactions can explain why risk preferences change over time and across contexts. We conduct an experiment in which subjects accept or reject gambles involving real money gains and losses. We introduce within-subject variation by alternating subjectively liked music and disliked music in the background. We find that favourite music increases risk-taking, and disliked music suppresses risk-taking, compared to a baseline of no music. Several theories in psychology propose mechanisms by which mood affects risktaking, but none of them fully explain our results. The results are, however, consistent with preference complementarities that extend to risk preference

Congestion, Coordination and Matching

We study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in finite congestion and coordination games. Player set is divided into two disjoint groups, called men and women. A man choosing an action a is better off if the number of other men choosing a decreases, or if the number of women choosing a increases. Analogously, a woman becomes better off if more men or fewer women choose the same action as she does. Existence proofs are constructive: we build simple ``best reply'' algorithms that converge to an equilibrium.congestion, coordination, matching

Coordination in the Labor Market

We solve the equilibrium market structure in a labor market where vacancies and unemployed workers can meet either in an intermediated market where wages are determined by take-it-orleave- it offers, or in a directed search market where firms post wages. By using an intermediary agents avoid the coordination problem which prevails in the search market. We study a monopolistic intermediary and perfect competition between intermediaries, and we consider the welfare properties of an intermediary institution, compared to an economy with an uncoordinated search process only.intermediary, matching, labor market

Wage Distribution with a Two-Sided Job Auction

wage distribution, job search, auctions

Competitive behavior, stress, and gender

This paper investigates whether physiological measures related to chronic and acute stress predict individual differences in willingness to compete. We measure individuals' autonomic nervous system activity in a resting state as well as under non-competitive and competitive incentive schemes using heart rate variability (HRV) measurement. We find that both baseline HRV and competition-induced changes in HRV predict willingness to compete. Notably, we find that women with low baseline HRV, a marker associated with chronic stress exposure, are more likely to choose piece rate incentives over competitive incentives than women with high baseline HRV. We observe that men with large acute HRV response to forced competition are more likely to choose tournament pay over piece rate pay than men with small acute HRV response to competition. Our results suggest that HRV can predict individual differences in willingness to compete, but HRV does not close the gender gap in willingness to compete at the aggregate level.Peer reviewe