Isolation or joining a mall? On the location choice of competing shops

I study the location choice of competing shops. A shop can either be isolated or join a mall. A fraction of consumers is uninformed about prices and incurs costs to travel between market places and to enter a shop. The equilibrium mall size is computed for several parameter values, showing that mall and isolated shops can coexist. Several effects play a role. Mall shops attract more consumers, but isolated shops set a higher maximum price. Moreover, numerical evaluations show that an increase in mall size decreases the average price level and increases the participation level of uninformed consumers.location choice; travel costs; pricing; consumer search

Advertising and Consumer Search in a Duopoly Model

We consider a duopoly in a homogenous goods market where part of the consumers are ex ante uninformed about prices. Information can come through two different channels: advertising and sequential consumer search. The model is similar to that of Robert and Stahl (1993) with two major (and some minor) modifications: (i) a (small) percentage of consumers is fully informed and (ii) less informed consumers do not have to pay a search cost for buying at a firm from which they have received an ad. We derive the symmetric Nash equilibria and show that price dispersion is an essential ingredient of any equilibrium. Despite the similarities in the models, our results differ substantially from those obtained by Robert and Stahl (1993). First, advertising and search are "substitutes" for a large range of parameters. Second, there is no monotone relationship between prices and the degree of advertising. In particular, it is possible that high prices are advertised, while low prices are not. Third, when the cost of either one of the information channels (search or advertising) vanishes, the competitive outcome arises. Finally, both expected advertised and non-advertised prices are non-monotonic in search cost. One of the implications is that firms actually may benefit from consumers having low (rather than high) search costs

Isolation or joining a mall? On the location choice of competing shops

I study the location choice of competing shops. A shop can either be isolated or join a mall. A fraction of consumers is uninformed about prices and incurs costs to travel between market places and to enter a shop. The equilibrium mall size is computed for several parameter values, showing that mall and isolated shops can coexist. Several effects play a role. Mall shops attract more consumers, but isolated shops set a higher maximum price. Moreover, numerical evaluations show that an increase in mall size decreases the average price level and increases the participation level of uninformed consumers

Isolation or joining a mall? On the location choice of competing shops

I study the location choice of competing shops. A shop can either be isolated or join a mall. A fraction of consumers is uninformed about prices and incurs costs to travel between market places and to enter a shop. The equilibrium mall size is computed for several parameter values, showing that mall and isolated shops can coexist. Several effects play a role. Mall shops attract more consumers, but isolated shops set a higher maximum price. Moreover, numerical evaluations show that an increase in mall size decreases the average price level and increases the participation level of uninformed consumers

Going where the Ad leads you: On High Advertised Prices and Search where to buy

The search literature assumes that consumers know which firms sell products they are looking for, but are unaware of the particular variety and the prices at which each firm sells. In this paper, we consider the situation where consumers are uncertain whether a firm carries the product at all by proposing a model where in the first stage firms decide on whether or not to carry the product. Firms may advertise, informing consumers not only of the price they charge, but also of the basic fact that they sell the product. In this way, advertising lowers the expected search cost. We show that this role of advertising can lead to a situation where advertised prices are higher than non—advertised prices in equilibrium

Interlocking Boards and Firm Performance: Evidence from a New Panel Database

An interlock between two firms occurs if the firms share one or more directors in their boards of directors. We explore the effect of interlocks on firm performance for 101 large Dutch firms using a large and new panel database. We use five different performance measures, and for each performance measure we design three different panel data models, where we allow the effect of the number of interlocks to be linear, quadratic or square root, either with or without lags. Based on all results we conclude that current interlocks can have a negative effect on future firm performance. We show that this negative effect is jointly established by (1) interlocking directors being too busy and (2) by directors being members of a homogenous upper class group

Essays on Consumer Search and Interlocking Directorates

Information is crucial to make good decisions, but obtaining and providing information often comes at a cost. Consumers and firms both need to balance these costs and benefits of obtaining and providing information in order to make the best decisions. The research in this thesis investigates several questions that pertain to the acquisition and provision of information. In the first part of this thesis it is assumed that consumers are not fully informed about the prices or availability of a product they want to buy. Consumers can search for information, but this comes at a cost. At the same time, shops can influence these costs. In the first two studies in this part, shops have the possibility to advertise. An advertisement provides information to consumers and reduces the search costs. We investigate, among other things, the pricing behavior of shops and the relation between search and advertising. The third study in this part of the thesis considers the location choice of shops. Locating together in a shopping mall reduces the search costs of consumers. This increases the competition between shops and lowers the prices, but we show that at the same time the sales volume increases. The total effect of locating together on profits is generally positive. The second part of this thesis considers director ties (also named interlocks). A director who has several directorships in different firms can serve as an information bridge between the different firms. At the same time, interlocking directors are busy and form a homogenous group. Data from the Netherlands show that in The Netherlands the positive information providing effect of interlocks is outweighed by a negative busyness and homogenous group effect