Accountability in the EU's para-regulatory state: the case of the Economic and Monetary Union

This article revisits Majone's famous argument about accountability in the regulatory state in reference to the European Union's (EU) Economic and Monetary Union. We show that the EU has entered the stage of a “para-regulatory state” marked by increasing EU regulation in areas linked to core state powers. Despite the redistributive and politicized nature of these policy areas, the EU's “para-regulatory state” has continued to rely on its regulatory model of accountability, focused on decisionmaking processes, and interest mediation. In line with Majone, we describe the model as procedural and contrast it to substantive accountability – which is necessary when regulation has clear redistributive implications. Using two case studies from fiscal policy and monetary affairs, we illustrate the predominance of procedural accountability as exercised by the European Parliament and EU Courts. We complement the empirical analysis with a normative discussion of how substantive accountability could potentially be rendered in both fields.Horizon 2020(H2020)716923Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

Opening Pandora’s Box? Joint Sovereignty and the Rise of EU Agencies with Operational Tasks

This article problematises the proliferation of European Union (EU) agencies with operational tasks as a new phenomenon capturing the exercise of joint sovereignty in European integration. While joint decision-making has been a feature of EU politics for decades, joint sovereignty is a broader category that additionally involves the creation of EU bodies able to intervene ‘on the ground’ alongside national public actors. We argue that the choice for joint sovereignty opens a Pandora’s box of implementation deficiencies which undermine the ability of both national and supranational actors to conduct operational activities effectively. We subsequently identify two frequent dysfunctions in policy implementation and connect them to ambiguity and conflict at the decision-making stage. Empirically, we illustrate the systemic link between decision-making and implementation problems in the functioning of two agencies with operational tasks active in the fields of border management (Frontex) and police cooperation (Europol).The Institutions of Politics; Design, Workings, and implications ( do not use, ended 1-1-2020)Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

Opening Pandora’s box?: Joint sovereignty and the rise of EU agencies with operational tasks

This article problematises the proliferation of European Union (EU) agencies with operational tasks as a new phenomenon capturing the exercise of joint sovereignty in European integration. While joint decision-making has been a feature of EU politics for decades, joint sovereignty is a broader category that additionally involves the creation of EU bodies able to intervene ‘on the ground’ alongside national public actors. We argue that the choice for joint sovereignty opens a Pandora’s box of implementation deficiencies which undermine the ability of both national and supranational actors to conduct operational activities effectively. We subsequently identify two frequent dysfunctions in policy implementation and connect them to ambiguity and conflict at the decision-making stage. Empirically, we illustrate the systemic link between decision-making and implementation problems in the functioning of two agencies with operational tasks active in the fields of border management (Frontex) and police cooperation (Europol).NWOInstitutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

Contesting the European Central Bank in banking supervision: accountability in practice at the European Parliament

The establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) raised expectations regarding the ability of the European Parliament (EP) to hold the European Central Bank (ECB) accountable for its decisions. This article examines the accountability interactions between the two institutions in the first years of the functioning of the SSM (2013-18). The focus is on the extent to which the EP contests ECB supervisory decisions in practice through letters and public hearings. The analysis shows a frequently-used infrastructure of political accountability that is however limited in ensuring the contestation of ECB conduct in banking supervision. The study identifies problems with the performance of the EP as an accountability forum and with the tight confidentiality rules of the SSM, which allow the ECB to silence contestation on many politically salient issues. The findings are based on an innovative analytical framework on the study of accountability interactions.Horizon 2020(H2020)716923Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

The dynamics of institutional behaviour in EU justice and home affairs: roles, representative claims, and varying policy positions

This article investigates the reasons behind varying institutional positions in the European Union's (EU) area of justice and home affairs (JHA). It argues that such instances of institutional behaviour cannot be fully understood without examining how each institution seeks to legitimize its role in the EU political system. A novel theoretical framework on institutional behaviour is advanced, connecting individual policy positions and governance choices to (1) institutional roles developed within different types of organizational structure, and (2) the representative claims made by officials involved in decision-making. The framework draws on insights from organizational theory regarding institutional role expectations and a constructivist approach to representation borrowed from the work of Michael Saward. Using three cases of JHA legislation from the post-Lisbon period, it is shown that the framework can explain varying patterns of institutional behaviour by exploring lines of justification present in the institutional discourse.Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

EU politicization beyond the Euro crisis: immigration crises and the politicization of free movement of people

This article explores the applicability of democratic functionalism as a theoretical framework explaining mechanisms of European Union (EU) politicization during immigration crises. Since most existing studies on the politicization of EU crisis situations focus on the Euro crisis, it is unclear if and how the politicization of EU immigration crises differs. Drawing on a 2011 crisis with legislative implications for the free movement of people in the Schengen Area, the article illustrates that immigration crises are politicized along exclusionary identities rather than along pro-/anti-European lines-as expected by democratic functionalism. Moreover, unlike in the Euro crisis, the 2011 case illustrates how the media can be instrumentalized by governments during immigration crises, with little political mobilization from the public. This case is relevant given the widespread politicization of the 2015 refugee crisis, which conversely attracted close media attention and caused serious public concern. As it stands, democratic functionalism is shown to lack a conceptualization of how much and for how long an issue needs to be contested in the European public sphere for the mechanisms of EU politicization described by the theory to hold.Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou

Parliamentary Oversight of European Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision

This dataset accompanies the article 'Police Patrols, Fire Alarms, or Ambulance Chasers? Parliamentary Oversight of European Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision', published in West European Politics (2024). The dataset includes all parliamentary questions addressed by Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) orally to the European Central Bank during the Monetary and the Banking Dialogues during 2014-2021. Questions are coded individually, meaning that an MEP can ask multiple questions per speech. Each question was manually coded to capture the type of question (according to the article's conceptualization), the topic, the year in which it was posed, as well as MEPs' nationality and political affiliation. For more information, please see the published article. The dataset includes a total of 976 individual questions for the Monetary Dialogue, retrieved from a dataset compiled by Massoc (2022), and 528 individual questions for the Banking Dialogue, retrieved from Akbik (2022; Maricut‐Akbik 2020). ReferencesAkbik, Adina (2022). ‘SSM Accountability: Lessons Learned for the Monetary Dialogues’, , European Parliament Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2022/699545/IPOL_IDA(2022)699545_EN.pdf (Accessed July 25, 2022).Maricut‐Akbik, Adina (2020). ‘Contesting the European Central Bank in Banking Supervision: Accountability in Practice at the European Parliament’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 58:5, 1199–1214.Massoc, Elsa (2022b). ‘How MEPs hold the ECB accountable’, Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) https://www.openicpsr.org/openicpsr/project/167901/version/V1/view (Accessed December 4, 2023).THIS DATASET IS ARCHIVED AT DANS/EASY, BUT NOT ACCESSIBLE HERE. TO VIEW A LIST OF FILES AND ACCESS THE FILES IN THIS DATASET CLICK ON THE DOI-LINK ABOV

Corrigendum to [Reconciling independence and accountability at the European Central Bank: the false promise of proceduralism]

Horizon 2020(H2020)716923Institutions, Decisions and Collective Behaviou