Inspiration of Imitation: Copyright Protection for Stage Directions

This Article addresses copyright protection for stage directions. Copyright law dictates that stage directions are subject to copyright protection, as they are original creative works that can easily be fixed in a tangible medium. Under their union contracts, theatre directors reserve ownership of the copyright in stage directions. Directors who believe that their staging has been misappropriated by a later director can prove infringement through showing access and substantial similarity. The doctrines of merger and scenes a faire, however, limit the extent of that copyright protection. If copyright law fails to fully vindicate a director\u27s hoped-for rights in stage directions, other legal theories also pose their own hurdles. Ultimately, a director should be able to successfully sue a later director for copyright infringement if the later director closely copies the most striking features of the original director\u27s staging. Give my regards to Broadway! Remember me to Herald Square! —George M. Cohan No man but a blockhead ever wrote, except for money. —Samuel Johnso

Disobedience and Contempt

A court\u27s power to impose contempt sanctions on recalcitrant individuals is essential to ensure orderly judicial proceedings and obedience of judicial decrees. Despite repeated efforts to distinguish between civil and criminal contempt and the procedures required for each, the U.S. Supreme Court arguably has failed to delineate a precise demarcation between the two that considers both the due process interests of alleged contemnors and the remedial needs of party plaintiffs. This Article suggests that the Court\u27s latest major decision on the differences between civil and criminal contempt, International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, represents the high water mark in the Court\u27s emphasis on affording heightened procedural protections to alleged contemnors. This Article observes that by implicitly expanding the definition of criminal contempt, the U.S. Supreme Court has neglected to consider adequately plaintiffs\u27 remedial entitlements and has unduly restricted litigants from obtaining equitable relief promptly and reliably. This Article proposes a return to the more traditional definitions of civil and criminal contempt coupled with additional procedural reforms that would enhance the rights of both civil and criminal contemnors while protecting plaintiffs\u27 and courts\u27 ability to have lawful decrees enforced

Certainty, Efficiency, and Realism: Rights in Collateral under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code

Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code requires that the debtor have rights in the collateral for the attachment of a security interest. The drafters, however, left the determination of the phrase\u27s meaning to the courts. This article argues that the requirement of rights in the collateral is unnecessary as it relates to tangible goods and should be deleted from Article 9. As an alternative to the uncertainty engendered by the phrase, the article proposes substituting a set of notice and priority rules that more clearly define the rights and obligations of the parties undertaking an Article 9 transaction involving tangible goods. It concludes by observing that Karl Llewellyn\u27s philosophy of Legal Realism would best be served by such an amendment

The Calculus of Animal Valuation: Crafting a Viable Remedy

For most of recorded history, the majority of legal systems have regarded domesticated animals as a species of property. Part I of this article reviews the traditional method of valuing animals in tort cases and notes that some modern courts have expanded beyond the classic fair market value standard and have allowed pet owners to recover for the value of the pet to them or even for loss of affection and companionship. Most courts, however, still value animals according to their fair market value, and Part I asserts that this method of valuation produces severe undercompensation of pet owners in many instances. Part II of this article explores generally the development of tort recoveries for “ethereal” injuries—injuries to the psychic and the emotions. Specifically, it discusses the evolution of derivative claims for loss of consortium and society, the abolition of certain claims for emotional distress such as alienation of affections and similar actions, and the increased recognition of claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Part II asserts that the same reasoning that led to an expansion of claims for ethereal injuries dictates that the courts afford some compensation for the emotional loss experienced because of the tortious injury to a companion animal. It also notes that pet destruction cases can be analogized to nuisance claims, for which many states allow recovery of damages for mental anguish. Part III explores the social science literature that documents the emotional importance of companion animals to their human owners. It asserts that a proper system of tort compensation should afford something more than a minimal recovery for the wrongful death of a companion animal. Part IV proposes a new rule of compensation for the tortious destruction of companion animals that will afford a significant recovery to pet owners. Initially, section IV.A addresses the general policy implications of compensating intangible losses in pet death cases and asserts that the fundamental policies of the tort compensation system are well served by recognizing such claims. It explores the tort theories of compensation, deterrence, and reflection of societal values as well as the related remedial policies of corrective justice and economic efficiency. Section IV.B then analyzes the inadequacies of the current legal rules for valuing companion animals, including the fair market value standard and the “value to the owner” concept. Section IV.C elaborates on my proposal to compensate animal guardians in pet destruction cases for both the pecuniary and nonpecuniary components of their loss. In Section IV.D, I respond to possible policy objections to my proposal and demonstrate that these objections can be overcome in a properly tailored compensation scheme