Essays on Economic Behaviour

The main thesis of these essays is that social phenomena are different from psychological phenomena and thus social sciences do not belong to behavioural sciences. Chapter 1 introduces the fundamental problem of the rational choice theory ("Macaulay's problem"): either the theory is empirical and false or it is without empirical content and true. Various suggested solutions to this problem are reviewed and criticized. It is argued that the problem is evaded once it is admitted that rational choice theory does not attempt to explain behaviour. It was developed to explain decreasing individual demand and its extension to behavioural sciences is illegitimate. In Chapter 2 the difference between the interpretation of rationality in choice theory and demand theory is shown. It is argued that choice theory must adopt the agent's point of view, while demand theory proceeds from the point of view of an observer. Chapter 3 applies the argument to the problem of indifference ("Nozick's problem"): it claims that choice theory must adopt strict ordering of alternatives because indifference is already accounted for in the description of the choice alternatives. The difference between the consumer perception and the objective price-quantity relation embodied in the demand function is further explored in Chapter 4 on the example of the Rothbardian demand theory. It is argued that the law of marginal utility defined in terms of subjective units (i.e. units relevant to the consumer) does not imply nonincreasing demand. Chapter 5 is complementary to the previous and attempts to answer the question, whether the concept of marginal utility is compatible with ordinalism. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses on the methodological level the difference between behavioural sciences and economics. It argues that the difference can be conveniently described with the help of Popper's concepts of 'World 2'and 'World 3'

J. S. Mill's Methodology of Political Economy

The article deals with Mill's views on methodology. The place taken by political economy in the general classification of knowledge is shown. This includes: natural distinction between physical and moral sciences (including non-reducibility of mental phenomena to physical phenomena) and definition of political economy as a separate science. Further, the concept of economic man as introduced by Mill is presented. Two methods, which Mill saw as appropriate for studying social phenomena - i. e. concrete deductive method and inverse deductive method - are examined. Finally, marginalist reinterpretation of Mill's methodology is suggested. This reinterpretation retains the major features of Mill's approach.methodology, J. S. Mill, Homo oeconomicus

O expertech a lidech: spasitelské lhaní v časech pandemie [Of Experts and Men: White Lies in the Times of a Pandemic]

Krize spojená s příchodem pandemie koronaviru ukázala, že užitečné expertní vědění sice podle všeho existuje, ale ne každému, kdo se představí jako expert, bychom měli věřit. Slovy doktora House: „Všichni lžou.“ Lžou i odborníci. Kapitola se zaměřuje na situace, kdy odborník lže takříkajíc „s dobrým úmyslem,“ neboť se domnívá, že pravda by veřejnost vedla k chování, které není společensky žádoucí. V takovém případě se jedná o lhaní paternalistické, protože má ochránit veřejnost před ní samotnou. Ukážeme příklady, kdy k němu dochází, a pokusíme se i odhadnout, jak dobře takový pokus o manipulaci veřejnosti funguje krátkodobě i dlouhodobě. Protože výsledky našeho rozboru nenaznačují, že by dobročinné lhaní odborníků bylo skutečně společensky prospěšné, pobavíme se také o tom, proč by se mu člověk v roli experta měl raději vyhnout