Indonesian politics in 2014: democracy’s close call

Indonesian democracy experienced a near miss in 2014, when Jakarta governor Joko Widodo (Jokowi) defeated former general Prabowo Subianto by a margin of 6.3% in the presidential election. Both candidates were populists who rose to prominence in the context of public disillusionment with incumbent president Yudhoyono; Prabowo, however, condemned Indonesia’s democratic system and promised to take Indonesia in a more authoritarian direction. We trace democracy’s close call through five phases: the dying months of Yudhoyono’s presidency, the rise of populist alternatives, the parliamentary elections of April 2014, the July presidential campaign, and the aftermath. We attribute the strength of Prabowo’s campaign to superior organisational and financial support, while Jokowi’s victory rested upon strong identification with him among poor and rural voters. Also determining the outcome was the fact that public satisfaction with democracy remained strong, undermining the effectiveness of Prabowo’s authoritarian-populist message. Nevertheless, democracy’s future remains uncertain, given that Prabowo and his supporters now control a sufficiently large number of parliamentary seats to continue promoting a rollback of democratic reforms

Indonesian civil-military relations : the armed Forces and political Islam in transition, 1997-2004

This thesis discusses the development of civil-military relations in Indonesia after the fall of the authoritarian New Order regime in 1998. It argues that despite wide-ranging changes to Indonesia's political system, the .armed forces continue to play a significant role in politics and society. Beside the opposition of the officer corps to substantial military reform, this study points to divisions within Indonesia's civilian elite as a major factor behind the stagnation in the current civil-military transition. In order to explain Indonesia's problems in establishing democratic control over its armed forces, the thesis focuses oil deeply entrenched socio-political structures, the character of the 1998 regime change and difficulties in the process of democratic consolidation. The analysis of these three areas makes it possible to locate Indonesia's position in comparative schemes of post-authoritarian civil-military-relations. Discussing the historical legacy of military politics in Indonesia, the study exposes important structural and ideological features of the involvement of the armed forces in politics. Structurally, the territorial command. structure and the practice of self-financing have nurtured a sense of institutional autonomy in the military that post-1998 governments found difficult to overturn. Ideologically, the feeling of entitlement to political supremacy, fed by highly derogatory views on civilian leadership qualities, has survived the fall of Soeharto and continues to shape the political mindset of the officer corps. On the civilian side, long-standing divisions between major societal constituencies have hampered the development of strong political institutions and have offered. the armed forces opportunities for intervention. This thesis discusses the cleavages within Indonesia's Muslim community, particularly between traditionalist and modernist groups, as one of the most important sources of conflict in the civilian realm. The 1998 regime change also posed significant challenges to the civil-military reform process. Moderate military officers succeeded in negotiating an orderly transfer of power from Soeharto to his deputy, avoiding the complete breakdown of the authoritarian system. Consequently; residual elements of the New Order were able to extend their influence into the post-Soeharto polity and slow down initiatives for reform. The regime change also highlighted the inability of the oppositional civilian elite to seize upon the opportunities presented by Soeharto's demise. Deeply divided and anxious not to alienate Soeharto, key civilian leaders failed to present a democratic alternative to the faltering regime. When the government finally collapsed, the non-regime elite found itself excluded from executive and legislative institutions for the first 18 months of the post-Soeharto era. The conflict between Indonesia's largest socio-political groups continued throughout the post-authoritarian transition, allowing the armed forces to repair their image damaged in decades of repressive rule under the New Order. The constitutional crisis of 2001, during which conflicts between the executive and the legislature paralysed political life, led to a surge in the reputation of the armed forces in society and the elite. Subsequently, retired officers emerged as influential actors in party politics and regional as well as national elections. Ultimately, the rise of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to the presidency in 2004 completed the successful adaptation of Indonesia's armed forces and their personnel to the new democratic framework

Entrepreneurs of Grievance. Drivers and Effects of Indonesia's Islamist Mobilization

There has been much scholarly debate on the causes and effects of Islamist mobilizations. As some authors involved in this debate have identified rising Islamist attitudes among Muslims as a main cause of Islamist mobilizations, our study advances detailed research of opinion survey data as the best methodology to verify or falsify this assertion. Discussing the case of Indonesia, we use original survey data sets to show that prior to the 2016 Islamist mobilization there, Islamist attitudes were in fact moderating. This means that hardening Islamist views in the Muslim population could not have caused the mobilization. Importantly, however, we can demonstrate that Islamist political attitudes increased after the mobilization, and they did so consistently around the themes propagated by its organizers. This supports theories of religio-political entrepreneurs being the main drivers of Islamist mobilizations. Grievances and religious beliefs, on the other hand, are necessary yet insufficient conditions for such actions

A research agenda for studying legislative incumbent turnover in new democracies, using Indonesia as a case study

Legislative incumbent turnover rates are an important indicator for the quality of a democracy. Low turnover rates may indicate the presence of oligarchic structures while high turnover rates may be a sign of political instability. Yet, there is little research on incumbent turnover in new democracies. This article will suggest ways to address this gap in the literature by looking at Indonesia. The country is not only the third largest democracy in the world but also a relatively new democracy that has only conducted four elections since 1998. The lack of studies on incumbent turnover in new democracies is mirrored in the literature on Indonesia. The vast scholarship on democratization in Indonesia that has emerged over the past twenty years has yet to harness the insights to be gained from examining legislative incumbent turnover rates. The goal of this article is twofold. One, to present for the first time a systematic and comprehensive account of incumbent turnover rates in Indonesia across all election cycles since 1998. Two, to sketch an agenda for future research on incumbent turnover in Indonesia and other new democracies and facilitate such research by making publicly available an original dataset on incumbent turnover in Indonesia

The politics of military reform in post-Suharto Indonesia : elite conflict, nationalism, and institutional resistance

For more about the East-West Center, see http://www.eastwestcenter.org/This study discusses the process of military reform in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto's New Order regime in 1998. The extent of Indonesia's progress in this area has been the subject of heated debate, both in Indonesia and in Western capitals. Human rights organizations and critical academics, on the one hand, have argued that the reforms implemented so far have been largely superficial, and that Indonesia's armed forces remain a highly problematic institution. Foreign proponents of military assistance to Indonesia, on the other hand, have asserted that the military has undergone radical change, as evidenced by its complete extraction from political institutions. This study evaluates the state of military reform eight years after the end of authoritarian rule, pointing to both significant achievements and serious shortcomings. Although the armed forces in the new democratic polity no longer function as the backbone of a powerful centralist regime and have lost many of their previous privileges, the military has been able to protect its core institutional interests by successfully fending off demands to reform the territorial command structure. As the military's primary source of political influence and off-budget revenue, the persistence of the territorial system has ensured that the Indonesian armed forces have not been fully subordinated to democratic civilian control. This ambiguous transition outcome so far poses difficult challenges to domestic and foreign policymakers, who have to find ways of effectively engaging with the military to drive the reform process forward

Local Elections and Autonomy in Papua and Aceh: Mitigating or Fueling Secessionism?

Page range: 1-39The article discusses the 2006 gubernatorial elections in Papua and Aceh, evaluating whether these elections have mitigated or exacerbated secessionist sentiments in the two provinces. It argues that the elections have a better chance of reducing separatist demands than did the half-hearted special autonomy regulations of 2001 because these elections put pressure on former separatists to perform in public office, created splits in the previously united protest movements, and forced both Papuans and Acehnese to redirect their attention away from the central government, which they had criticized, and towards urgent internal problems in their home provinces