On the Optimality of Patent Licensing with Maximum Production Volume

This paper compares alternative licensing schemes of a patentor, that is, at the same time, a producer within an industry. The licensing scheme can assume the form of a royalty per unit of output, a fixed fee, or a fixed fee with maximum authorized production. We show that, when the innovation is non-drastic, in a duopolistic Cournot competition, the third method dominates the others. As the patentor has strong incentives to limit the output of the opponent, this practice must be carefully monitored by the antitrust authority.

Why Should a Firm Choose to Limit the Size of Its Market Area?

We analyze a variant of the standard Dixit-Stiglitz (AER, 1977) model, adding transport costs and assuming that, in addition to price, a firm can choose the size of the market area and the quality of the product. We also modify the standard cost function, making variable costs and fixed costs increasing in both "reach" and quality. We characterize the solution of the model and we find the conditions under which a firm decides to limit the market area. Finally, we show that the firm's behavior is constrained socially optimal.

European Airlines Conduct after September 11th

This paper analyses the network reorganisation that European carriers have implemented after September 11th in the transatlantic flights. We model carriers' conduct as a mixture of short- and long-term goals where the weights depend on firm-specific variables (adjustment costs, financial situation) and subjective expectations on the crisis duration. Data provide some support to our conjectures that high adjustment costs, induce low reaction to the demand fall and that a bad financial situation shifts the carries attention to short-term profitability. Finally, the analysis of the composition of short- and long-term reaction provides some insights into the carriers' perspectives of the crisis duration.

Why Should a Firm Choose to Limit the Size of its Market Area?

We study when a monopolistically-competitive firm may optimally choose to limit the size of its market. This may be the case when the cost of serving the market with geographically dispersed customers is increasing in size. We also investigate the incentives faced by a firm to limit the reach of its market, when it adopts different pricing schemes. We show that under certain assumptions the derived equilibria are constrained socially optimal.Monopolistic competition; Transport costs; Endogenous fixed costs; Overlapping market areas

On-line Booking and Revenue Management: Evidence from a Low-Cost Airline

Using unique data on a low-cost airline posted prices and seat availability, this study sheds some light on whether the airline's actual practice of yield management techniques con- forms with some predictions from economic models of peak-load pricing under demand uncertainty. On the one hand, robust support is found to the notion that prices increase as the seat availability decreases; on the other, theoretical models that do not account for stochastic peak-load pricing fail to capture an important source of dispersion in the data.Inter-temporal pricing, competition, price dispersion

On cost restrictions in spatial competition models with heterogeneous firms

This paper investigates the properties of two types of cost restrictions that guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies in Bayesian spatial competition models with heterogenous firms.Localized competition; market effciency, cost heterogeneity.

The Circular City with Heterogenous Firms

The paper extends the Salop model of localized competition by allowing frms to have heterogeneous costs. We provide a general but highly tractable analytical solution for the equilibrium prices, and we study the long-run properties of the model using two different entry games. We show that cost heterogeneity affects the efficiency of the market equilibrium by increasing welfare and inducing less excessive entry. Further, we illustrate the positive effects of the existence of a selection mechanism, which induces less efficient firms not to start production. The model also replicates some recent results on dense markets.Localised Competition; market efficiency; cost heterogeneity; large markets.

The Circular City with Heterogeneous Firms

The paper extends the Salop model of localized competition by allowing firms to have heterogeneous costs. We provide a general but highly tractable analytical solution for the equilibrium prices, and we study the long-run properties of the model using two different entry games. We show that cost heterogeneity affects the efficiency of the market equilibrium by increasing welfare and inducing less excessive entry. Further, we illustrate the positive effects of the existence of a selection mechanism, which induces less efficient firms not to start production. The model also replicates some recent results on dense markets.Localized competition; market effciency, cost heterogeneity; large markets.

Accessibilità aerea e capacità esportativa del manifatturiero italiano

Questo lavoro analizza il ruolo esercitato dal trasporto aereo passeggeri nel favorire la capacità esportativa del manifatturiero italiano ruotando attorno a due interrogativi principali. In primo luogo, vuole verificare se la presenza di servizi di trasporto aereo passeggeri abbia o meno un impatto positivo sulle esportazioni; in secondo luogo vuole analizzare se la composizione dell’offerta (differente mix tra vettori low-cost e vettori tradizionali) eserciti o meno un’influenza sulla propensione ad esportare. Questo contributo appartiene al filone di ricerca che studia le determinanti della crescita e dello sviluppo (in primis le infrastrutture di trasporto) anche tenendo conto del loro impatto sulle esportazioni.

Network competition - the co-existence of hub-and-spoke and point-to-point

Airlines network choices are analysed to describe the co-existence of alternative business models: the full service model based on the hub-and-spoke (HS) system and the low cost model based on point-to-point (PP) system. The analysis is carried on both theoretically and empirically. In the theoretical part, we show that the rise of the low costs business model can be the consequence of a simple two-player game. When two carriers compete in designing their network configurations (HS or PP), asymmetric equilibria emerge, i.e. one carrier will choose HS and the other PP. Full service carriers are stuck to a HS configuration to serve intercontinental destinations, whilst non-flag carriers implement a point-to-point network. In the second part, the recent network evolution in Europe is empirically evaluated by means of different spatial measures of concentration, such as Gini index, Freeman centrality index and Bonacich centrality. In addition, we also provide an airline-specific measure of centrality based on scheduled time comparison of direct to one-stop services. Spatial measures of centrality capture a reduction of centrality in non-flag carriers and small changes in the network centrality of flag carriers. Indeed, the time-based measure of centrality suggests an increase of centrality of flag carriers.