Unfree to speak and forced to hate? The phenomenon of the All-Poland Women's Strike

This chapter explores abusive language’s role when employed by a group with a lower social status whose rights are threatened by political authorities. We focus on the language of protest that emerged during the 2020 All-Poland Women’s Strike, following a court ruling that almost totally banned legal abortions in Poland. Since some slogans used by these protesters could be interpreted as expressions of abusive language, we decided to analyze their meaning in a wider socio-political context. We show that women’s use of vulgarisms and offensive language can serve as a tool of social and political change and that it may lead to empowerment. Moreover, given the cultural underpinnings of Polish society’s gender-based social norms, we show that the use of abusive language may symbolize the process of redefining the traditional gender contract in Poland

Autobiographical memory in the service of the self – on the role of visual perspective in retrieving self-threatening events

Celem pracy było zbadanie funkcji perspektywy wizualnej, przyjmowanej przez osoby z wysoką defensywną (vs. dojrzałą) samoocena, podczas odtwarzania wspomnień autobiograficznych, które zagrażają Ja. Wspomnienia mogą jawić nam się z perspektywy pierwszoosobowej lub trzecioosobowej. Samoocena defensywna stanowi czynnik uwrażliwiający na psychologiczne zagrożenie. Zakładano zatem, że będzie pozytywnie związana z trzecioosobowymi wizualizacjami zagrażającej przeszłości. Samoocena dojrzała, zapewniająca bufor ochronny przed zagrożeniem, powinna łączyć się z pierwszoosobowym konfrontowaniem się z zagrażającą przeszłością. Przeprowadzono cztery eksperymenty, w których mierzono narcyzm oraz samoocenę, a następnie kontrolowano ich wspólna wariancję otrzymując defensywny versus dojrzały komponent autoewaluacji. W Eksperymentach 1 i 3 respondenci odtwarzali wspomnienia zagrażające Ja (wstyd) lub wzmacniające Ja (duma). W Eksperymencie 2 kontrastowano wydarzenia negatywne zagrażające Ja (wstyd) z wydarzeniami negatywnymi, niezagrażającymi Ja (smutek). Perspektywa wizualna była zmienną zależną. Dodatkowo, w Eksperymencie 3 mierzono korelaty przyjmowanej perspektywy. W Eksperymencie 4 manipulowano przyjmowaną perspektywą podczas odtwarzania zdarzeń zagrażających Ja (wstyd), badając jej skutki. Wyniki wykazały, że jednostki z wysoką samooceną defensywną unikały pierwszoosobowej perspektywy, przyjmując trzecioosobową podczas odtwarzania zagrażającej przeszłości. Trzecioosobowa perspektywa wiązała się zaś z: (1) niższymi wynikami na skali wewnętrznych atrybucji przyczynowych oraz (2) większą percepcją zmiany Ja od czasów wspominanego wydarzenia. Osoby z wysoką samoocena dojrzałą konfrontowały się pierwszoosobowo ze wspomnieniowym zagrożeniem, czemu towarzyszyły wyższe wyniki na skali wewnętrznych atrybucji przyczynowych.This research examines the role of visual perspective adopted by individuals high in defensive versus genuine self-esteem while retrieving self-threatening memories. Autobiographical memories can be retrieved either from a first-person or a third-person visual perspective. Because defensive self-esteem is linked to sensitivity to psychological threats, it should predict retrieval of self-threatening memories using the third-person perspective. Genuine self-esteem is resilient to threats. Therefore, it should be associated with retrieving self-relevant, even if threatening, memories from the first-person perspective.In four experiments I measured narcissism and self-esteem and accounted for their shared variance to distinguish unique effects of defensive versus genuine self-evaluation. In Experiments 1 and 3 participants were asked to recall self-threatening (shameful) or self-boosting (proud) situations. Experiment 2 manipulated self-relevance of negative memories by asking participants to recall self-threatening (shameful) or negative, yet not self-threatening (sad) situations. Visual perspective of memory retrieval served as the dependent variable (Experiments: 1, 2, 3). Experiment 3 additionally examined psychological concomitants of visual perspective. In Experiment 4 the type of visual perspective (third vs. first-person) was manipulated during self-threatening (shameful) mnemonic retrieval. Subjective perception of self-change served as the dependent variable. Overall, individuals high in defensive self jesteem avoided the first-person and employed the third person visual perspective in self threatening memories which was related to (1) decreased internal causal attributions and (2) higher perceptions of selfchange. Individuals high in genuine self-esteem adopted firstperson visual perspective in self-threatening memories which positively correlated with internal causal attribution

An autobiographical gateway: Narcissists avoid first-person visual perspective while retrieving self-threatening memories

This research examines the role of narcissistic versus genuine self-evaluation in the retrieval of self-threatening memories. Autobiographical memories can be retrieved either from a first-person or a third-person visual perspective. Because narcissism is linked to sensitivity to psychological threats, it should predict retrieval of self-threatening memories using the third-person perspective. Genuine self-esteem, on the other hand, is resilient to threats. Therefore, it should be associated with retrieving self-relevant, even if threatening, memories from the first-person perspective. In two experiments we measured narcissism and self-esteem. Experiment 1 manipulated valence of self-relevant memories by asking participants to recall self-threatening (shameful) or self-boosting (proud) situations. Experiment 2 manipulated self-relevance of negative memories by asking participants to recall self-threatening (shameful) or negative, yet not self-threatening (sad) situations. Visual perspective of memory retrieval served as the dependent variable. In Experiment 1, narcissism predicted avoiding the first-person perspective and employing the third-person perspective in self-threatening memories, while self-esteem predicted the first-person perspective regardless of the memories being self-threatening or self-boosting. In Experiment 2, narcissism predicted the third-person perspective, while genuine self-esteem predicted the first-person perspective when self-threatening memories were recalled. Neither narcissism, nor genuine self-esteem were associated with visual perspective when participants recalled negative memories irrelevant to the self. Results shed light on the role of self-evaluation in processing autobiographical memories

Why do narcissists find conspiracy theories so appealing?

Narcissism—a conviction about one’s superiority and entitlement to special treatment—is a robust predictor of belief in conspiracy theories. Recent developments in the study of narcissism suggest that it has three components: antagonism, agentic extraversion, and neuroticism. We argue that each of these components of narcissism might predispose people to endorse conspiracy theories due to different psychological processes. Specifically, we discuss the role of paranoia, gullibility, and the needs for dominance, control, and uniqueness. We also review parallel findings for narcissistic beliefs about one’s social groups. We consider the wider implications this research might have, especially for political leadership. We conclude by discussing outstanding questions about sharing conspiracy theories and other forms of misinformation

Superficial ingroup love? Collective narcissism predicts ingroup image defense, outgroup prejudice, and lower ingroup loyalty

We examined the associations between the need for personal control, different types of ingroup commitment, and group‐related outcomes: (1) defensive responses to ingroup criticism, (2) ingroup disloyalty, and (3) outgroup attitudes. We assumed that collective narcissism (i.e., a belief in ingroup’s greatness which is contingent on external validation and stems from frustrated individual needs) should be concerned with defending the ingroup image and derogating outgroups, but not necessarily with being loyal to the ingroup. Secure ingroup identification (i.e., a confidently held ingroup evaluation, which stems from satisfied needs), in contrast, should predict greater ingroup loyalty and positive outgroup attitudes. We expected these effects to be especially strong once we account for the overlap between collective narcissism and group‐level self‐investment – a key component of ingroup identification. In a nationally representative sample of Polish adults (n = 1,007), collective narcissism (net of group‐level self‐investment) mediated between low personal control and ingroup image defense, lower group loyalty, and less positive outgroup attitudes. Secure ingroup identification (group‐level self‐investment net of collective narcissism) mediated between high personal control and ingroup loyalty and positive outgroup attitudes. It was not associated with ingroup image defense. Implications for understanding the role of identification in inter‐ and intra‐group relations are discussed

The Collective Conspiracy Mentality in Poland

In recent decades several conspiracy theories became prominent topics of Polish public debate: the Smoleńsk catastrophe, “gender conspiracy” and “Jewish conspiracy” are some examples of such theories. These conspiracy theories can be viewed as manifestations of a collective conspiracy mentality, a collective mental state in which other groups, nations, or institutions are viewed as ill-intended and willing to conspire against the in-group. This state is instigated by salient historical representations of one’s own group (e.g., nation), viewing the in-group as a victim of others. It is boosted by a special kind of defensive in-group identity—collective narcissism. Finally, it bears negative consequences for inter-group relations

Populism as identity politics: Perceived ingroup disadvantage, collective narcissism and support for populism

Populists combine anti-elitism with a conviction that they hold a superior vision of what it means to be a true citizen of their nation. We expected support for populism to be associated with national collective narcissism—an unrealistic belief in the greatness of the national group, which should increase in response to perceived ingroup disadvantage. In Study 1 (Polish participants; n=1007), national collective narcissism predicted support for the populist Law and Justice party. In the experimental Study 2 (British participants; n=497), perceived long-term ingroup disadvantage led to greater support for Brexit and this relationship was accounted for by national collective narcissism. In Study 3 (American participants; n=403), group relative deprivation predicted support for Donald Trump and this relationship was accounted for by national collective narcissism. These associations were present even when we controlled for conventional national identification. We discuss implications of the link between collective narcissism and support for populism

Coping strategies and belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories

Conspiracy beliefs have been related to aversive emotional experiences often accompanying major world events and have also been linked to maladaptive ways of coping with stress. In this research, we examined how different coping strategies (i.e., self-sufficient, social-support, avoidance, and religious) predicted the adoption of COVID-19 conspiracy theories. In two studies (Study 1, n = 1000 and Study 2, n = 616) conducted among Polish participants, we found that avoidance and religious coping were positively linked to COVID- 19 conspiracy beliefs. In Study 1, conspiracy beliefs also mediated the positive relationships between avoidance and religious coping and adherence to safety and self-isolation guidelines during the COVID-19 pandemic. Study 2 additionally showed that the relationship between fear, induced by reading threatening news on COVID-19, and conspiracy beliefs was the strongest among those high in avoidance coping. These studies highlight the role of coping strategies in the adoption of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs