Unfree to speak and forced to hate? The phenomenon of the All-Poland Women's Strike

This chapter explores abusive language’s role when employed by a group with a lower social status whose rights are threatened by political authorities. We focus on the language of protest that emerged during the 2020 All-Poland Women’s Strike, following a court ruling that almost totally banned legal abortions in Poland. Since some slogans used by these protesters could be interpreted as expressions of abusive language, we decided to analyze their meaning in a wider socio-political context. We show that women’s use of vulgarisms and offensive language can serve as a tool of social and political change and that it may lead to empowerment. Moreover, given the cultural underpinnings of Polish society’s gender-based social norms, we show that the use of abusive language may symbolize the process of redefining the traditional gender contract in Poland

Autobiographical memory in the service of the self – on the role of visual perspective in retrieving self-threatening events

Celem pracy było zbadanie funkcji perspektywy wizualnej, przyjmowanej przez osoby z wysoką defensywną (vs. dojrzałą) samoocena, podczas odtwarzania wspomnień autobiograficznych, które zagrażają Ja. Wspomnienia mogą jawić nam się z perspektywy pierwszoosobowej lub trzecioosobowej. Samoocena defensywna stanowi czynnik uwrażliwiający na psychologiczne zagrożenie. Zakładano zatem, że będzie pozytywnie związana z trzecioosobowymi wizualizacjami zagrażającej przeszłości. Samoocena dojrzała, zapewniająca bufor ochronny przed zagrożeniem, powinna łączyć się z pierwszoosobowym konfrontowaniem się z zagrażającą przeszłością. Przeprowadzono cztery eksperymenty, w których mierzono narcyzm oraz samoocenę, a następnie kontrolowano ich wspólna wariancję otrzymując defensywny versus dojrzały komponent autoewaluacji. W Eksperymentach 1 i 3 respondenci odtwarzali wspomnienia zagrażające Ja (wstyd) lub wzmacniające Ja (duma). W Eksperymencie 2 kontrastowano wydarzenia negatywne zagrażające Ja (wstyd) z wydarzeniami negatywnymi, niezagrażającymi Ja (smutek). Perspektywa wizualna była zmienną zależną. Dodatkowo, w Eksperymencie 3 mierzono korelaty przyjmowanej perspektywy. W Eksperymencie 4 manipulowano przyjmowaną perspektywą podczas odtwarzania zdarzeń zagrażających Ja (wstyd), badając jej skutki. Wyniki wykazały, że jednostki z wysoką samooceną defensywną unikały pierwszoosobowej perspektywy, przyjmując trzecioosobową podczas odtwarzania zagrażającej przeszłości. Trzecioosobowa perspektywa wiązała się zaś z: (1) niższymi wynikami na skali wewnętrznych atrybucji przyczynowych oraz (2) większą percepcją zmiany Ja od czasów wspominanego wydarzenia. Osoby z wysoką samoocena dojrzałą konfrontowały się pierwszoosobowo ze wspomnieniowym zagrożeniem, czemu towarzyszyły wyższe wyniki na skali wewnętrznych atrybucji przyczynowych.This research examines the role of visual perspective adopted by individuals high in defensive versus genuine self-esteem while retrieving self-threatening memories. Autobiographical memories can be retrieved either from a first-person or a third-person visual perspective. Because defensive self-esteem is linked to sensitivity to psychological threats, it should predict retrieval of self-threatening memories using the third-person perspective. Genuine self-esteem is resilient to threats. Therefore, it should be associated with retrieving self-relevant, even if threatening, memories from the first-person perspective.In four experiments I measured narcissism and self-esteem and accounted for their shared variance to distinguish unique effects of defensive versus genuine self-evaluation. In Experiments 1 and 3 participants were asked to recall self-threatening (shameful) or self-boosting (proud) situations. Experiment 2 manipulated self-relevance of negative memories by asking participants to recall self-threatening (shameful) or negative, yet not self-threatening (sad) situations. Visual perspective of memory retrieval served as the dependent variable (Experiments: 1, 2, 3). Experiment 3 additionally examined psychological concomitants of visual perspective. In Experiment 4 the type of visual perspective (third vs. first-person) was manipulated during self-threatening (shameful) mnemonic retrieval. Subjective perception of self-change served as the dependent variable. Overall, individuals high in defensive self jesteem avoided the first-person and employed the third person visual perspective in self threatening memories which was related to (1) decreased internal causal attributions and (2) higher perceptions of selfchange. Individuals high in genuine self-esteem adopted firstperson visual perspective in self-threatening memories which positively correlated with internal causal attribution

An autobiographical gateway: Narcissists avoid first-person visual perspective while retrieving self-threatening memories

This research examines the role of narcissistic versus genuine self-evaluation in the retrieval of self-threatening memories. Autobiographical memories can be retrieved either from a first-person or a third-person visual perspective. Because narcissism is linked to sensitivity to psychological threats, it should predict retrieval of self-threatening memories using the third-person perspective. Genuine self-esteem, on the other hand, is resilient to threats. Therefore, it should be associated with retrieving self-relevant, even if threatening, memories from the first-person perspective. In two experiments we measured narcissism and self-esteem. Experiment 1 manipulated valence of self-relevant memories by asking participants to recall self-threatening (shameful) or self-boosting (proud) situations. Experiment 2 manipulated self-relevance of negative memories by asking participants to recall self-threatening (shameful) or negative, yet not self-threatening (sad) situations. Visual perspective of memory retrieval served as the dependent variable. In Experiment 1, narcissism predicted avoiding the first-person perspective and employing the third-person perspective in self-threatening memories, while self-esteem predicted the first-person perspective regardless of the memories being self-threatening or self-boosting. In Experiment 2, narcissism predicted the third-person perspective, while genuine self-esteem predicted the first-person perspective when self-threatening memories were recalled. Neither narcissism, nor genuine self-esteem were associated with visual perspective when participants recalled negative memories irrelevant to the self. Results shed light on the role of self-evaluation in processing autobiographical memories

Administration of testosterone inhibits initiation of seminal tubule growth and decreases Sertoli cell number in the earliest period of rat's postnatal development.

Sertoli cell (SC) number determines testes size and their capacity to produce spermatozoa. In the rat SC proliferate until 15th postnatal day (PND). Their proliferation is stimulated by FSH and inhibited by estradiol, but the role for androgens is uncertain. In this study we analyzed the effects of testosterone administration on testes growth and SC number in relation to timing of the treatment. Male rats were injected with 2.5 mg of testosterone propionate (TP) from birth until 5th PND and autopsied either on 6th PND [TP1-5(6)] or on 16th PND [TP1-5(16)] (transient administration). Other rats received TP from birth until 15th PND [TP1-15] or between 5th and 15th PND [TP5-15] continuously and were autopsied on day 16th. Control groups (C) received vehicle. In the Cs serum level of estradiol was 20-fold higher (

Superficial ingroup love? Collective narcissism predicts ingroup image defense, outgroup prejudice, and lower ingroup loyalty

We examined the associations between the need for personal control, different types of ingroup commitment, and group‐related outcomes: (1) defensive responses to ingroup criticism, (2) ingroup disloyalty, and (3) outgroup attitudes. We assumed that collective narcissism (i.e., a belief in ingroup’s greatness which is contingent on external validation and stems from frustrated individual needs) should be concerned with defending the ingroup image and derogating outgroups, but not necessarily with being loyal to the ingroup. Secure ingroup identification (i.e., a confidently held ingroup evaluation, which stems from satisfied needs), in contrast, should predict greater ingroup loyalty and positive outgroup attitudes. We expected these effects to be especially strong once we account for the overlap between collective narcissism and group‐level self‐investment – a key component of ingroup identification. In a nationally representative sample of Polish adults (n = 1,007), collective narcissism (net of group‐level self‐investment) mediated between low personal control and ingroup image defense, lower group loyalty, and less positive outgroup attitudes. Secure ingroup identification (group‐level self‐investment net of collective narcissism) mediated between high personal control and ingroup loyalty and positive outgroup attitudes. It was not associated with ingroup image defense. Implications for understanding the role of identification in inter‐ and intra‐group relations are discussed

The risk of mental disorders in patients with disorders/differences of sex differentiation/development (DSD) and Y chromosome

Introduction: Patients with disorders/differences of sex differentiation/development (DSD) are exposed to physical and mental suffering. The aim of the study was to assess the following: the mental health status and the risk of mental problems in adult DSD patients, their dependence on therapeutic procedures, and to identify groups of disorders that require particular psychological support. Material and methods: The study involved 59 patients with DSD (gonadal dysgenesis — GD, androgen insensitivity syndrome — AIS, 5-alpha reductase deficiency, ovotestis), and with the Y chromosome in the karyotype, aged 16–65 years. All completed the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-28) for the assessment of their mental health status. Raw results were converted into sten scores using norms for the Polish adult population to assess the risk of mental problems. Results: A high risk of mental problems was identified in 24% of individuals (26% men, 21% women). Women, when compared with men, displayed a significantly higher mean level of anxiety and insomnia (7.3 vs. 4.6 scores) and somatic symptoms (7.4 vs. 5.5), and worse general mental health status (25.6 vs. 18.8). The most disturbing symptoms were observed among patients with complete and partial AIS, and complete GD (general mental health status: 39.5, 24.3, and 24.2, respectively), women lacking a vagina (27.2), and without an enlarged clitoris (27.5). Patients after genital surgery had significantly fewer somatic symptoms (5.4 vs. 7.8; p < 0.05) and better general mental health status in comparison to those without surgery (20.1 vs. 24.9; p < 0.05). No significant differences were observed between patients using hormone replacement therapy and those who were not. Conclusions: The individuals with DSD and Y chromosome in the karyotype have increased risk of developing mental problems in comparison to the general Polish population. The risk factors seem to be as follows: female gender, the lack of a vagina, the lack of virilisation (no enlarged clitoris), and no genital operations performed. In some cases, sex hormone replacement therapy may be also the risk of mental problems. Particularly vulnerable groups are CAIS, PAIS, and CGD. The psychological support and an individual approach to particular needs of these patients is necessary.

Why do narcissists find conspiracy theories so appealing?

Narcissism—a conviction about one’s superiority and entitlement to special treatment—is a robust predictor of belief in conspiracy theories. Recent developments in the study of narcissism suggest that it has three components: antagonism, agentic extraversion, and neuroticism. We argue that each of these components of narcissism might predispose people to endorse conspiracy theories due to different psychological processes. Specifically, we discuss the role of paranoia, gullibility, and the needs for dominance, control, and uniqueness. We also review parallel findings for narcissistic beliefs about one’s social groups. We consider the wider implications this research might have, especially for political leadership. We conclude by discussing outstanding questions about sharing conspiracy theories and other forms of misinformation