Embodied Language Comprehension Requires an Enactivist Paradigm of Cognition

Two recurrent concerns in discussions on an embodied view of cognition are the “necessity question” (i.e., is activation in modality-specific brain areas necessary for language comprehension?) and the “simulation constraint” (i.e., how do we understand language for which we lack the relevant experiences?). In the present paper we argue that the criticisms encountered by the embodied approach hinge on a cognitivist interpretation of embodiment. We argue that the data relating sensorimotor activation to language comprehension can best be interpreted as supporting a non-representationalist, enactivist model of language comprehension, according to which language comprehension can be described as procedural knowledge – knowledge how, not knowledge that – that enables us to interact with others in a shared physical world. The enactivist view implies that the activation of modality-specific brain areas during language processing reflects the employment of sensorimotor skills and that language comprehension is a context-bound phenomenon. Importantly, an enactivist view provides an embodied approach of language, while avoiding the problems encountered by a cognitivist interpretation of embodiment

Early Social Cognition: Alternatives to Implicit Mindreading

According to the BD-model of mindreading, we primarily understand others in terms of beliefs and desires. In this article we review a number of objections against explicit versions of the BD-model, and discuss the prospects of using its implicit counterpart as an explanatory model of early emerging socio-cognitive abilities. Focusing on recent findings on so-called ‘implicit’ false belief understanding, we put forward a number of considerations against the adoption of an implicit BD-model. Finally, we explore a different way to make sense of implicit false belief understanding in terms of keeping track of affordances

Geest, lichaam en materie

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Understanding the Coordinative Function of Stylistic Conventions

Anthropological literature on culture shock assigns a social-coordinative function to stylistic conventions such as etiquette and dress codes. In the philosophical literature on the connection between conventions and coordination, however, it is frequently claimed that stylistic conventions do not solve coordination problems, conceived of as situations of interdependent decision making that can be modelled in game theoretical terms. I argue that the debate on conventions and coordination nevertheless provides tools for understanding how and why stylistic conventions serve a coordinative purpose. Some coordination games allow for stable equilibria only by means of public signals that are external to a game, known as correlation devices. I argue that such devices come in different kinds. In complementary coordination games, primary coordination devices allow for rules that specify role-divisions, while secondary correlation devices make existing role-divisions cognitively tractable. Stylistic conventions can be interpreted as correlation devices of the latter kind. We share etiquette and dress codes as secondary correlation devices that highlight who plays which role, which transactions in role-interactions transpire, and where specific role-interactions can be expected to take place

Why Functional Properties can be Emergent : An Argument against Kim

Slors Marc. Why Functional Properties can be Emergent : An Argument against Kim . In: Intellectica. Revue de l'Association pour la Recherche Cognitive, n°25, 1997/2. Emergence and explanation. pp. 59-65

What is a cognitive ontology, anyway?

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