Social referencing and social appraisal: commentary on the Clément and Dukes (2016) and Walle et al. (2016) articles

We comment on two articles on social referencing and social appraisal. We agree with Walle, Reschke, and Knothe’s (2017) argument that at one level of analysis, social referencing and social appraisal are functionally equivalent: In both cases, another person’s emotional expression is observed and this expression informs the observer’s own emotional reactions and behavior. However, we also agree with Clément and Dukes’s (2017) view that (at another level of analysis), there is an important difference between social referencing and social appraisal. We also argue that they are likely to occur at different stages of emotion process

Parsing (malicious) pleasures:schadenfreude and gloating

We offer the first empirical comparison of the pleasure in seeing (i.e., schadenfreude) and in causing (i.e., gloating) others’ adversity. In Study 1, we asked participants to recall and report on an (individual or group) episode of pleasure that conformed to our formal definition of schadenfreude, gloating, pride, or joy, without reference to an emotion word. Schadenfreude and gloating were distinct in the situational features of the episode, participants’ appraisals of it, and their expressions of pleasure (e.g., smiling, boasting). In Study 2, we had participants imagine being in an (individual or group) emotion episode designed to fit our conceptualization of schadenfreude or gloating. Individual and group versions of the emotions did not differ much in either study. However, the two pleasures differed greatly in their situational features, appraisals, experience, and expression. This parsing of the particular pleasures of schadenfreude and gloating brings nuance to the study of (malicious) pleasure, which tends to be less finely conceptualized and examined than displeasure despite its importance to social relations

Improving the effectiveness of intergroup apologies: the role of apology content and moral emotions

We report three studies reported in which we examined how changing the content of an intergroup apology affects how the apology is received. In Study 1, we investigated how emphasizing structural, relational, or identity-related factors influenced reactions to an apology from a large group, a small group, and from an individual. There was limited evidence that these apology variations affected the way in which the two group apologies were received, but there were large differences in the individual apology condition, where the influence of these factors was mediated by perceptions of the transgressor. In Studies 2 and 3, we combined all three apology factors into an apology from a large group, comparing this with a control condition in which none of these factors was included. We also manipulated the expression of remorse (Study 2) and of shame and guilt (Study 3) emotion in the apology. Including the apology factors increased forgiveness, an effect again mediated by perceptions of the transgressor. Higher expression of remorse, guilt, and (especially) shame also increased forgiveness, relative to control conditions. The implications for enhancing the effectiveness of intergroup apologies are discussed

“Fury, us”: Anger as a basis for new group self-categories

We tested the hypothesis that shared emotions, notably anger, influence the formation of new self-categories. We first measured participants' (N = 89) emotional reactions to a proposal to make university assessment tougher before providing feedback about the reactions of eight other co-present individuals. This feedback always contained information about the other individuals' attitudes to the proposals (four opposed and four not opposed) and in the experimental condition emotion information (of those opposed, two were angry, two were sad). Participants self-categorised more with, and preferred to work with, angry rather than sad targets, but only when participants' own anger was high. These findings support the idea that emotions are a potent determinant of self-categorisation, even in the absence of existing, available self-categories

Admiration regulates social hierarchy:Antecedents, dispositions, and effects on intergroup behavior

In four studies, we report evidence that admiration affects intergroup behaviors that regulate social hierarchy. We demonstrate that manipulating the legitimacy of status relations affects admiration for the dominant and that this emotion negatively predicts political action tendencies aimed at social change. In addition, we show that greater warmth and competence lead to greater admiration for an outgroup, which in turn positively predicts deferential behavior and intergroup learning. We also demonstrate that, for those with a disposition to feel admiration, increasing admiration for an outgroup decreases willingness to take political action against that outgroup. Finally, we show that when the object of admiration is a subversive “martyr,” admiration positively predicts political action tendencies and behavior aimed at challenging the status quo. These findings provide the first evidence for the important role of admiration in regulating social hierarchy

Educationism and the irony of meritocracy: negative attitudes of higher educated people towards the less educated

Social psychology has studied ethnic, gender, age, national, and other social groups but has neglected education-based groups. This is surprising given the importance of education in predicting people’s life outcomes and social attitudes. We study whether and why people evaluate education-based in-groups and out-groups differently. In contrast with popular views of the higher educated as tolerant and morally enlightened, we find that higher educated participants show education-based intergroup bias: They hold more negative attitudes towards less educated people than towards highly educated people. This is true both on direct measures (Studies 1-2) and on more indirect measures (Studies 3-4). The less educated do not show such education-based intergroup bias. In Studies 5-7 we investigate attributions regarding a range of disadvantaged groups. Less educated people are seen as more responsible and blameworthy for their situation, as compared to poor people or working class people. This shows that the psychological consequences of social inequality are worse when they are framed in terms of education rather than income or occupation. Finally, meritocracy beliefs are related to higher ratings of responsibility and blameworthiness, indicating that the processes we study are related to ideological beliefs. The findings are discussed in light of the role that education plays in the legitimization of social inequality

Antecedents and Consequences of Group-Based Guilt: The Effects of Ingroup Identification

Effects of ingroup identification on antecedents and consequences of group-based guilt were examined in two experiments. In the first study, ingroup identification was unrelated to guilt when the negative historical information was said to come from an outgroup source, but was positively related when the same information was said to come from an ingroup source. Among high identifiers it is difficult to dismiss negative information when the source is one's own ingroup. In the second study, people who are low in identification were more in favor of acknowledging the negative aspects of their group's history as a way of alleviating feelings of guilt. We discuss the implications of these results for coming to terms with the legacy of a negative ingroup past