Innovation Contests with Entry Auction

We consider procurement of an innovation from heterogeneous sellers. Innovations are random but depend on unobservable effort and private information. We compare two procurement mechanisms where potential sellers first bid in an auction for admission to an innovation contest. After the contest, an innovation is procured employing either a fixed prize or a first-price auction. We characterize Bayesian Nash equilibria such that both mechanisms are payoff-equivalent and induce the same efforts and innovations. In these equilibria, signaling in the entry auction does not occur since contestants play a simple strategy that does not depend on rivals' private information

Leading-effect vs. Risk-taking in Dynamic Tournaments: Evidence from a Real-life Randomized Experiment

Two 'order effects' may emerge in dynamic tournaments with information feedback. First, participants adjust effort across stages, which could advantage the leading participant who faces a larger 'effective prize' after an initial victory (leading-effect). Second, participants lagging behind may increase risk at the final stage as they have 'nothing to lose' (risk-taking). We use a randomized natural experiment in professional two-game soccer tournaments where the treatment (order of a stage-specific advantage) and team characteristics, e.g. ability, are independent. We develop an identification strategy to test for leading-effects controlling for risk-taking. We find no evidence of leading-effects and negligible risk-taking effects

Best-of-Three Contests: Experimental Evidence

We conduct an experimental analysis of a best-of-three Tullock contest. Intermediate prizes lead to higher efforts, while increasing the role of luck (as opposed to effort) leads to lower efforts. Both intermediate prizes and luck reduce the probability of contest ending in two rounds. The patterns of players‟ efforts and the probability that a contest ends in two rounds is consistent with „strategic momentum‟, i.e. momentum generated due to strategic incentives inherent in the contest. We do not find evidence for „psychological momentum‟, i.e. momentum which emerges when winning affects players‟ confidence. Similar to previous studies of contests, we find significantly higher efforts than predicted and strong heterogeneity in effort between subjects

On Environmental Regulation of Oligopolies: Emission versus Performance Standards

By specializing Montero’s (J Environ Econ Manag 44:23–44, 2002) model of environmental regulation under Cournot competition to an oligopoly with linear demand and quadratic abatement costs, we extend his comparison of firms incentives to invest in R&D under emission and performance standards by solving for a closed form solution of the underlying two-stage game. This allows for a full comparison of the two instruments in terms of their resulting propensity for R&D and equilibrium industry output. In addition, we incorporate an equilibrium welfare analysis. Finally, we investigate a three-stage game wherein a welfare-maximizing regulator sets a socially optimal emission cap under each policy instrument. For the latter game, while closed-form solutions for the subgame-perfect equilibrium are not possible, we establish numerically that the resulting welfare is always larger under a performance standard

Tradable Pollution Permits and the Regulatory Game

This paper analyzes polluters\u27 incentives to move from a traditional command and control (CAC) environmental regulatory regime to a tradable permits (TPP) regime. Existing work in environmental economics does not model how firms contest and bargain over actual regulatory implementation in CAC regimes, and therefore fail to compare TPP regimes with any CAC regime that is actually observed. This paper models CAC environmental regulation as a bargaining game over pollution entitlements. Using a reduced form model of the regulatory contest, it shows that CAC regulatory bargaining likely generates a regulatory status quo under which firms with the highest compliance costs bargain for the smallest pollution reductions, or even no reduction at all. As for a tradable permits regime, it is shown that all firms are better off under such a regime than they would be under an idealized CAC regime that set and enforced a uniform pollution standard, but permit sellers (low compliance cost firms) may actually be better off under a TPP regime with relaxed aggregate pollution levels. Most importantly, because high cost firms (or facilities) are the most weakly regulated in the equilibrium under negotiated or bargained CAC regimes, they may be net losers in a proposed move to a TPP regime. When equilibrium costs under a TPP regime are compared with equilibrium costs under a status quo CAC regime, several otherwise paradoxical aspects of firm attitudes toward TPP type reforms can be explained. In particular, the otherwise paradoxical pattern of allowances awarded under Phase II of the 1990 Clean Air Act\u27s acid rain program, a pattern tending to favor (in Phase II) cleaner, newer generating units, is explained by the fact that under the status quo regime, a kind of bargained CAC, it was the newer cleaner units that were regulated, and which therefore had higher marginal control costs than did the largely unregulated older, plants. As a normative matter, the analysis here implies that the proper baseline for evaluating TPP regimes such as those contained in the Bush Administration\u27s recent Clear Skies initiative is not idealized, but nonexistent CAC regulatory outcomes, but rather the outcomes that have resulted from the bargaining game set up by CAC laws and regulations