That Some of Sol Lewitt's Later Wall Drawings Aren't Wall Drawings

Sol LeWitt is probably most famous for wall drawings. They are an extension of work he had done in sculpture and on paper, in which a simple rule specifies permutations and variations of elements. With wall drawings, the rule is given for marks to be made on a wall. We should distinguish these algorithmic works from impossible-to-implement instruction works and works realized by following preparatory sketches. Taking the core feature of a wall drawing to be that it is algorithmic, some of LeWitt's later works are wall drawings in name only

Science, Values, and the Priority of Evidence

It is now commonly held that values play a role in scientific judgment, but many arguments for that conclusion are limited. First, many arguments do not show that values are, strictly speaking, indispensable. The role of values could in principle be filled by a random or arbitrary decision. Second, many arguments concern scientific theories and concepts which have obvious practical consequences, thus suggesting or at least leaving open the possibility that abstruse sciences without such a connection could be value-free. Third, many arguments concern the role values play in inferring from evidence, thus taking evidence as given. This paper argues that these limitations do not hold in general. There are values involved in every scientific judgment. They cannot even conceivably be replaced by a coin toss, they arise as much for exotic as for practical sciences, and they are at issue as much for observation as for explicit inference

Distributed Cognition and the Task of Science

This paper gives a characterization of distributed cognition (d-cog) and explores ways that the framework might be applied in studies of science. I argue that a system can only be given a d-cog description if it is thought of as performing a task. Turning our attention to science, we can try to give a global d-cog account of science or local d-cog accounts of particular scientific projects. Several accounts of science can be seen as global d-cog accounts: Robert Merton\u27s sociology of scientific norms, Philip Kitcher\u27s 20th-century account of cognitive labor, and Kitcher\u27s 21st-century notion of well-ordered science. Problems that arise for them arise just because of the way that they attribute a function to science. The paper concludes by considering local d-cog accounts. Here, too, the task is the crux of the matter

Miracles, Trust, and Ennui in Barnes’ Predictivism

Eric Barnes’ The Paradox of Predictivism is concerned primarily with two facts: predictivism and pluralism. In the middle part of the book, he peers through these two lenses at the tired realist scarecrow of the no-miracles argument. He attempts to reanimate this weatherworn realist argument, contra suggestions by people like me that it should be abandoned. In this paper, I want to get clear on Barnes’ contribution to the debate. He focuses on what he calls the miraculous endorsement argument, which explains not the success of a specific theory but instead the history of successes for an entire research program. The history of successes is explained by reliable and improving methods, which are the flipside of approximately true background theories. Yet, as Barnes notes, the whole story must begin with methods that are at least minimally reliable. Barnes demands that the realist explain the origin of the minimally reliable take-off point, and he suggests a way that the realist might do so. I contend that his explanation still relies on contingent developments and so fails to completely explain the development of take-off theories. However, this line of argument digs into familiar details of the no-miracles argument and overlooks what’s new in Barnes’ approach. By calling attention to pluralism, he reminds us that we need an account of scientific expertise. This is important, I suggest, because expertise is not indefinite. We do not trust specific experts for everything, but only for things within the bounds of their expertise. Drawing these boundaries relies on our own background theories and is only likely to be reliable if our background theories are approximately true. I argue, then, that pluralism gives us reason to be realists

Judging Covers

Cover versions form a loose but identifiable category of tracks and performances. We distinguish four kinds of covers and argue that they mark important differences in the modes of evaluation that are possible or appropriate for each: mimic covers, which aim merely to echo the canonical track; rendition covers, which change the sound of the canonical track; transformative covers, which diverge so much as to instantiate a distinct, albeit derivative song; and referential covers, which not only instantiate a distinct song, but for which the new song is in part about the original song. In order to allow for the very possibility of transformative and referential covers, we argue that a cover is characterized by relation to a canonical track rather than merely by being a new instance of a song that had been recorded previousl

Synchronization of One Dimensional Array of Point Josephson Junctions Coupled to a Common Load

We study the synchronization in a one dimensional array of point Josephson junctions coupled to a common capacitor, which establishes a long-range interaction between junctions and synchronizes them. The stability diagram of synchronization in a noise-free system is obtained. The current when junctions transform from resistive state into superconducting state, is then calculated and its dependence on the shunt parameters and the dissipation of junctions is revealed. In the presence of thermal noise, the synchronized oscillations are destroyed at a critical temperature and the system undergoes a continuous phase transition of desynchronization. A possible stability diagram of the synchronized oscillations with respect to thermal noise, current, dissipations and shunt capacitance is then constructed. Finally we investigate the dynamic relaxation from random oscillations into synchronized state. The relaxation time increases with the system size and temperature, but is reduced by the shunt capacitor.Comment: 11.2 pages, 14 figure

forall x (UBC Edition)

This is an open-access introductory logic textbook, prepared by Jonathan Ichikawa, based on P.D. Magnus's forallx. This (v2.0, July 2020) is intended as a stable, ready-for-teaching edition

On the fundamental group of the complement of a complex hyperplane arrangement

We construct two combinatorially equivalent line arrangements in the complex projective plane such that the fundamental groups of their complements are not isomorphic. The proof uses a new invariant of the fundamental group of the complement to a line arrangement of a given combinatorial type with respect to isomorphisms inducing the canonical isomorphism of the first homology groups.Comment: 12 pages, Latex2e with AMSLaTeX 1.2, no figures; this last version is almost the same as published in Functional Analysis and its Applications 45:2 (2011), 137-14

Breathers in the weakly coupled topological discrete sine-Gordon system

Existence of breather (spatially localized, time periodic, oscillatory) solutions of the topological discrete sine-Gordon (TDSG) system, in the regime of weak coupling, is proved. The novelty of this result is that, unlike the systems previously considered in studies of discrete breathers, the TDSG system does not decouple into independent oscillator units in the weak coupling limit. The results of a systematic numerical study of these breathers are presented, including breather initial profiles and a portrait of their domain of existence in the frequency-coupling parameter space. It is found that the breathers are uniformly qualitatively different from those found in conventional spatially discrete systems.Comment: 19 pages, 4 figures. Section 4 (numerical analysis) completely rewritte

No Grist for Mill on Natural Kinds

According to the standard narrative, natural kind is a technical notion that was introduced by John Stuart Mill in the 1840s and the recent craze for natural kinds, launched by Putnam and Kripke, is a continuation of that tradition. I argue that the standard narrative is mistaken. The Millian tradition of kinds was not particularly influential in the 20th century, and the Putnam-Kripke revolution did not clearly engage with even the remnants that were left of it. The presently active tradition of natural kinds is less than half a century old. Recognizing this might help us better appreciate both Mill and natural kinds